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Abstract
Market impact is the effect caused by transactions that can move asset prices.
Nash equilibria describe an optimal state for the players in a non-cooperative
game. In this thesis, we combine these two concepts to analyze the competing
behavior of two or more large traders in a financial market.
We first consider n risk-averse agents who compete for liquidity in an
Almgren–Chriss market impact model. Mathematically, this situation can
be described by a Nash equilibrium for a certain linear-quadratic differential
game with state constraints. The state constraints enter the problem as ter-
minal boundary conditions for finite and infinite time horizons. We prove
existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria and give closed-form solutions in
some special cases. We also analyze qualitative properties of the equilibrium
strategies and provide corresponding financial interpretations.
Motivated by the observation that high-frequency traders may use oscil-
latory trading strategies, which result in a “hot-potato game”, we propose
quadratic transaction costs in order to make the market more stable and effi-
cient. We identify a critical value for the size of the transaction costs, above
which all oscillations disappear and strategies become buy-only or sell-only.
Numerical simulations show that for both traders the expected costs can be
lower with transaction costs than without. The liquidation costs can increase
with trading frequency when there are no transaction costs, but decrease with
trading frequency when transaction costs are sufficiently high.
Moreover, we extend this model in several aspects including incorporation
of permanent impact, unequal splitting of combined liquidation costs, opti-
mal closed-loop strategies, and we introduce a continuous-time version of the
model. In particular, we prove that a Nash equilibrium for continuous-time
strategies exists only if the transaction costs are exactly equal to a critical
value. For the nonexistence of optimal strategies we give intuitive and math-
ematical explanations.

Zusammenfassung
Markteinfluss wird durch Transaktionen verursacht, die Vermo¨genspreise vera¨-
ndern ko¨nnen. Nash-Gleichgewichte beschreiben einen optimalen Zustand in
einem nichtkooperativen Spiel fu¨r mehrere Spieler. In dieser Arbeit kombinie-
ren wir diese zwei U¨berlegungen, um das Wettbewerbsverhalten von zwei oder
mehreren großen Ha¨ndlern in einem Finanzmarkt zu analysieren.
Zuna¨chst betrachten wir n risikoaverse Agenten, die in einem Almgren–
Chriss Markteinflussmodell um Liquidita¨t konkurrieren. Mathematisch kann
diese Situation durch ein Nash-Gleichgewicht fu¨r ein linear-quadratisches Dif-
ferenzialspiel mit Zustandsbeschra¨nkungen beschrieben werden. Die Zustands-
beschra¨nkungen liefern Randbedingungen fu¨r endliche und unendliche Zeitho-
rizonte an. Wir beweisen die Existenz und Eindeutigkeit des Nash-Gleichgewic-
hts und geben die Lo¨sung in geschlossener Form in einigen Sonderfa¨llen an.
Wir analysieren auch qualitative Eigenschaften der Gleichgewichtsstrategien
und geben entsprechende finanzielle Interpretationen an.
Anschließend beobachten wir, dass Hochfrequenzha¨ndler oszillierende Hand-
lungsstrategien verwenden, die ein “hot-potato game”verursachen ko¨nnen. Mo-
tiviert durch diese Beobachtung schlagen wir quadratische Transaktionskosten
vor, damit der Markt an Stabilita¨t und Effizienz gewinnen kann. Wir bestim-
men einen kritischen Wert fu¨r die Gro¨ße der Transaktionskosten, oberhalb de-
rer alle Oszillationen verschwinden und alle Handelsstrategien nur aus Ka¨ufen
oder Verka¨ufen bestehen. Nummerische Simulationen zeigen, dass die erwarte-
ten Liquidationskosten mit Transaktionskosten fu¨r beide Ha¨ndler niedriger als
ohne Transaktionskosten sein ko¨nnen. Außerdem erho¨hen sich die Liquidati-
onskosten mit der Handelsfrequenz, wenn keine Transaktionskosten existieren
und umgekehrt genauso, wenn die Transaktionskosten ausreichend hoch sind.
Daru¨ber hinaus erweitern wir dieses Modell um mehrere Aspekte: den Ein-
bau von permanentem Preiseinfluss, eine ungleiche Aufteilung von kombinier-
ten Liquidationskosten und optimale closed-loop Strategien. Wir leiten auch
eine zeitstetige Version des Modells ab. Insbesondere zeigen wir, dass ein Nash-
Gleichgewicht fu¨r zeitstetige Strategien nur dann existiert, wenn die Transak-
tionskosten genau gleich dem kritischen Wert entsprechen. Zur Nichtexistenz
von optimalen Strategien fu¨hren wir sowohl intuitive als auch mathematische
Erkla¨rungen an.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Overview
In financial markets, market impact is the effect on asset prices that a market participant
causes when buying or selling an asset. The transaction moves the price against the
buyer or seller, i.e., upward when buying and downward when selling. Market impact is
closely related to market liquidity. In many cases “liquidity” and “market impact” are
used synonymously. In classical financial market models, markets are usually assumed
to be frictionless with infinite liquidity. This assumption works well if trading volumes
are small and trading actions do not affect asset prices. However, if trading volumes are
sufficiently large, they do impact asset prices. A common observation is that for large
execution it is more efficient to split orders into several smaller orders and spread them
over a certain time horizon. The problem of how to split and spread orders in an optimal
way to minimize liquidation costs is known as optimal execution problem.
A first model for optimal execution was introduced by Bertsimas and Lo [1998]. Dy-
namic discrete-time optimal trading strategies which minimize the expected cost of trading
a large block of equity over a fixed time horizon is studied. Almgren and Chriss [1999,
2000] determine optimal trading strategies for liquidation of a large single-asset portfolio
to minimize a combination of volatility risk and market impact costs. Its continuous-time
variant is studied by Almgren [2003]. In all these models, market impact is described by
temporary and permanent impact. Temporary impact affects only the individual trade
that has triggered it, which affects only the current trade and does not last, while perma-
nent impact affects all current and future trades equally and does not change until new
large trading comes or new information is revealed. However, only considering temporary
and permanent impact may dismiss some features of market impact, especially when the
trading time scale is finer. One observes that price impact can be neither temporary nor
permanent, but transient. That is, each order triggers immediate price impact which then
gradually decays over time. A first quantitative model for transient impact is proposed
by Obizhaeva and Wang [2013]. In that work, orders are assumed to be block-shaped
and the transient impact is identified by exponential resilience, which is linear in the size
of the orders. The optimal strategies which minimize the expected execution costs for
buying a target position of shares are given explicitly. This model is further extended
by Alfonsi et al. [2008], Alfonsi et al. [2010], Alfonsi and Schied [2010], Gatheral [2010],
Gatheral et al. [2012] and Alfonsi et al. [2012]. We refer to Gatheral and Schied [2013]
and Lehalle [2013] for recent surveys on the price impact literature.
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On the other hand, there are usually more than one agent generating market impact
in a financial market. In a competing situation each of these agents will try to maximize
their own liquidation payoff or utility. Therefore, each agent must optimize their trading
strategy by taking into account the market impact caused by the other agents. A nature
question is whether there exists a stable point at which each agent maximizes their payoff
or utility given the strategies of the other agents. This leads to consider a Nash equilibrium,
see Nash et al. [1950], Nash [1951], the most commonly used concept in a non-cooperative
or competing game to analyze the outcome of the strategic interaction of multiple players.
In a Nash equilibrium no player can benefit by changing strategies while the other players
keep theirs unchanged.
There are several previous works in this area. Brunnermeier and Pedersen [2005]
discuss predatory trading by analyzing optimal strategies in Nash equilibria. They find
that if a trader has to liquidate a large position of an asset, other strategic traders may
take advantage by knowing this. For example, one agent will short sell an asset and then
buy back to gain an arbitrage profit if this agent knows that a large position of this asset
is being sold, since large liquidation usually pulls down asset price. Carlin et al. [2007]
also find this phenomenon by applying an Almgren–Chriss market impact model for risk-
neutral agents who have the same liquidation time horizon. In this modeling framework
equilibrium strategies are given explicitly by linear combinations of exponential functions.
This model is further extended by Scho¨neborn and Schied [2009]. There competitors are
allowed to have a longer time horizon than the seller who has a large liquidation. It is
found that depending on market conditions, there is either predatory trading or liquidity
provision in Nash equilibria. By extending the model of Obizhaeva and Wang [2013] for
two competing agents, Scho¨neborn [2008] observes that the equilibrium strategies can
exhibit strong oscillations in both of open-loop and closed-loop models. An intuitive
reason for the oscillatory strategies is to protect against possible predatory trading by the
other agent.
Furthermore, Moallemi et al. [2012] consider a dynamic game for one seller and one
predator with asymmetric information. An algorithm for computing perfect Bayesian
equilibrium is presented. Carmona and Yang [2011] use numerical methods to analyze
a system of coupled HJB equations arising from a closed-loop Nash equilibrium for two
utility-maximizing agents. Using a mean field game approach, Carmona and Webster
[2012] analyze Nash equilibria for an infinite player problem and Lachapelle et al. [2013]
consider a stochastic market impact model for institutional investors and high frequency
traders.
1.2 Statement of results
In this thesis we consider Nash equilibria in two main types of market impact models.
The main goal is to determine the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria and to
analyze the properties of optimal strategies. In Chapter 2 we study n risk-averse agents
who compete for liquidity in an Almgren-Chriss market impact model. In Chapter 3
we analyze a Nash equilibrium between two high-frequency traders in a simple market
impact model with transient price impact and additional quadratic transaction costs. In
the following we state the main results of this thesis.
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Chapter 2
We consider a standard continuous-time Almgren and Chriss [2000] framework for n
investors who are active over a fixed time period or an infinite time horizon. We prove
the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria and give closed-form solutions in some
special cases. We also analyze qualitative properties of the equilibrium strategies and
provide corresponding financial interpretations. This chapter is based on Schied and
Zhang [2013b].
In Section 2.1, we assume that n investors are active over a fixed time period [0, T ]. The
trading strategy employed by the i-th investor is denoted byXi = (Xi(t))t∈[0,T ] ∈ X (xi, T ),
where X (xi, T ) denotes the class of all admissible strategies with an initial value xi. When
the n investors use the respective strategies X1, . . . , Xn, the price process is given by
SX1,...,Xn(t) := S0(t) + γ
n∑
j=1
(Xj(t)−Xj(0)) + λ
n∑
j=1
X˙j(t), t ∈ [0, T ],
where S0 follows a Bachelier model with an extra drift b,
S0(t) = S0 + σW (t) +
∫ t
0
b(s) ds.
We analyze open-loop Nash equilibria for mean-variance optimization and constant abso-
lute risk aversion (CARA) utility maximization.
Definition. Suppose that n ∈ N, x1, . . . , xn ∈ R are initial asset positions, and that
α1, . . . , αn are nonnegative coefficients of risk aversion.
• A Nash equilibrium for mean-variance optimization consists of a collection X∗1 , . . . , X∗n
of deterministic strategies such that for each i andX∗−i = {X∗1 , . . . , X∗i−1, X∗i+1, . . . , X∗n}
the strategy X∗i ∈ Xdet(xi, T ) maximizes the mean-variance functional
E[R(X|X∗−i) ]−
αi
2
var(R(X|X∗−i)).
• A Nash equilibrium for CARA utility maximization consists of a collection X∗1 , . . . , X∗n
of admissible strategies such that for each i the strategy X∗i ∈ X (xi, T ) maximizes
the expected utility
E[uαi(R(X|X∗−i)) ]
over all X ∈ X (xi, T ).
We then derive the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria for mean-variance
optimization.
Result (Theorem 2.1.2). For given n ∈ N, α1, . . . , αn ≥ 0, and x1, . . . , xn there exists
a unique Nash equilibrium X∗1 , . . . , X
∗
n for mean-variance optimization. It is given as the
unique solution of the following second-order system of differential equations
αiσ
2Xi(t)− 2λX¨i(t) = b(t) + γ
∑
j 6=i
X˙j(t) + λ
∑
j 6=i
X¨j(t),
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with two-point boundary conditions
Xi(0) = xi and Xi(T ) = 0
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
This result is one of the main contributions of this thesis. We see that this situation
can be described by a linear-quadratic differential game with state constraints. The state
constraints enter the problem as terminal boundary conditions. To prove this result, we
first show by way of contradiction that there exists at most one Nash equilibrium for mean-
variance optimization. Then we show that in a Nash equilibrium, each strategy must be
a solution of a second order differential equation with boundary conditions if they are
sufficiently smooth. The proof is completed by showing the existence of a solution to be
an n-dimensional two-point boundary value problem. As a consequence, we also show that
the Nash equilibrium for mean-variance optimization is also a Nash equilibrium for CARA
utility maximization. It follows as in Schied et al. [2010] that each Nash equilibrium in
the class of deterministic strategies is also a Nash equilibrium in the class of adaptive
strategies.
If the risk aversions of the n investors are identical and there is no price drift, we
obtain a closed form of the optimal strategies in a Nash equilibrium.
Result (Theorem 2.1.8). Assume that α1 = · · · = αn = α > 0 and b = 0. We define
θ± =
γ ±√γ2 + 4ασ2λ
2λ
and ρ± = − (n− 1)γ
2(n+ 1)λ
± ρ̂
for
ρ̂ =
√
(n− 1)2γ2 + 4(n+ 1)ασ2λ
2(n+ 1)λ
.
Then the ith equilibrium strategy X∗i is of the form
X∗i (t) = ci(θ+)e
θ+t + ci(θ−)eθ−t + c(ρ+)eρ+t + c(ρ−)eρ−t,
where, for xn :=
1
n
∑n
j=1 xj,
ci(θ+) =
xn − xi
e2θ̂T − 1 , ci(θ−) =
−(xn − xi)
1− e−2θ̂T , c(ρ+) =
−xn
e2ρ̂T − 1 , c(ρ−) =
xn
1− e−2ρ̂T .
Moreover, Σ(t) =
∑n
i=1X
∗
i (t), which solves the two-point boundary value problem (2.20),
is given by
Σ(t) =
nxn
2 sinh(ρ̂T )
(
eρ̂T eρ−t − e−ρ̂T eρ+t
)
.
This result can be further simplified if n = 2. For this case, we give numerical simu-
lations and qualitative discussion.
In Section 2.2, we consider the infinite time case. To simplify the discussion, we assume
that the drift b vanishes. The following result is on the existence and uniqueness of Nash
equilibria for mean-variance optimization.
Result (Theorem 2.2.2). Suppose that one of the following two conditions holds:
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1. n ∈ N is arbitrary and α1 = · · · = αn = α > 0;
2. n = 2 and α1, α2 are distinct and strictly positive.
Then for all x1, . . . , xn ∈ R there exists a unique Nash equilibrium for mean-variance
optimization with infinite time horizon, which is also a Nash equilibrium for CARA utility
maximization.
In case 1 the optimal strategies are given by
X∗i (t) = (xi − xn)eθ−t + xneρ−t,
where xn =
1
n
∑n
j=1 xj; ρ− and θ− are as in (2.22).
In case 2 the fourth-order equation
τ 4 − 2γ
3λ
τ 3 − γ
2 + 2λσ2(α1 + α2)
3λ2
τ 2 +
σ4α1α2
3λ2
= 0
has precisely two distinct strictly negative roots, τ1, τ2, and the equilibrium strategies X
∗
1 (t)
and X∗2 (t) are linear combinations of the exponential functions e
τ1t and eτ2t.
We also prove that the optimal strategies X
(T )
1 , . . . , X
(T )
n in a Nash equilibrium of
finite time period [0, T ] are convergent to the optimal strategies for infinite time horizon
as T ↑ ∞. Finally we discuss some qualitative properties of Nash equilibria on predatory
trading.
Chapter 3
Following the observation by the report CFTC-SEC [2010] and Scho¨neborn [2008], we first
consider a straightforward two-agent extension of the market impact model of Obizhaeva
and Wang [2013] and we call it primary model. Then we extend the primary model in
three aspects: incorporation of permanent impact, splitting of combined liquidation costs
and closed-loop strategies. Finally we analyze a continuous-time version of the primary
model.
Section 3.1 is based on Schied and Zhang [2013a]. In this section we assume that when
the two agents X and Y apply respective strategies ξ ∈ X (X0,T) and η ∈ X (Y0,T), the
asset price is given by
Sξ,ηt = S
0
t − λ
∑
tk<t
e−ρ(t−tk)(ξk + ηk),
where S0 is a martingale and X (Z0,T) denotes the class of all admissible strategies in T
with an initial value Z0. Under this assumption, we observe that if one agent executes
its order, say ηk, immediately after the order, say ξk, of the other agent, this will result
in an additional cost term λξkηk for the slower agent. Assuming that none of the two
agents has an advantage in latency over the other, we define the liquidation costs and the
corresponding Nash equilibrium.
Definition. Suppose that T = {t0, t1, . . . , tN}, X0 and Y0 are given. Let furthermore
(εi)i=0,1,... be an i.i.d. sequence of Bernoulli (
1
2
)-distributed random variables that are in-
dependent of σ(
⋃
t≥0Ft). Then the liquidation costs of ξ ∈ X (X0,T) given η ∈ X (Y0,T)
6 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
are defined as
CT(ξ|η) = X0S00 +
N∑
k=0
(λ
2
ξ2k − Sξ,ηtk ξk + εkλξkηk + θξ2k
)
,
and the liquidation costs of η given ξ are
CT(η|ξ) = Y0S00 +
N∑
k=0
(λ
2
η2k − Sξ,ηtk ηk + (1− εk)λξkηk + θη2k
)
.
A Nash equilibrium is a pair (ξ∗,η∗) of strategies in X (X0,T)×X (Y0,T) such that
E[ CT(ξ∗|η∗) ] = inf
ξ∈X (X0,T)
E[ CT(ξ|η∗) ] and E[ CT(η∗|ξ∗) ] = inf
η∈X (Y0,T)
E[ CT(η|ξ∗) ].
Note that each trade ζk incurs quadratic transaction costs of the form θζ
2
k , where θ is
a nonnegative parameter.
Following this model setup, we derive the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria
in the class of adapted strategies.
Result (Theorem 3.1.6). Let ρ > 0, λ > 0, and θ ≥ 0 be given. For any time grid T and
initial values X0, Y0 ∈ R, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium (ξ∗,η∗) ∈ X (X0,T) ×
X (Y0,T). The optimal strategies ξ∗ and η∗ are deterministic and given by
ξ∗ =
1
2
(X0 + Y0)v +
1
2
(X0 − Y0)w,
η∗ =
1
2
(X0 + Y0)v − 1
2
(X0 − Y0)w,
where
v =
1
1>(λG+ λG˜+ 2θ Id)−11
(λG+ λG˜+ 2θ Id)−11,
w =
1
1>(λG− λG˜+ 2θ Id)−11(λG− λG˜+ 2θ Id)
−11.
To prove this result, first we show by way of contradiction that there exists at most one
Nash equilibrium in the class of adapted strategies. Then we show that a Nash equilibrium
in the class of deterministic strategies is also a Nash equilibrium in the class of adapted
strategies. Finally we find a unique Nash equilibrium of deterministic strategies.
In numerical simulations we find that optimal strategies in a Nash equilibrium exhibit
strong oscillations when there are no transaction costs. This phenomenon is also observed
by Scho¨neborn [2008, Section 9.3]. These oscillations can be interpreted as a of hedging
against predatory trading by the other agent.
Since oscillatory strategies are neither efficient nor stable, we suggest a critical value
of transaction costs in the following result such that all oscillations disappear completely
when transaction costs are above this critical value.
Result (Theorem 3.1.14). Suppose that λ, T > 0 and TN :=
{
kT
N
∣∣∣ k = 0, 1, . . . , N}.
Then the following conditions are equivalent.
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(a) For every N ∈ N and ρ > 0, all components of v are nonnegative.
(b) For every N ∈ N and ρ > 0, all components of w are nonnegative.
(c) θ ≥ θ∗ = λ/4.
The proof of this result is complex and relies on M-matrix and the corresponding
theorems in Berman and Plemmons [1994]. An astonishing fact is that, if both agents
have a same initial value, the expected liquidation costs for both agents are decreasing as
the trading frequency N increases if θ = θ∗, while the expected liquidation costs increase
if θ = 0. This observation indicates that the transaction costs lead not only smooth but
also efficient strategies.
In Section 3.2, we assume that when the two financial agents X and Y apply respective
strategies ξ and η, the asset prices are given by
Sξ,ηt = S
0
t − λ
∑
tk<t
e−ρ(t−tk)(ξk + ηk)− γ
∑
tk<t
(ξk + ηk).
The first two extensions we consider are incorporation of permanent impact and split-
ting of combined liquidation costs. We derive the existence and uniqueness of Nash
equilibria for these two extensions in the class of adapted strategies.
Result (Theorems 3.2.3 and 3.2.12). Given ρ > 0, λ > 0 and γ > 0. For any time
grid T and initial values X0, Y0 ∈ R, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium (ξ∗,η∗) ∈
X (X0,T)× X (Y0,T) in the class of adapted strategies. The optimal strategies ξ∗ and η∗
are deterministic.
In particular we also derive the critical value of transaction costs such that all oscil-
lations of optimal strategies disappear completely if permanent impact is present. We
see in the following result that permanent impact plays a similar role as transient impact
does in the interaction with transaction costs.
Result (Theorem 3.2.5). Given λ, T > 0 and TN :=
{
kT
N
∣∣∣ k = 0, 1, . . . , N}. The
following conditions are equivalent:
(a) for every N ∈ N and ρ > 0, all components of v are nonnegative,
(b) for every N ∈ N and ρ > 0, all components of w are nonnegative,
(c) θ ≥ θ∗ = (λ+ γ)/4,
where
v =
(
λG+ 2θ Id + λG˜− γH˜>
)−1
1
1>
(
λG+ 2θ Id + λG˜− γH˜>
)−1
1
, w =
(
λG˜> + 2θ Id + γH˜>
)−1
1
1>
(
λG˜> + 2θ Id + γH˜>
)−1
1
.
The last extension is the closed-loop model, in which for each execution time all
trades of the other agent at previous execution time will be considered. We use dynamic
programming to derive the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria.
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Result (Theorem 3.2.14). There exists a unique Nash equilibrium (ξ∗,η∗) in the class of
closed-loop strategies. At each execution time point tn, the optimal orders are linear in
remained asset positions Xn, Yn, and transient impact In, i.e.,
ξ∗n = A
X
n Xn +B
X
n Yn + C
X
n In, η
∗
n = A
Y
nXn +B
Y
n Yn + C
Y
n In.
The cost functionals of the Nash equilibrium (ξ∗,η∗) for n ∈ 0, 1, . . . , N are
JXn (Xn, Yn, In) =a
X
n X
2
n + b
X
n Y
2
n + c
X
n I
2
n + u
X
n XnYn + v
X
n XnIn + w
X
n YnIn + γ(X0 + Y0)Xn,
JYn (Xn, Yn, In) =a
Y
nX
2
n + b
Y
n Y
2
n + c
Y
n I
2
n + u
Y
nXnYn + v
Y
nXnIn + w
Y
n YnIn + γ(X0 + Y0)Yn.
All of the coefficients
AXn , B
X
n , C
X
n , a
X
n , b
X
n , c
X
n , u
X
n , v
X
n , w
X
n , A
Y
n , B
Y
n , C
Y
n , a
Y
n , b
Y
n , c
Y
n , u
Y
n , v
Y
n , w
Y
n ∈ R
can be recursively computed for each time tn, n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}.
In numerical simulations we observe that there exists certain cooperation between the
two agents in this closed-loop model.
In Section 3.3, we consider a continuous-time version of the primary model. When the
two agents X and Y are active, the price process is given by
SX,Yt = S
0
t + λ
∫
[0,t)
e−ρ(t−s) dXs + λ
∫
[0,t)
e−ρ(t−s) dYs.
This model is an extended version of the continuous-time model introduced in Gatheral
et al. [2012] with the exponential decay G(t) = e−ρt for two agents. This model can
also be regarded as a continuous-time version of the model introduced in Section 3.1 that
comes from Obizhaeva and Wang [2013] originally.
Through two different approaches, we obtain the following expression of liquidation
costs, which is consistent with the primary model.
Definition. Given initial asset positions x, y ∈ R and T > 0. The liquidation costs of
X ∈ X (x, [0, T ]) given Y ∈ X (y, [0, T ]) are defined as
C(X|Y ) = 1
2
∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,T ]
λe−ρ|t−s| dXs dXt +
∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,t)
λe−ρ(t−s) dYs dXt
+
λ
2
∑
t∈[0,T ]
∆Xt∆Yt + θ
∑
t∈[0,T ]
(∆Xt)
2,
and the liquidation costs of Y ∈ X (y, [0, T ]) given X ∈ X (x, [0, T ]) are defined as
C(Y |X) = 1
2
∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,T ]
λe−ρ|t−s| dYs dYt +
∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,t)
λe−ρ(t−s) dXs dYt
+
λ
2
∑
t∈[0,T ]
∆Xt∆Yt + θ
∑
t∈[0,T ]
(∆Yt)
2,
where X (z, [0, T ]) denotes the class of all admissible strategies in the time horizon [0, T ]
with an initial value z.
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We assume that each agent seeks to minimize their expected liquidation costs ac-
cordingly. In the following result, we prove that for any nontrivial case, a unique Nash
equilibrium exits if and only if the transaction costs are exactly equal to a critical value.
Result (Theorem 3.3.6). Given ρ > 0, λ > 0, T > 0 and x, y ∈ R with x 6= 0 or y 6= 0.
There exists a unique Nash equilibrium (X∗, Y ∗) in the class X (x, [0, T ]) × X (y, [0, T ])
of adapted strategies if and only if θ = λ/4. The optimal strategies X∗ and Y ∗ are
deterministic and given by
X∗t =
1
2
(x+ y)Vt +
1
2
(x− y)Wt,
Y ∗t =
1
2
(x+ y)Vt − 1
2
(x− y)Wt,
where
Vt =
e3ρT
(
6ρ(T − t) + 4)− 4e3ρt
2e3ρT (3ρT + 5)− 1 if t ∈ [0, T ], and V0− = 1,
Wt =
ρ(T − t) + 1
ρT + 1
if t ∈ [0, T ), and W0− = 1, WT = 0.
There are several steps to prove this result. First we derive an equivalent condition
for the optimality of a deterministic strategy X∗ given another deterministic strategy Y .
This condition helps us to find Nash equilibria in the class of deterministic strategies.
Then we find a Nash equilibrium in the class of deterministic strategies if the transaction
costs θ are exactly equal to λ/4. Then we show that this deterministic Nash equilibrium
is also a Nash equilibrium in the class of adapted strategies and it is unique. At last we
show by way of contradiction that there exists no Nash equilibrium in the class of adapted
strategies if θ 6= λ/4.
To understand this result intuitively, numerical simulations of the primary model
suggest that: when θ < θ∗, oscillatory strategies are not convergent to a continuous-time
strategy; when θ > θ∗, the components v and w are convergent to the functions V and
W . However, strategies consisting of V and W form a Nash equilibrium if and only if
θ = θ∗.
Following this observation, we take a review of the single-agent model, where the price
process is given by
St = S
0
t − λ
∑
tk<t
e−ρ(t−tk)ξk.
We prove that there is no optimal strategy minimizing the expected liquidation costs
E[C(X)] := E
[
1
2
(∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,T ]
λe−ρ|t−s| dXs dXt + 2θ
∑
t∈[0,T ]
(
∆Xt
)2)]
, θ > 0.
Result (Proposition 3.3.15, Corollary 3.3.16). Let h : [0,∞) → [0,∞) be a positive
definite decay kernel. If h(t) is continuous in (0,∞) but h(0) 6= limt↓0 h(t), then for all
strategies X ∈ Xdet(x, T ) there is no constant η ∈ R, such that X solves the generalized
Fredholm integral equation, ∫
[0,T ]
h(|t− s|) dXs = η.
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Particularly, given λ > 0, ρ > 0, T > 0, θ > 0 and an initial asset position x 6= 0, there
is no optimal strategy in the class Xdet(x, [0, T ]) of deterministic strategies.
The key point for the nonexistence of optimal strategies is that the decay kernel is
not continuous at t = 0 if θ > 0. In this case one would try to use continuous strategies
to approximate jumps infinitesimally to avoid the quadratic transaction costs incurred by
jumps. However it has been shown in Gatheral et al. [2012] that an optimal strategy X∗
with x 6= 0 must have jumps at t = 0 and t = T if θ = 0. These two conflicting situations
lead to the nonexistence of optimal strategies.
Chapter 2
A state-constrained differential game
in the Almgren-Chriss framework
We analyze a state-constrained differential game that arises for risk-averse economic agents
aiming to liquidate a given asset position by a given time T > 0. Agents face both price
impact and volatility risk. For a single agent there is hence a trade-off between slow
trading so as to reduce transaction costs from price impact and fast liquidation in view of
volatility risk. Beginning with Bertsimas and Lo [1998] and Almgren and Chriss [2000],
a large numbers of papers has recently been studying the corresponding single-agent
optimization problems in various settings; we refer to Lehalle [2013] and Gatheral and
Schied [2013] for recent overviews and more complete lists of references. The problem
becomes even more interesting when considering not just one but n agents who are aware
of each others initial positions, a situation that is not unlikely to occur in reality; see
Carlin et al. [2007] and Scho¨neborn and Schied [2009]. Together with Brunnermeier and
Pedersen [2005], these two papers were among the first to consider a corresponding game
theoretic approach, but only consider open-loop Nash equilibria for risk-neutral agents
applying deterministic strategies. Moallemi et al. [2012] give an extension to a model
with asymmetric information. Carmona and Yang [2011] use numerical simulations to
study a system of coupled HJB equations arising from a closed-loop Nash equilibrium
for two utility-maximizing agents. Lachapelle et al. [2013] apply mean-field games to
modeling the price formation process in the presence of high-frequency traders.
Here we consider agents maximizing a mean-variance functional in a continuous-time
Almgren and Chriss [2000] framework, which is a very common setup for portfolio liquida-
tion in practice. It leads to a linear-quadratic differential game, which has the interesting
additional feature of a terminal state constraint arising from the liquidation constraint
imposed in portfolio liquidation. This state constraint leads to two-point boundary prob-
lems in place of the usual initial value problems connected with unconstrained differential
games. Aside from the financial interpretation of our results, this chapter thus also con-
tributes a natural case study for a class of state-constrained differential games.
Our main results provide existence and uniqueness statements for the corresponding
Nash equilibria with both finite and infinite time horizon. In several cases we can also
give closed-form solutions of the equilibrium strategies. These formulas allow us to discuss
some qualitative properties of the Nash equilibrium. Some of these properties are surpris-
ing as they show that certain monotonicity properties that are discussed in the finance
literature may break down under certain market conditions. See Lebedeva et al. [2012]
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for discussions and for an empirical analysis of a large data set of portfolio liquidations
by large investors.
This chapter is based on Schied and Zhang [2013b] and is organized as follows. In Sub-
section 2.1.1 we recall some background material on portfolio liquidation in the Almgren-
Chriss framework. Existence, uniqueness, and representation results for Nash equilibria
with finite time horizon are stated in Subsection 2.1.2. Subsection 2.1.3 contains a discus-
sion of the qualitative properties of the corresponding two-player Nash equilibrium. Nash
equilibria with infinite time horizon are discussed in Section 2.2.
2.1 Nash equilibrium with finite time horizon
2.1.1 Background
We consider a standard continuous-time Almgren and Chriss [2000] framework for in-
vestors who are active over a fixed time period [0, T ]. An investor may hold an initial
position of x shares and is required to close this position by time T . The information flow
available to an investor is modeled by a filtration (Ft)t≥0 on a given probability space
(Ω,F ,P). The trading strategy employed by the investor is denoted by X = (X(t))t∈[0,T ].
It needs to satisfy the following conditions of admissibility:
• X satisfies the liquidation constraint X(T ) = 0;
• X is adapted to the filtration (Ft)t≥0;
• X is absolutely continuous in the sense that there exists a progressively measurable
process (X˙(t))t∈[0,T ] such that for all ω ∈ Ω,
∫ T
0
(X˙(t, ω))2 dt <∞ and
X(t, ω) = X(0, ω) +
∫ t
0
X˙(s, ω) ds, t ∈ [0, T ];
• there exists a constant c ≥ 0 such that |X(t, ω)| ≤ c for all t and ω.
The class of all strategies that are admissible in this sense and satisfy X(0) = x for
given x ∈ R will be denoted by X (x, T ). Let us also introduce the subclass Xdet(x, T ) of
all strategies in X (x, T ) that are deterministic in the sense that they do not depend on
ω.
The “unaffected price process” S0 describes the fluctuations of asset prices perceived
by an investor who has no inside information on large trades carried out by other market
participants during the time interval [0, T ]. In the Almgren–Chriss model it is usually
assumed that S0 follows a Bachelier model. Here we are sometimes also going to allow
for an extra drift to describe current price trends. Thus,
S0(t) = S0 + σW (t) +
∫ t
0
b(s) ds,
where S0 is a constant, W is a standard Brownian motion, σ ≥ 0, and b is deterministic
and continuous.
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When an investor is using the strategy X ∈ X (x, T ), the strategy X will influence the
prices at which assets are traded. In the linear Almgren–Chriss framework, one assumes
that the resulting price is given by
SX(t) := S0(t) + γ(X(t)−X(0)) + λX˙(t), t ∈ [0, T ], (2.1)
where the constants γ ≥ 0 and λ > 0 describe the respective permanent and temporary
price impact components. At each time t ∈ [0, T ], the infinitesimal amount of −X˙(t) dt
shares are sold at price SX(t). The total revenues generated by the strategy X ∈ X (x, T )
are therefore given by
R(X) := −
∫ T
0
X˙(t)SX(t) dt.
The optimal trade execution problem consists in maximizing a cost-risk functional of the
revenues over all admissible strategies in X (x, T ). One possibility is the maximization of
expected revenues,
maximize E[R(X) ] (2.2)
as considered in many paper on optimal execution and, with the notable exception of
Carmona and Yang [2011], all other papers dealing with corresponding Nash equilibria.
Bertsimas and Lo [1998] were among the first to propose this problem. In practice, it is
common to take into account the volatility risk arising from late execution by maximizing
a mean-variance criterion:
maximize E[R(X) ]− α
2
var (R(X)); (2.3)
here α is a nonnegative risk-aversion parameter. When dealing with the problem (2.3),
admissible strategies are usually restricted to the class Xdet(x, T ) of deterministic strate-
gies. Except for the results in Lorenz and Almgren [2011], little is known when general
adapted strategies are used in (2.3); to the knowledge of the authors, not even the exis-
tence of maximizers has been established to date. The main reason for this is the lack of
time consistency of the variance functional, which does not fit well into a context of dy-
namic optimization. On the other hand, Schied et al. [2010] show that the maximization
of (2.3) over deterministic strategies X ∈ Xdet(x, T ) is equivalent to the maximization of
the expected utility of revenues,
maximize E[uα(R(X)) ], (2.4)
over all strategies in X (x, T ) when
uα(x) :=
{
1
α
(1− e−αx) if α > 0,
x if α = 0;
(2.5)
is a CARA utility function with absolute risk aversion α ≥ 0. We refer to Lehalle [2013]
and Gatheral and Schied [2013] for recent overview on portfolio liquidation and related
issues of market microstructure.
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2.1.2 Mean-variance and CARA utility optimization
Now suppose that n investors are active in the market, using the respective strategies
X1, . . . , Xn. As in (2.1), each strategy Xi will impact the price process S
0, thus leading
to the following price with aggregated price impact:
SX1,...,Xn(t) := S0(t) + γ
n∑
j=1
(Xj(t)−Xj(0)) + λ
n∑
j=1
X˙j(t), t ∈ [0, T ]. (2.6)
Let us denote by X−i the collection X−i := {X1, . . . , Xi−1, Xi+1, . . . , Xn} of strategies of
all competitors of player i. Then player i will obtain the following revenues,
R(Xi|X−i) = −
∫ T
0
X˙i(t)S
X1,...,Xn(t) dt,
and seek to maximize one of the objective functionals (2.2), (2.3), or (2.4). A natural
question is whether there exists a Nash equilibrium in which each player maximizes their
objective functional given the strategies of their competitors. For the maximization of the
expected revenues and vanishing drift, this problem is solved in Carlin et al. [2007] within
the class of deterministic strategies. It is later extended in Scho¨neborn and Schied [2009]
to the case in which players have different time horizons and by Moallemi et al. [2012]
to a situation with asymmetric information. A system of coupled HJB equations arising
from a closed-loop Nash equilibrium for two utility-maximizing agents is studied through
numerical simulations by Carmona and Yang [2011]. Here we will now conduct a math-
ematical analysis of n-player open-loop Nash equilibria for mean-variance optimization
(2.3) and CARA utility maximization (2.4).
Definition 2.1.1. Suppose that n ∈ N, x1, . . . , xn ∈ R are initial asset positions, and
that α1, . . . , αn are nonnegative coefficients of risk aversion.
• A Nash equilibrium for mean-variance optimization consists of a collectionX∗1 , . . . , X∗n
of deterministic strategies such that for each i andX∗−i = {X∗1 , . . . , X∗i−1, X∗i+1, . . . , X∗n}
the strategy X∗i ∈ Xdet(xi, T ) maximizes the mean-variance functional
E[R(X|X∗−i) ]−
αi
2
var (R(X|X∗−i)).
• A Nash equilibrium for CARA utility maximization consists of a collectionX∗1 , . . . , X∗n
of admissible strategies such that for each i the strategy X∗i ∈ X (xi, T ) maximizes
the expected utility
E[uαi(R(X|X∗−i)) ]
over all X ∈ X (xi, T ).
Let Xi ∈ X (xi, T ) be given and write X−i := {X1, . . . , Xi−1, Xi+1, . . . , Xn} for i =
1, . . . , n. For Y ∈ X (y, T ) we note first that, after integrating by parts,
R(Y |X−i) = yS0 − γ
2
y2 +
∫ T
0
Y (t)
(
b(t) + γ
∑
j 6=i
X˙j(t)
)
dt
− λ
n∑
j 6=i
∫ T
0
Y˙ (t)X˙j(t) dt− λ
∫ T
0
Y˙ (t)2 dt+ σ
∫ T
0
Y (t) dW (t).
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When all Xi and Y are deterministic, it follows that
E[R(Y |X−i) ]− αi
2
var (R(Y |X−i)) = c+
∫ T
0
Li(t, Y (t), Y˙ (t)|X−i) dt, (2.7)
where c = yS0 − γ2y2 and the Lagrangian Li is given by
Li(t, q, p|X−i) = q
(
b(t) + γ
∑
j 6=i
X˙j(t)
)
− αiσ
2
2
q2 − λp
(∑
j 6=i
X˙j(t) + p
)
. (2.8)
Note that the equilibrium strategies X∗i for CARA utility maximization are allowed to
be adapted and maximize the expected utility within the entire class X (xi, T ), whereas,
for reasons explained above, only deterministic strategies are allowed in mean-variance
optimization. We start by formulating a general existence and uniqueness result for the
Nash equilibrium for mean-variance optimization.
Theorem 2.1.2. For given n ∈ N, α1, . . . , αn ≥ 0, and x1, . . . , xn there exists a unique
Nash equilibrium X∗1 , . . . , X
∗
n for mean-variance optimization. It is given as the unique
solution of the following second-order system of differential equations
αiσ
2Xi(t)− 2λX¨i(t) = b(t) + γ
∑
j 6=i
X˙j(t) + λ
∑
j 6=i
X¨j(t), (2.9)
with two-point boundary conditions
Xi(0) = xi and Xi(T ) = 0 (2.10)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
To prove Theorem 2.1.2, we need the following auxiliary lemmas.
Lemma 2.1.3. In the context of Theorem 2.1.2 there exists at most one Nash equilibrium
for mean-variance optimization.
Proof. We assume by way of contradiction that (X01 , . . . , X
0
n) and (X
1
0 , . . . , X
1
n) are two
distinct Nash equilibria with Xki ∈ X (xi, T ) for i = 1, . . . , n and k = 0, 1. For β ∈ [0, 1]
let Xβi := βX
1
i + (1− β)X0i and define
f(β) :=
n∑
i=1
∫ T
0
(
Li(t,Xβi (t), X˙βi (t)|X0−i) + Li(t,X1−βi (t), X˙1−βi (t)|X1−i)
)
dt.
By assumption, the strategyXki maximizes the functional Y 7→
∫ T
0
Li(t, Y (t), Y˙ (t)|Xk−i) dt
within the class Xdet(xi, T ) for k = 0, 1. We therefore must have f(β) ≤ f(0) for β > 0,
which implies that
d
dβ
∣∣∣
β=0
f(β) ≤ 0. (2.11)
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On the other hand, by interchanging differentiation and integration, which is permitted
due to our assumptions on admissible strategies and due to the linear-quadratic form of
the Lagrangian, a short computation shows that
d
dβ
∣∣∣
β=0
f(β)
=
n∑
i=1
∫ T
0
[
γ(X1i (t)−X0i (t))
n∑
j=1
(X˙0j (t)− X˙1j (t))− γ(X1i (t)−X0i (t))(X˙0i (t)− X˙1i (t))
+ αiσ
2(X1i (t)−X0i (t))2 + λ(X˙1i (t)− X˙0i (t))
n∑
j=1
(X˙1j (t)− X˙0j (t)) + λ(X˙0i (t)− X˙1i (t))2
]
dt.
We note next that∫ T
0
(X1i (t)−X0i (t))(X˙0i (t)− X˙1i (t)) dt =
1
2
(X1i (T )−X0i (T ))2 −
1
2
(X1i (0)−X0i (0))2 = 0.
Moreover, by the same argument,∫ T
0
(X1i (t)−X0i (t))(X˙0j (t)− X˙1j (t)) dt = −
∫ T
0
(X1j (t)−X0j (t))(X˙0i (t)− X˙1i (t)) dt,
and hence
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∫ T
0
(X1i (t)−X0i (t))(X˙0j (t)− X˙1j (t)) dt = 0.
It follows that
d
dβ
∣∣∣
β=0
f(β)
=
∫ T
0
[
αiσ
2
n∑
i=1
(X1i (t)−X0i (t))2 + λ
n∑
i=1
(X˙0i (t)− X˙1i (t))2 + λ
( n∑
i=1
(X˙0i (t)− X˙1i (t))
)2]
dt,
which is strictly positive since the two Nash equilibria (X01 , . . . , X
0
n) and (X
1
0 , . . . , X
1
n) are
distinct. But this contradicts (2.11).
Lemma 2.1.4. For i = 1, . . . , n there exists at most one maximizer in Xdet(y, T ) of the
functional Y 7→ ∫ T
0
Li(t, Y (t), Y˙ (t)|X−i) dt. If, moreover, X1, . . . , Xn ∈ C2[0, T ] then
there exists a unique maximizer Y ∗ ∈ Xdet(y, T ) ∩ C2[0, T ], which is given as the unique
solution of the two-point boundary value problem{
αiσ
2Y (t)− 2λY¨ (t) = b(t) + γ∑j 6=i X˙j(t) + λ∑j 6=i X¨j(t),
Y (0) = y, Y (T ) = 0.
Proof. It follows from the strict concavity of the Lagrangian Li and the convexity of the
set Xdet(y, T ) that there can be at most one maximizer in Xdet(y, T ).
Now we show the existence of a maximizer under the additional assumptionX1, . . . , Xn ∈
C2[0, T ]. The Euler–Lagrange equation,
Liq(t, Y (t), Y˙ (t)|X−i) =
d
dt
Lip(t, Y (t), Y˙ (t)|X−i)
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is read as follows for our problem:
αiσ
2Y (t)− 2λY¨ (t) = b(t) + γ
∑
j 6=i
X˙j(t) + λ
∑
j 6=i
X¨j(t) (2.12)
with boundary condition Y (0) = y and Y (T ) = 0. Denoting the right-hand side of (2.12)
by u(t), the general solution of this second-order ODE is of the form
Y (t) = c1e
−κit + c2eκit − 1
4λκi
∫ t
0
eκi(t−s)u(s) ds+
1
4λκi
∫ t
0
e−κi(t−s)u(s) ds, (2.13)
where c1 and c2 are constants and κi =
√
αiσ2/2λ. It is clear that the two constants
c1 and c2 can be uniquely determined by imposing the boundary conditions Y (0) = y
and Y (T ) = 0. From now on, let Y ∗ ∈ Xdet(y, T ) ∩ C2[0, T ] denote the corresponding
solution. We will now verify that Y ∗ is indeed a maximizer of our problem. To this end,
let Y ∈ Xdet(y, T ) be arbitrary. Using first the concavity of (q, p) 7→ Li(t, q, p|X−i) and
then the fact that Y ∗ solves the Euler–Lagrange equation (2.12), we get
Li(t, Y ∗(t), Y˙ ∗(t)|X−i))− Li(t, Y (t), Y˙ (t)|X−i)
≥ Liq(t, Y ∗(t), Y˙ ∗(t)|X−i))(Y ∗(t)− Y (t)) + Lip(t, Y ∗(t), Y˙ ∗(t)|X−i))(Y˙ ∗(t)− Y˙ (t))
=
( d
dt
Lip(t, Y ∗(t), Y˙ ∗(t)|X−i)
)
(Y ∗(t)− Y (t)) + Lip(t, Y ∗(t), Y˙ ∗(t)|X−i))(Y˙ ∗(t)− Y˙ (t))
=
d
dt
(
Lip(t, Y ∗(t), Y˙ ∗(t)|X−i)(Y ∗(t)− Y (t))
)
.
Therefore, ∫ T
0
Li(t, Y ∗(t), Y˙ ∗(t)|X−i) dt−
∫ T
0
Li(t, Y (t), Y˙ (t)|X−i) dt
≥
∫ T
0
d
dt
(
Lip(t, Y ∗(t), Y˙ ∗(t)|X−i)(Y ∗(t)− Y (t))
)
dt = 0,
where in the final step we have used that Y ∗(0) = Y (0) and Y ∗(T ) = Y (T ). This proves
the lemma.
Proof of Theorem 2.1.2. According to Lemma 2.1.3 there exists at most one Nash equi-
librium. We will now show that there exists a Nash equilibrium (X∗1 , . . . , X
∗
n) such that
each strategy X∗i belongs to Xdet(xi, T ) ∩ C2[0, T ]. By Lemma 2.1.4, each strategy X∗i
must then be a solution of the second-order differential equation
αiσ
2Xi(t)− 2λX¨i(t) = b(t) + γ
∑
j 6=i
X˙j(t) + λ
∑
j 6=i
X¨j(t), (2.14)
with boundary conditions
Xi(0) = xi and Xi(T ) = 0. (2.15)
We can clearly combine the n differential equations (2.14) into a system of n coupled
second-order linear ordinary differential equations for the vector X∗ := (X∗1 , . . . , X
∗
n)
>.
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It follows again from Lemma 2.1.4 that every solution of the system (2.14), (2.15) is a
Nash equilibrium. Therefore it will be sufficient to show the existence of a solution to the
n-dimensional two-point boundary value problem (2.14), (2.15).
By introducing the auxiliary function Y (t) for the derivative X˙(t), by letting b(t)
be the vector with all components equal to b(t), and by defining the n × n matrices
A := σ2diag(α1, . . . , αn), the identity matrix I = diag(1, . . . , 1), and the matrix J with
all entries equal to one, the system (2.14) can be re-written as follows:(
A −γ(J − I)
0 I
)(
X(t)
Y (t)
)
−
(
0 λ(J + I)
I 0
)(
X˙(t)
Y˙ (t)
)
=
(
b(t)
0
)
. (2.16)
Clearly, X solves (2.14) if and only if
(
X
X˙
)
solves (2.16). In particular every solution of
(2.16) with boundary conditions (2.15) yields a Nash equilibrium.
Now consider the homogeneous system (2.16), (2.15) with b(t) = 0 and initial values
x1 = · · · = xn = 0. The corresponding boundary condition can be written as
(X(0),Y (0),X(T ),Y (T ))> ∈ V, (2.17)
where V ⊂ R4n is the 2n-dimensional linear space
V =
{
(x0,y0,x1,y1)
> ∈ R4n |x0 = x1 = 0
}
.
It is clear that
(
X
Y
)
=
(
0
0
)
is a solution. In fact this trivial solution is the only solution since
every solution must be a Nash equilibrium, and Nash equilibria are unique by Lemma
2.1.3. It therefore follows from the general theory of linear boundary value problems
for systems of ordinary differential equations that the two-point boundary value problem
(2.16), (2.17) has a unique solution for every continuous b : [0, T ] → Rn (and in fact for
every continuous R2n-valued function substituting
(
b(t)
0
)
on the right-hand side of (2.16));
see Kurzweil [1986, (9.22), p. 189]. Using this fact, we let
(
X0
Y 0
)
be the solution of (2.16),
(2.17) when b(t) in (2.16) is replaced by b0(t) = (b01(t), . . . , b
0
n(t)) for
b0i (t) = b(t) +
T − t
T
αiσ
2xi − γ
T
∑
j 6=i
xj.
One then checks that
X∗i (t) := X
0
i (t) +
T − t
T
xi, i = 1, . . . , n,
solves (2.14), (2.15) and is thus the desired Nash equilibrium.
Remark 2.1.5. With Z(t) := (X(t),Y (t))> the system (2.16) can be written as
Z˙(t) = MZ(t) + f(t), (2.18)
where
M :=
(
0 λ(J + I)
I 0
)−1(
A −γ(J − I)
0 I
)
,
2.1. FINITE TIME HORIZON 19
and
f(t) := −
(
0 λ(J + I)
I 0
)−1(
b(t)
0
)
.
Note that J2 = nJ and that hence
(J + I)
(
I − 1
n+ 1
J
)
= I =
(
I − 1
n+ 1
J
)
(J + I).
It follows that (
0 λ(J + I)
I 0
)−1
=
(
0 I
1
λ
(I − 1
n+1
J) 0
)
and hence
M =
(
0 I
1
λ
(A− 1
n+1
JA) −γ
λ
( 2
n+1
J − I)
)
. (2.19)
It will become clear from (2.7), (2.8) and below that, from a mathematical point of
view, the Nash equilibrium constructed above is an open-loop linear-quadratic differen-
tial game with state constraints. The state constraints are provided by the liquidation
constraints Xi(T ) = 0, i = 1, . . . , n. They are responsible for the fact that we cannot
apply standard results on the existence and uniqueness of open-loop linear-quadratic dif-
ferential games, and significantly complicate the proof for the existence of Nash equilibria,
especially in the case of an infinite time horizon as studied in Section 2.2. It is also in-
teresting to point out that the proof of the existence of solutions to (2.9), (2.10) rests on
the uniqueness of Nash equilibria, which is established in Lemma 2.1.3.
Our next result states that the unique Nash equilibrium for mean-variance optimiza-
tion is also a Nash equilibrium for CARA utility maximization. It is an open question,
however, whether there may be more than one Nash equilibrium for CARA utility maxi-
mization.
Corollary 2.1.6. For given n ∈ N, α1, . . . , αn ≥ 0, and x1, . . . , xn the Nash equilibrium
for mean-variance optimization constructed in Theorem 2.1.2 is also a Nash equilibrium
for CARA utility maximization.
Proof. Let X∗1 , . . . , X
∗
n be the unique Nash equilibrium for mean-variance optimization as
constructed in Theorem 2.1.2. When X∗−i := {X∗1 , . . . , X∗i−1, X∗i+1, . . . , X∗n} is fixed, the
ith agent perceives
SX
∗
−i(t) := S0(t) + γ
∑
j 6=i
(Xj(t)−Xj(0)) + λ
∑
j 6=i
X˙j(t), t ∈ [0, T ],
as “unaffected”price process. It is of the form
SX
∗
−i(t) = S0 + σW (t) +
∫ t
0
bi(s) ds
for a deterministic and continuous function bi : [0, T ] → R. Since the process SX∗−i has
independent increments and S
X∗−i
T has all exponential moments, i.e., E
[
eβS
X∗−i
T
]
<∞ for
all β ∈ R, it follows as in Schied et al. [2010, Theorem 2.1] that for αi > 0
sup
X∈X (xi,T )
E[uαi(R(X|X−i)) ] = sup
X∈Xdet(xi,T )
E[uαi(R(X|X−i)) ].
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But for αi > 0 and X ∈ Xdet(xi, T ) we have
E[uαi(R(X|X−i)) ] =
1
αi
(
1− e−αiE[R(X|X−i) ]+α
2
i
2
var (R(X|X−i)
)
,
which shows that CARA utility maximization is equivalent to the maximization of the
corresponding mean-variance functional. The corresponding result for αi = 0 is obvious.
Let us now have a closer look at the system (2.9). It simplifies when all agents have
the same risk aversion:
Corollary 2.1.7. In the setting of Theorem 2.1.2 suppose that α1 = · · · = αn = α ≥ 0.
Then
Σ(t) :=
n∑
i=1
X∗i (t)
is the unique solution of the following one-dimensional two-point boundary value problem
ασ2Σ(t)− (n− 1)γΣ˙(t)− (n+ 1)λΣ¨(t) = nb(t), Σ(0) =
n∑
i=1
xi, Σ(T ) = 0. (2.20)
Given Σ, each equilibrium strategy X∗i is equal to the unique solution of the following
one-dimensional two-point boundary value problem,
ασ2Xi(t) + γX˙i(t)− λX¨i(t) = b(t) + γΣ˙(t) + λΣ¨(t), Xi(0) = xi, Xi(T ) = 0. (2.21)
Proof. Letting Σ(t) :=
∑n
j=1Xj(t) and re-writing (2.9) yields
ασ2Xi(t) + γX˙i(t)− λX¨i(t) = b(t) + γΣ˙(t) + λΣ¨(t),
and hence (2.21). Summing over i then implies (2.20).
It is possible to obtain closed-form solutions of (2.20) and (2.21), but the correspond-
ing expressions are quite involved. The situation simplifies when the drift b vanishes
identically:
Theorem 2.1.8. In the setting of Corollary 2.1.7 assume in addition that b = 0 and
α > 0. We define
θ± =
γ ±√γ2 + 4ασ2λ
2λ
and ρ± = − (n− 1)γ
2(n+ 1)λ
± ρ̂ (2.22)
for
ρ̂ =
√
(n− 1)2γ2 + 4(n+ 1)ασ2λ
2(n+ 1)λ
. (2.23)
Then the ith equilibrium strategy X∗i is of the form
X∗i (t) = ci(θ+)e
θ+t + ci(θ−)eθ−t + c(ρ+)eρ+t + c(ρ−)eρ−t, (2.24)
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where, for xn :=
1
n
∑n
j=1 xj,
ci(θ+) =
xn − xi
e2θ̂T − 1 , ci(θ−) =
−(xn − xi)
1− e−2θ̂T , c(ρ+) =
−xn
e2ρ̂T − 1 , c(ρ−) =
xn
1− e−2ρ̂T .
(2.25)
Moreover, Σ(t) =
∑n
i=1X
∗
i (t), which solves the two-point boundary value problem (2.20),
is given by
Σ(t) =
nxn
2 sinh(ρ̂T )
(
eρ̂T eρ−t − e−ρ̂T eρ+t
)
. (2.26)
To prove Theorem 2.1.8, we need the following auxiliary lemma.
Lemma 2.1.9. For α1 = · · · = αn = α > 0 the matrix M from (2.19) has four real
eigenvalues θ+, θ−, ρ+, ρ− given by (2.22). Moreover, with 1 ∈ Rn denoting the vector
with all entries equal to 1, the corresponding eigenspaces are given by
E(ρ±) = span
(
1
ρ±1
)
and E(θ±) =
{(
v
θ±v
) ∣∣∣v ∈ Rn, v ⊥ 1}.
Proof. Let us write an arbitrary vector in R2n as
(
v1
v2
)
for v1,v2 ∈ Rn. By applying M to(
v1
v2
)
we see that we must have v2 = τv1 for
(
v1
v2
)
to be an eigenvector with eigenvalue τ .
So let us consider vectors in R2n of the form
(
v
τv
)
for v ∈ Rn and τ ∈ R. The equation
M
(
v
τv
)
= τ
(
v
τv
)
is equivalent to(ασ2
λ
+
τγ
λ
)
v − ασ
2 + τγ
n+ 1
Jv = τ 2v. (2.27)
When v = 1 then Jv = nv and (2.27) becomes the quadratic equation
ασ2 + γτ − n(ασ
2 + 2γτ)
n+ 1
− λτ 2 = 0, (2.28)
which is solved for τ = ρ+ and τ = ρ−. When v ⊥ 1 then Jv = 0 and (2.27) becomes the
quadratic equation
ασ2 + γτ − λτ 2 = 0, (2.29)
which is solved for τ = θ+ and τ = θ−. Since the eigenvectors are found and thus span
the entire space R2n, the proof is completed.
Proof of Theorem 2.1.8. It follows from Theorem 2.1.2 and its proof that X∗1 , . . . , X
∗
n are
obtained from the solutions of (2.18) for f(t) = 0. The general solution of this system is
of the form Z(t) = etMZ(0). By Lemma 2.1.9, M is diagonalizable and so every solution
Z(t) must be a linear combination of exponential functions eτt, where τ is an eigenvalue of
M . Another application of Lemma 2.1.9 thus implies that each X∗i can be represented as
in (2.24). One finally checks that for ci(θ+), ci(θ−), c(ρ+), c(ρ−) as in (2.25) the boundary
conditions X∗i (0) = xi and X
∗
i (T ) = 0 are satisfied.
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The formulas in Theorem 2.1.8 can be further simplified in a two-player setting:
Corollary 2.1.10. In the setting of Theorem 2.1.8 assume in addition that n = 2. Then
X∗1 (t) =
1
2
(
Σ(t) + ∆(t)
)
and X∗2 (t) =
1
2
(
Σ(t)−∆(t)), (2.30)
where
Σ(t) = (x1 + x2)e
− γt
6λ
sinh
(
(T−t)
√
γ2+12αλσ2
6λ
)
sinh
(
T
√
γ2+12αλσ2
6λ
) , (2.31)
∆(t) = (x1 − x2)e
γt
2λ
sinh
(
(T−t)
√
γ2+4αλσ2
2λ
)
sinh
(
T
√
γ2+4αλσ2
2λ
) . (2.32)
Proof. From (2.26) we have that Σ(t) = X∗1 (t) + X
∗
2 (t) is given by (2.31). When letting
∆(t) := X∗1 (t) − X∗2 (t), we get from (2.21) that ∆ solves the two-point boundary value
problem
ασ2∆(t) + γ∆˙(t)− λ∆¨(t) = 0, ∆(0) = x1 − x2, ∆(T ) = 0.
This boundary value problem is solved by (2.32).
The following mean-field limit is obtained in a straightforward manner by sending n
to infinity in Theorem 2.1.8.
Corollary 2.1.11. In the setting of Theorem 2.1.8 suppose that limn↑∞ 1n
∑n
j=1 xj = x ∈
R. Then, as n ↑ ∞, the equilibrium strategy of agent i converges to
x− xi
e2θ̂T − 1e
θ+t − x− xi
1− e−2θ̂T e
θ−t +
x
1− e− γTλ
e−
γt
λ − x
e
γT
λ − 1
, (2.33)
where θ+, θ− and θ̂ are as in (2.22) and (2.23).
Proof. Note that as n ↑ ∞, we have ρ̂ = γ
2λ
, ρ+ = 0 and ρ− = −γλ . Putting this into
(2.24) completes the proof.
2.1.3 Qualitative discussion of the two-player Nash equilibrium
Throughout this subsection, (X∗1 , X
∗
2 ) will denote the two-player Nash equilibrium con-
structed in Corollary 2.1.10. We first present numerical simulations of X∗1 and X
∗
2 . We
assume that agent 1 uses deterministic strategies to sell the asset position of one unit
in the time horizon [0, 1], that is, X∗1 ∈ Xdet(1, 1). In Figures 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 we show
equilibrium strategies for agent 1 under the following four different conditions of X∗2 :
• X∗2 ∈ Xdet(1, 1): agent 2 wants to sell a same asset position;
• X∗2 ∈ Xdet(0, 1): agent 2 uses an admissible round trip;
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Asset Position
Figure 2.1: Optimal asset positions of X∗1 with initial position x1 = 1 in Nash equilibrium
in cases that x2 = 1, 0,−1, and X∗2 is absent with λ = σ = A = T = 1, γ = 10.
• X∗2 ∈ Xdet(−1, 1): agent 2 wants to buy the equal amount of asset position that
agent 1 wants to sell;
• X∗2 is absent.
Note that the optimal strategy of a single agent without competitors is given by
X∗0 (t) = x0
sinh(κ(T − t))
sinh(κT )
, (2.34)
where κ =
√
ασ2/2λ; see Almgren [2003] or take n = 1 in (2.26).
By setting A = λ = σ = 1, γ = 10, Figure 2.1 displays the Nash equilibria with an
enlargement of the permanent impact coefficient γ. A remarkable observation is that the
optimal strategy in case that a round trip is present (the thick solid line) is not concave
or convex with respect to time t any more. Liquidation of the asset position given an
opposite investor (the thin dashed line) is significantly delayed while the normal asset
position without X∗2 is nearly linear.
In Figure 2.2, we set A = λ = γ = 1, σ = 10. We observe that, an enlargement of the
market fluctuation σ leads to an early liquidation. That means, agent 1 tends to liquidate
earlier in an unstable market.
Furthermore, we see in Figure 2.3 that all the four lines will converge to a nearly linear
curve if the coefficient of temporary impact λ increases.
To study the behavior of the strategies X∗0 , X
∗
1 , X
∗
2 we will need the following elemen-
tary fact.
Lemma 2.1.12. For 0 < ν < 1 the function
f(x) :=
sinh(νx)
sinh(x)
is strictly decreasing on [0,∞).
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Figure 2.2: Optimal asset positions of X∗1 with initial position x1 = 1 in Nash equilibrium
in cases that x2 = 1, 0,−1, and X∗2 is absent with λ = γ = A = T = 1, σ = 10.
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Figure 2.3: Optimal asset positions of X∗1 with initial position x1 = 1 in Nash equilibrium
in cases that x2 = 1, 0,−1, and X∗2 is absent with σ = γ = A = T = 1, λ = 10.
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Figure 2.4: X∗1 (1) as a function of ασ
2. Left: x1 = 1.12, x2 = 2.06, T = 2, and λ = γ = 1;
Right: x1 = 0.7, x2 = −1.9, T = 2, λ = 0.2, and γ = 0.1.
Proof. Note that
f ′(x) =
ν cosh(νx) sinh(x)− cosh(x) sinh(νx)
(sinh(x))2
=
(1 + ν) sinh((1− ν)x)− (1− ν) sinh((1 + ν)x)
2(sinh(x))2
.
With λ := (1−ν)/(1+ν) the strict convexity of sinh implies that for ν ∈ (0, 1) and x > 0
sinh((1− ν)x) < λ sinh((1 + ν)x) + (1− λ) sinh(0) = 1− ν
1 + ν
sinh((1 + ν)x).
Therefore f ′(x) < 0.
It follows immediately from this fact that X∗0 (t) is a strictly decreasing function of
ασ2 when x0 > 0 and 0 < t < T . Economically, this means that the agent will liqui-
date the initial asset position faster when the perceived volatility risk increases, because
var (R(X∗0 )) is proportional to ασ2 according to (2.7) and (2.8). So the first guess would
be that also the equilibrium strategy X∗1 should be a decreasing function of ασ
2 when
x1 > 0. This guess is also analyzed and tested empirically by Lebedeva et al. [2012] for
a large data set of block executions by large insiders. Here, however, all we get from
applying Lemma 2.1.12 to (2.30) is the following partial result.
Proposition 2.1.13. If x1 ≥ x2 ≥ 0 then X∗1 (t) is a strictly decreasing function of ασ2
for 0 < t < T .
As a matter of fact, the monotonicity in ασ2 may break down in the two-player Nash
equilibrium when the conditions x1 ≥ x2 and x2 ≥ 0 in Proposition 2.1.13 are not both
satisfied; see Figure 2.4. An intuitive explanation for this failure of monotonicity can
be understood from Figure 2.5. Here, agent 2 has a larger initial position than agent
1. When ασ2 increases from 0.1 to 0.8, agent 2 receives a relatively high increase in
volatility risk and therefore increases the liquidation speed throughout the first part of
[0, T ] while slowing down in the second part. The volatility risk of agent 1 also increases,
but it does so less than for agent 2. On the other hand, the increased price pressure
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Figure 2.5: X∗1 (t) (solid) and X
∗
2 (t) (dashed) as functions of t ∈ [0, T ] for x1 = 1.12,
x2 = 2.06, T = 2, λ = γ = 1, and ασ
2 = 0.1 (left), ασ2 = 0.8 (center) and ασ2 = 2.5
(right).
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
-0.10
-0.05
0.05
0.10
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
0.338
0.340
0.342
0.344
0.346
Figure 2.6: Left: X∗1 (1) as a function of λ for x1 = 0.2, x2 = 4, T = 2, ασ
2 = 1, and
γ = 0.3; Right: X∗1 (1) as a function of γ for x1 = 0.86, x2 = 0.28, T = 2, ασ
2 = 1, and
λ = 1.
from agent 2 leads to unfavorable asset prices for agent 1, and this latter effect outweighs
the increased volatility risk. Therefore it is beneficial for agent 1 to delay selling in the
first and accelerate the strategy in the second part of the time interval. This leads to
the observed increase of the intermediate asset position X∗1 (1). When ασ
2 increases even
further, the increase in volatility risk becomes dominant, and so X∗1 (1) starts to decrease.
Next, X∗0 (t) is independent of γ, whereas both two-player equilibrium strategies are
nontrivial functions of γ. The intuitive reason for this dependence is the fact that the
permanent price impact created by the liquidation strategy of one agent is perceived as
an additional price trend by the other agent.
Moreover, X∗0 (t) is an increasing function of λ by Lemma 2.1.12. The monotonicity in
λ has the clear economic intuition that increasing the transaction costs from temporary
price impact reduces the benefits from an early liquidation and thus drives the optimal
strategy toward the linear liquidation strategy that is optimal in the risk-neutral case
α = 0. It is also tested and analyzed empirically by Lebedeva et al. [2012]. By applying
Lemma 2.1.12 to (2.30) it is only possible to obtain the monotonic dependence of X∗1 (t)
on γ and λ when x1 = x2:
Proposition 2.1.14. If x1 = x2 ≥ 0 then X∗1 (t) = X∗2 (t) is a strictly decreasing function
of γ and a strictly increasing function of λ for 0 < t < T .
As shown in Figure 2.6, the monotonic dependence on γ or λ may break down when
the condition x1 = x2 from Proposition 2.1.14 is not satisfied. The intuitive explanation
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for these effects are similar to the one for the breakdown of monotonicity for ασ2. For
instance, when λ increases in a Nash equilibrium with 0 < x1  x2, both agents receive
an incentive to reduce the curvature of their strategies, that is, to sell slower in the first
part of the trading interval and to sell faster during the second part. Agent 2 will therefore
create less price impact during the first part of [0, T ] and more price impact in the second
part. In equilibrium, this change in price impact generated by one trader creates another
incentive for the other trader with just the opposite effect, namely to increase trading
speed during the first part of [0, T ] and to reduce it during the second part when the
unfavorable price impact generated by the competitor is increased. When the position of
agent 1 is smaller than the one of agent 2, this second effect can dominate the increase of
transaction costs in the strategy of agent 1 so that we observe the decrease of X∗1 (1) on
the leftmost side of Figure 2.6.
2.2 Nash equilibrium with infinite time horizon
Now we consider mean-variance optimization and CARA utility maximization for an
infinite time horizon [0,∞). Financially, this problem corresponds to a situation in which
none of the agents faces a material time constraint. To simplify the discussion, we assume
from the beginning that the drift b(·) vanishes identically. Then the unaffected price
process is given by S0(t) = S0 + σW (t) for t ≥ 0. Here we need to assume that σ 6= 0. If
only one agent is active, we are in the situation of Schied and Scho¨neborn [2009], where
the problem of maximizing the expected utility of revenues is discussed for an infinite time
horizon. As discussed there, a strategy (X(t))t≥0 should satisfy the following conditions
of admissibility so that the utility-maximization problem is well-defined for a single agent:
• X is adapted to the filtration (Ft)t≥0;
• X is absolutely continuous in the sense that X(t) = X(0) + ∫ t
0
X˙(s) ds for some
progressively measurable process X˙(t))t≥0 for which∫ ∞
0
(X˙(t))2 dt <∞ P-a.s.; (2.35)
• X is bounded and satisfies
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
X(t)2 dt
]
<∞ and lim
t↑∞
(X(t))2t log log t = 0 P-a.s. (2.36)
The class of all strategies that are admissible in this sense and satisfy X(0) = x for given
x ∈ R will be denoted by X (x,∞). As before we denote by Xdet(x,∞) the subclass of all
deterministic strategies in X (x,∞). When the admissible strategy X is used, the affected
price process is
SX(t) = S0(t) + γ(X(t)−X(0)) + λX˙(t).
It is shown in Schied and Scho¨neborn [2009, Section 3.1] that the total revenues of X ∈
X (x,∞) are P-a.s. well-defined as the limit
R(X) := − lim
T↑∞
∫ T
0
X˙(t)SX(t) dt = xS0 − γ
2
x2 + σ
∫ ∞
0
X(t) dW (t)− λ
∫ ∞
0
(X˙(t))2 dt
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(see also Lemma 2.2.1 below). Moreover, for α > 0, the unique strategy that maximizes
the expected utility E[uα(R(X)) ] over X ∈ X (x,∞) is given by
X∗0 (t) = x exp
(
− t
√
ασ2
2λ
)
, t ≥ 0;
see Corollary 4.4 in Schied and Scho¨neborn [2009]. Since R(X) is a Gaussian random
variable for X ∈ Xdet(x,∞) one sees that
E[uα(R(X)) ] = 1
α
(
1− e−αE[R(X) ]+α
2
2
var (R(X))
)
, X ∈ Xdet(x,∞),
and so X∗0 also maximizes the mean-variance functional E[R(X) ] − α2var (R(X)) over
X ∈ Xdet(x,∞).
When n investors apply strategies X1, X2, . . . , Xn, the affected price S
X1,...,Xn(t) is
again given by (2.6), as in the case of a finite time horizon. It will follow from Lemma
2.2.1 below that the admissibility of X1, X2, . . . , Xn guarantees that the following limit
exists P-a.s.:
R(Xi|X−i) := − lim
T↑∞
∫ T
0
X˙i(t)S
X1,...,Xn(t) dt.
The respective Nash equilibria for mean-variance optimization and CARA utility maxi-
mization can now be defined by taking T =∞ in Definition 2.1.1.
Lemma 2.2.1. For Xi ∈ X (xi,∞), i = 1, . . . , n, the limit
R(Xi|X−i) := − lim
T↑∞
∫ T
0
X˙i(t)S
X1,...,Xn(t) dt
exists and is given by
R(Xi|X−i)
= xiS0 − γ
2
x2i +
∫ ∞
0
Xi(t) dW (t) + γ
∑
j 6=i
∫ ∞
0
Xi(t)X˙j(t) dt− λ
n∑
j=1
∫ ∞
0
X˙i(t)X˙j(t) dt.
Proof. Integrating by parts yields
−
∫ T
0
X˙i(t)S
X1,...,Xn(t) dt
= (xi −Xi(T ))S0 −X(T )W (T ) + σ
∫ T
0
Xi(t) dW (t)− γ
2
(Xi(T )−Xi(0))2
− γ
∑
j 6=i
Xi(T )(Xj(T )−Xj(0)) + γ
∑
j 6=i
∫ T
0
Xi(t)X˙j(t) dt− λ
n∑
j=1
∫ T
0
X˙i(t)X˙j(t) dt.
The assertion now follows by using the law of the iterated logarithm for W , (2.35), (2.36),
and the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality.
Now let Xi ∈ X (xi,∞), i = 1, . . . , n, be given. As in (2.7), (2.8) we get that for
Y ∈ X (y,∞),
E[R(Y |X−i) ]− αi
2
var (R(Y |X−i)) = c+
∫ ∞
0
Li(t, Y (t), Y˙ (t)|X−i) dt,
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where c = yS0 − γ2y2 and the Lagrangian Li is given by (2.8). Note that we must have
αiσ
2 > 0 to have a chance to obtain solutions of the mean-variance optimization problem
for otherwise the Lagrangian is linear. Here is our result on the existence and uniqueness
of a Nash equilibrium for mean-variance optimization with infinite time horizon.
Theorem 2.2.2. Suppose that one of the following two conditions holds:
1. n ∈ N is arbitrary and α1 = · · · = αn = α > 0;
2. n = 2 and α1, α2 are distinct and strictly positive.
Then for all x1, . . . , xn ∈ R there exists a unique Nash equilibrium for mean-variance
optimization with infinite time horizon, which is also a Nash equilibrium for CARA utility
maximization.
In case 1 the optimal strategies are given by
X∗i (t) = (xi − xn)eθ−t + xneρ−t, (2.37)
where xn =
1
n
∑n
j=1 xj; ρ− and θ− are as in (2.22).
In case 2 the fourth-order equation
τ 4 − 2γ
3λ
τ 3 − γ
2 + 2λσ2(α1 + α2)
3λ2
τ 2 +
σ4α1α2
3λ2
= 0
has precisely two distinct strictly negative roots, τ1, τ2, and the equilibrium strategies X
∗
1 (t)
and X∗2 (t) are linear combinations of the exponential functions e
τ1t and eτ2t.
To prove Theorem 2.2.2, we need the following auxiliary lemma.
Lemma 2.2.3. For i = 1, . . . , n and αi > 0 the functional Y 7→
∫∞
0
Li(t, Y (t), Y˙ (t)|X−i) dt
has at most one maximizer in Xdet(y,∞). If, moreover, X1, . . . , Xn belong to C2[0,∞)
and are such that ∫ T
0
∣∣∣∣γ∑
j 6=i
X˙j(t) + λ
∑
j 6=i
X¨j(t)
∣∣∣∣ dt <∞, (2.38)
then there exists a unique maximizer Y ∗ ∈ Xdet(y, T ) ∩ C2[0,∞), which is given as the
unique solution of the boundary value problem
αiσ
2Y (t)− 2λY¨ (t) = γ
∑
j 6=i
X˙j(t) + λ
∑
j 6=i
X¨j(t), Y (0) = y, lim
t↑∞
Y (t) = 0.
Moreover, Y satisfies
∫∞
0
|Y˙ (t)|+ |Y¨ (t)| dt <∞.
Proof. It follows from the strict concavity of the Lagrangian Li and the convexity of the
set Xdet(y,∞) that there can be at most one maximizer in Xdet(y,∞).
Now we show the existence of a maximizer under the additional assumptions (2.38)
and X1, . . . , Xn ∈ C2[0,∞). As noted in the proof of Lemma 2.1.4, the general solution
of the Euler–Lagrange equation (2.12) is given by
Y (t) = c1e
−κit + c2eκit − 1
4λκi
∫ t
0
eκi(t−s)u(s) ds+
1
4λκi
∫ t
0
e−κi(t−s)u(s) ds, (2.39)
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where u(t) = γ
∑
j 6=i X˙j(t) +λ
∑
j 6=i X¨j(t), c1 and c2 are constants, and κi =
√
αiσ2/2λ >
0. One checks that (2.38) implies that
∫ t
0
e−κi(t−s)u(s) ds→ 0 as t ↑ ∞. Therefore, when
letting
c2 :=
1
4λκi
∫ ∞
0
e−κisu(s) ds (2.40)
and c1 := y − c2, one sees that Y solves (2.39).
To see that
∫∞
0
|Y˙ (t)|+ |Y¨ (t)| dt <∞, note first that∫ T
0
∫ t
0
e−κi(t−s)|u(s)| ds dt = 1
κi
∫ T
0
|u(s)| ds− 1
κi
∫ T
0
e−κi(T−s)|u(s)| ds
and ∫ T
0
∫ ∞
t
eκi(t−s)|u(s)| ds dt = 1
κi
∫ ∞
0
(eκi(s∧T−s) − 1)|u(s)| ds,
both of which by (2.38) converge to finite limits for T ↑ ∞. It thus follows from (2.39)
and (2.40) that
∫∞
0
|Y˙ (t)|+ |Y¨ (t)| dt <∞.
Finally, it is clear from the preceding arguments that Y ∗ ∈ Xdet(y, T )∩C2[0,∞). The
optimality of Y ∗ follows as in the second part of the proof of Lemma 2.1.4.
Proof of Theorem 2.2.2. One first shows just as in Lemma 2.1.3 that there can be at
most one Nash equilibrium for mean-variance optimization. Moreover, one shows as in
the proof of Corollary 2.1.6 that a Nash equilibrium for mean-variance optimization is
also a Nash equilibrium for CARA utility maximization.
Now we turn to the proof of existence of a Nash equilibrium for given initial values
x1, . . . , xn ∈ R. Let M be the 2n × 2n-matrix defined in Remark 2.1.5. As observed in
the proof of Lemma 2.1.9, any eigenvector of M with eigenvalue τ must be of the form(
v
τv
)
for some v ∈ Rn. We will show below that in both cases, 1 and 2, there exists a basis
v1, . . . ,vn of Rn and numbers τ1, . . . , τn < 0 (which are not necessarily distinct) such that(
v1
τ1v1
)
, . . . ,
(
vn
τnvn
)
are eigenvectors of M . Taking this fact as given, let c1, . . . , cn ∈ R be
such that c1v1 + · · ·+ cnvn = (x1, . . . , xn)> and define
Z(0) := c1
(
v1
τ1v1
)
+ · · ·+ cn
(
vn
τnvn
)
and Z(t) := etMZ(0).
We denote by X∗(t) the first n components of Z(t). As observed in the proof of Theorem
2.1.2 and Remark 2.1.5, X∗(t) will solve the system (2.14) of coupled Euler–Lagrange
equations, which by Lemma 2.2.3 is sufficient for optimality in the infinite-horizon set-
ting, provided that the components correspond to admissible strategies and satisfy the
integrability conditions of Lemma 2.2.3. But each component of X∗(t) is by construction
a linear combination of the decreasing exponential functions eτ1t, . . . , eτnt, and so these
conditions are clearly satisfied.
Now we consider the situation in case 1. Then θ− and ρ− defined in (2.22) are strictly
negative, and so the required existence of v1, . . . ,vn follows from Lemma 2.1.9. It follows
from the preceding part of the proof that each component of X∗(t) can be written as
X∗i (t) = ci(θ−)e
θ−t + c(ρ−)eρ−t.
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Letting again Σ(t) :=
∑n
j=1X
∗
j (t) and arguing as in the proof of Theorem 2.1.8 yields
first Σ(t) =
∑n
i=1 xie
ρ−t and then
c(ρ−) =
1
n
n∑
j=1
xj and ci(θ−) = xi − c(ρ−).
This establishes (2.37) and completes the proof of Theorem 2.2.2 under assumption 1.
Now we turn toward case 2. We may assume without loss of generality that σ = 1.
The characteristic polynomial of the matrix M of the system (2.18) for n = 2 is
χ(τ) := τ 4 − 2γ
3λ
τ 3 − γ
2 + 2λ(α1 + α2)
3λ2
τ 2 +
α1α2
3λ2
.
Its derivative, χ′, has three distinct roots, t0, t+, t−, which are given by
t0 = 0, t± =
3γ ±√33γ2 + 48 (α1 + α2)λ
12λ
.
Note first that t0 is a strictly positive local maximum of χ since
χ(t0) =
α1α2
3λ2
> 0, χ′′(t0) = −2 (2α1λ+ 2α2λ+ γ
2)
3λ2
< 0.
Next, t+ > 0, t− < 0, and
χ(t−) =
1
864λ5
(
− 96λ3 (α21 − α1α2 + α22)− 168γ2λ2(α1 + α2)− 69γ4λ
+ 16γλ(α1 + α2)
√
48λ3(α1 + α2) + 33γ2λ2 + 11γ
3
√
48λ3(α1 + α2) + 33γ2λ2
)
.
If we can show that χ(t−) < 0 then χ will have precisely two distinct strictly negative
roots. It is, however, not easy to determine by direct inspection of our preceding formula
whether χ(t−) < 0. But we already know that for α1 = α2 the matrix M has exactly two
strictly negative (though not necessarily distinct) eigenvalues, ρ− and θ−. So in this case,
both eigenvalues must be strictly negative roots of χ. We moreover know that χ(0) > 0,
limτ↓−∞ χ(τ) = +∞, and that t− is the only strictly negative critical point of χ. It
follows that we must have χ(t−) ≤ 0 when α1 = α2. Now suppose that α1 6= α2 and let
α := 1
2
(α1 + α2). Then α1 + α2 = α + α and
α21 − α1α2 + α22 − α2 =
3
4
(α1 − α2)2 > 0.
It therefore follows that χ(t−) < χ(t−), where χ denotes the characteristic polynomial
of M when both α1 and α2 have been substituted by α. Since the formula for t− is left
invariant by this substitution, we must have χ(t−) ≤ 0 according to what has been said
before, and so we arrive at χ(t−) < 0.
It follows from the preceding paragraph that M has two distinct strictly negative
eigenvalues τ1 and τ2. Hence there exist corresponding eigenvectors of the form
(
v1
τ1v1
)
and(
v2
τ2v2
)
. But we still need to exclude the possibility that v1 and v2 are linearly dependent
to complete the proof. To this end, note that it follows from (2.19) that we must have
1
λ
(
A− 1
n+ 1
JA
)
w − τ γ
λ
( 2
n+ 1
J − I
)
w = τ 2w (2.41)
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for
(
w
τw
)
to be an eigenvector of M with eigenvalue τ .
Let us first suppose that the components w1 and w2 of w do not add up to zero:
w1 +w2 6= 0. Then taking the inner product of the vector equation (2.41) with the vector(
1
1
)
yields the equation
α1w1 + α2w2 − τγ(w1 + w2) = 3τ 2λ(w1 + w2).
This quadratic equation in τ has the two possible roots
τ± =
−γ ±
√
γ2 + 12λα1w1+α2w2
w1+w2
6λ
,
one of which must be equal to τ . Since τ− < 0 < τ+ it follows that
(
w
τ˜w
)
cannot be an
eigenvector of M for any τ˜ that is different from τ and has the same sign as τ .
Let us now consider the case in which w1 = −w2. Taking the inner product of the
equation (2.41) with the vector
(−1
1
)
and using the requirement w1, w2 6= 0 yields the
equation α2 + α1 + 2τγ = 2τ
2λ, which is independent of w1 and w2. It has the roots
γ ±√γ2 + 4λ(α1 + α2)
2λ
,
which again have different signs. We thus conclude as in the case w1 + w2 6= 0.
On the one hand, the structure of equilibrium strategies for an infinite time horizon
appears to be simpler than for the finite-time situation. On the other hand, the assump-
tions of Theorem 2.2.2 are more restrictive than those of Theorem 2.1.2. The reason is
that all solutions X1(t), . . . , Xn(t) of the system (2.9) are linear combinations of expo-
nential functions and thus can only take the limits ±∞ and 0 for t ↑ ∞. We therefore
cannot apply standard results on the existence of solutions for boundary value problems
on non-compact intervals such as those in Cecchi et al. [1980], where it is required that
the possible boundary values at t = ∞ include the full space Rn. Instead, we show here
that the eigenspaces associated with the negative eigenvalues of a certain non-symmetric
matrix M are sufficiently rich. For n > 2 we are only able to understand these eigenspaces
when α1 = · · · = αn.
Remark 2.2.4. In the situation of part 1 of Theorem 2.2.2, consider the correspond-
ing Nash equilibrium X
(T )
1 , . . . , X
(T )
n for the finite time interval [0, T ] as constructed in
Theorem 2.1.8. Then we conclude from (2.24) and (2.25) that
lim
T↑∞
X
(T )
i (t) = X
∗
i (t) for i = 1, . . . , n and t ≥ 0,
where X∗i is as in (2.37).
Let us finally discuss some qualitative properties of the Nash equilibrium in part 1
of Theorem 2.2.2. One issue that is discussed in Carlin et al. [2007] and Scho¨neborn
and Schied [2009] is whether agents with zero initial capital, xi = 0 for i 6= 1, engage in
predatory trading or liquidity provision when another agent, say agent 1, is liquidating a
large block of shares. Here, predatory trading refers to a strategy during which the asset
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Figure 2.7: Strategies X∗i (t) for λ = 0.15 (left) and λ = 0.16 (right) for various choices of
n and for xi = 0,
∑n
j=1 xj = 1, γ = 0.16, and ασ
2 = 0.33.
is shortened at the initial high price and then bought back later when the sell strategy of
agent 1 has depreciated the asset price. This strategy is “predatory” in the sense that the
revenues it generates for agent i are made at the expense of agent 1. Liquidity provision
refers to exactly the opposite strategy: agent i acquires a long position by first buying
and later re-selling some of the shares agent 1 is liquidating. It can hence be seen as
a cooperative behavior on behalf of agent i. Both Carlin et al. [2007] and Scho¨neborn
and Schied [2009] consider risk-neutral agents who need to close their positions in finite
time. In Carlin et al. [2007] all agents face the same time constraint, and in this case
liquidity provision can only be observed if cooperation is enforced by repeating the game
Scho¨neborn and Schied [2009] allow a longer time horizon for agent i than for agent 1
and in this case find that liquidity provision may be possible, depending on the market
parameters and the number of competitors. Our result here is Corollary 2.2.5 below. It
is illustrated in Figure 2.7. Note that by Remark 2.2.4 the two possibilities of predatory
trading and liquidity provision must occur already for finite time horizons T , a fact that
is markedly different from the risk-neutral case α = 0 considered in Carlin et al. [2007]
and Scho¨neborn and Schied [2009].
Corollary 2.2.5. In the situation of part 1 of Theorem 2.2.2 suppose that
∑n
i=1 xi > 0.
Then an agent with xi = 0 engages in liquidity provision in the sense that X
∗
i (t) > 0 for
all t > 0 if and only if ασ2λ > 2γ2. When ασ2λ < 2γ2 this agent engages in predatory
trading, and for ασ2λ = 2γ2 the agent does not trade at all.
Proof of Corollary 2.2.5. It follows from (2.37) that X∗i (t) has the same sign as
ρ− − θ− = γ
2λ
( −2n
n+ 1
+
√
1 + ξ −
√(n− 1
n+ 1
)2
+
ξ
n+ 1
)
,
where ξ = 4ασ2λ/γ2. The right-hand side is a strictly increasing function of ξ and vanishes
for ξ = 8.
Finally, we briefly discuss the behavior of equilibrium strategies as a function of the
number n of agents active in the market. Lebedeva et al. [2012] discuss the following
two hypothesis and analyze their validity for a large data set of block executions by large
insiders:
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Figure 2.8: Left: X∗1 (1.5) as a function of n ∈ {2, . . . , 20} for γ = 0.155 (circles) and
γ = 0.16 (bullets) with x1 = 1,
∑n
i=1 xi = 3.5, λ = 0.15, and ασ
2 = 0.33. Right: X∗1 (1.5)
as a function of n ∈ {2, . . . , 20} for ∑ni=1 xi = −10 (circles) and ∑ni=1 xi = 10 (bullets)
with x1 = 3, λ = 0.15, γ = 1.6, and ασ
2 = 0.33.
• Hypothesis 1: “Trade duration decreases if several insiders compete for exploiting
the same long-lived information.”
• Hypothesis 2: “Trade duration increases if several insiders trade simultaneously
in the same direction for liquidity reasons.”
In the situation of part 1 of our Theorem 2.2.2 we typically do indeed find equilibrium
strategies that are monotone in n, but the effective trade duration can be both increasing
and decreasing in n; see Figure 2.8. Here, the effective trade duration can be defined as
the time until a certain high percentage of the initial inventory has been liquidated. So
both hypotheses from Lebedeva et al. [2012] are compatible with risk-averse agents in an
Almgren–Chriss setting.
Chapter 3
A hot-potato game under transient
price impact
According to the Report CFTC-SEC [2010] on the Flash Crash of May 6, 2010, the events
that lead to the Flash Crash included a large sell order of E-Mini S&P 500 contracts:
. . . a large Fundamental Seller (. . . ) initiated a program to sell a total of 75,000
E-Mini contracts (valued at approximately $4.1 billion). . . . [On another] oc-
casion it took more than 5 hours for this large trader to execute the first
75,000 contracts of a large sell program. However, on May 6, when markets
were already under stress, the Sell Algorithm chosen by the large Fundamental
Seller to only target trading volume, and not price nor time, executed the sell
program extremely rapidly in just 20 minutes.
The report CFTC-SEC [2010] furthermore suggests that a “hot-potato game” between
high-frequency traders (HFTs) created artificial trading volume that contributed to the
acceleration of the Fundamental Seller’s trading algorithm:
. . . HFTs began to quickly buy and then resell contracts to each other—
generating a “hot-potato” volume effect as the same positions were rapidly
passed back and forth. Between 2:45:13 and 2:45:27, HFTs traded over 27,000
contracts, which accounted for about 49 percent of the total trading volume,
while buying only about 200 additional contracts net.
See also Kirilenko et al. [2010] for additional background.
Scho¨neborn [2008] observes that the equilibrium strategies of two competing economic
agents, who trade sufficiently fast in a simple market impact model with exponential
decay of price impact, can exhibit strong oscillations. These oscillations have a striking
similarity with the “hot-potato game” mentioned in CFTC-SEC [2010] and Kirilenko
et al. [2010]. In each trading period, one agent sells a large asset position to the other
agent and buys a similar position back in the next period. An intuitive reason for this
hot-potato game is to protect against possible predatory trading by the other agent.
In this chapter, we pick up this observation by Scho¨neborn [2008]. Our first contribu-
tion is to extend the result by identifying a unique Nash equilibrium for two competing
agents within a larger class of adaptive trading strategies and by giving an explicit for-
mula for the equilibrium strategies. This formula allows us to establish the existence of
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oscillatory equilibrium strategies in some generality. We call this extended model the
primary model.
Another new feature of the primary model is the addition of quadratic transaction
costs, which can be thought of temporary price impact in the sense of Bertsimas and Lo
[1998], Almgren and Chriss [2000] or as a transaction tax. The main goal of this chapter is
to study the impact of the additional transaction costs on equilibrium strategies. Theorem
3.1.14, one of our main results, precisely identifies a critical threshold θ∗ for the size θ of
these transaction costs at which all oscillations disappear. That is, for transactions θ ≥ θ∗
certain “fundamental” equilibrium strategies consist exclusively of all buy trades or of all
sell trades. For θ < θ∗, the “fundamental” equilibrium strategies will contain both buy
and sell trades when the resilience of price impact in between two trades is sufficiently
small.
In addition, numerical simulations will exhibit some rather striking properties of equi-
librium strategies. They reveal, for instance, that the expected costs of both agents can
be a decreasing function of θ ∈ [0, θ0] when trading speed is sufficiently high. As a result,
both agents can carry out their respective trades at a lower cost when there are transac-
tion costs, compared to the situation without transaction costs. Even more interesting is
the behavior of the costs as a function of the trading frequency. We will see that for θ = θ∗
the costs can decrease as the trading frequency goes up, whereas they can (essentially)
increase for θ = 0. In particular the latter effect is surprising, because at first glance a
higher trading frequency suggests greater flexibility in the choice of a strategy and hence
the possibility to use more efficient trading strategies. So why are the costs then increas-
ing in the trading frequency? We will argue that the intuitive reason for this effect is
a trade-off that occurs between the discouragement for predatory trading strategies by
the other agent and the additional payment of transaction costs for one’s own strategies.
The discouragement of predatory trading strategies through increased transaction costs
means that both agents can use more efficient strategies to carry out their trades, and
the benefits of the effects outweigh the price to be paid in the higher transaction costs.
We also extend the primary model in three aspects. First we impose permanent impact
and observe its interaction with transient impact and transaction costs. We will see that
incorporating permanent impact increases the critical value of transaction costs, i.e., one
needs to impose more transaction costs to prevent oscillatory strategies when there exists
permanent impact. Another aspect we discuss is splitting of combined liquidation costs.
We show the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria in the case that the combined
liquidation costs are not equally split. Since the combined liquidation costs in our model
will be taken by the one who trades slower than the other, the splitting of the combined
liquidation costs can be regarded as a problem of latency impact. Then we simulate Nash
equilibria in several cases. The last aspect we analyze is Nash equilibria in a closed-loop
model. In comparison to open-loop strategies, for each execution time point tn, closed-
loop strategies are allowed to take into account the trades of the other agent at execution
time points t0, . . . , tn−1. We derive an explicit formula of optimal closed-loop strategies
by dynamic programming. Through numerical simulations, we compare open-loop and
closed-loop strategies. Furthermore, we also impose transaction costs, unequal splitting
of combined liquidation costs and analyze their effects.
Another contribution of this chapter is to extend the primary model by considering its
continuous-time version. By two different approaches we obtain the same definition of the
liquidation costs, which is consistent with the primary model. A surprising result is that
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for any nontrivial case, a unique Nash equilibrium exists if and only if the transaction
costs θ are exactly equal to a critical value θ∗. Mathematically, there exists no strategy
that satisfies an equivalent condition for the existence of Nash equilibria if θ 6= θ∗. This
equivalent condition is defined through an integral equation. Furthermore, we also show
that the unique Nash equilibrium only consists of deterministic strategies. Intuitively,
when θ 6= θ∗, we observe by our numerical simulations that both agents will try to use
the strategies consisted of infinite tiny jumps to avoid the penalty of transaction costs.
However, these strategies are convergent to strategies having large jumps at the beginning
and the end of trading time horizon that lead to significant transaction costs. This causes
the nonexistence of Nash equilibria.
This chapter builds on several research developments in the existing literature. First,
there are several papers on predatory trading such as Brunnermeier and Pedersen [2005],
Carlin et al. [2007] and Scho¨neborn and Schied [2009] dealing with Nash equilibria for
several agents that are active in a market model with price impact. While predatory
trading prevails in Brunnermeier and Pedersen [2005], Carlin et al. [2007], it is found
in Scho¨neborn and Schied [2009] that, depending on market conditions, either predatory
trading or liquidity provision is optimal. In contrast to these previous studies, the price
impact model we use here goes back to Bouchaud et al. [2004] and Obizhaeva and Wang
[2013]. It is further developed in Alfonsi et al. [2008, 2010], Gatheral [2010], Predoiu
et al. [2011], Alfonsi et al. [2012], Lorenz and Schied [2012], to mention only a few related
papers. We refer to Gatheral and Schied [2013], Lehalle [2013] for recent surveys on the
price impact literature and extended bibliographies.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.1 we explain our modeling framework
of the primary model. The existence and uniqueness theorem for the Nash equilibrium is
stated and we analyze the oscillations of equilibrium strategies. Here we state one of the
main results on the critical threshold for the disappearance of oscillations. Section 3.1 is
based on Schied and Zhang [2013a]. In Section 3.2, three extensions of the primary model
are stated. Here we consider incorporation of permanent impact, unequal splitting of
combined liquidation costs and closed-loop strategies. For each extension we also present
numerical simulations. In Section 3.3, we define the liquidation costs and analyze the
continuous-time version of the primary model. Then we state another main result on the
existence of Nash equilibria and analyze why Nash equilibria exist only for one critical
value of transaction costs. At last we take a review on the effects of transaction costs in
single-agent models.
3.1 The primary model
3.1.1 Modeling framework
We consider two financial agents, X and Y , who are active in a market impact model for
one risky asset. When none of the two agents is active, asset prices are described by a right-
continuous martingale1 S0 = (S0t )t≥0 on a filtered probability space (Ω, (Ft)t≥0,F ,P),
for which F0 is P-trivial. The process S0 is often called the unaffected price process.
1The martingale assumption is natural from an economic point of view, because we are interested here
in high-frequency trading over short time intervals [0, T ]. See also the discussion in Alfonsi et al. [2012]
for additional arguments.
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Trading takes place at the discrete trading times of a time grid T = {t0, t1, . . . , tN},
where 0 = t0 < t1 < · · · < tN = T . Both agents are assumed to use trading strategies
that are admissible in the following sense.
Definition 3.1.1. Suppose that a time grid T = {t0, t1, . . . , tN} is given. An admissible
trading strategy for T and Z0 ∈ R is a vector ζ = (ζ0, . . . , ζN) of random variables such
that
1. each ζi is Fti-measurable and bounded,
2. Z0 = ζ0 + · · ·+ ζN P-a.s.
The set of all admissible strategies for given T and Z0 is denoted by X (Z0,T).
For ζ ∈ X (Z0,T), the value of ζi is taken as the number of shares traded at time
ti, with a positive sign indicating a sell order and a negative sign indicating a purchase.
Thus, the requirement 2 in the preceding definition can be interpreted by saying that Z0
is the initial asset position of the agent at time t0 = 0 and that by time tN = T (e.g., the
end of a trading day) the agent must have a zero inventory. The assumption that each ζi
is bounded can be made without loss of generality from an economic point of view.
When the two agents X and Y apply respective strategies ξ ∈ X (X0,T) and η ∈
X (Y0,T), the asset price is given by
Sξ,ηt = S
0
t − λ
∑
tk<t
e−ρ(t−tk)(ξk + ηk). (3.1)
That is, at each time tk ∈ T, the combined trading activities of the two agents move
the current price by the amount −λ(ξk + ηk), but this immediate price impact decays
exponentially in time at rate ρ ≥ 0. In this form, the model is a straightforward two-
agent extension of the market impact model of Obizhaeva and Wang [2013]. One intuition
behind this model is that Sξ,η describes the price movements of the mid-price in a block-
shaped limit order book of height 1/λ and without bid-ask spread; see, e.g., Alfonsi et al.
[2008], Obizhaeva and Wang [2013].
Let us now discuss the definition of the liquidation costs incurred by each agent. When
just one agent, say X, places a nonzero order at time tk, then the price is moved from
Sξ,ηtk to S
ξ,η
tk+
= Sξ,ηtk − λξk and the trade ξk incurs the following expenses:∫ Sξ,ηtk −λξk
Sξ,ηtk
z
1
λ
dz =
λ
2
ξ2k − Sξ,ηtk ξk.
Suppose now that the order ηk of agent Y is executed immediately after the order ξk.
Then the price is moved from Sξ,ηtk − λξk to Sξ,ηtk − λξk − ληk, and agent Y incurs the
expenses ∫ Sξ,ηtk −λξk−ληk
Sξ,ηtk
−λξk
z
1
λ
dz =
λ
2
η2k − Sξ,ηtk ηk + λξkηk.
So greater latency results in the additional cost term λξkηk for agent Y . Clearly, this
term would appear in the expenses of agent X when the roles of X and Y are reversed.
In the sequel, we are going to assume that none of the two agents has an advantage in
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latency over the other. Therefore, if both agents place nonzero orders at time tk, execution
priority is given to that agent who wins an independent coin toss.
In addition to the liquidation costs motivated above, we will also impose that each
trade ζk incurs quadratic transaction costs of the form θζ
2
k , where θ is a nonnegative
parameter.
Definition 3.1.2. Suppose that T = {t0, t1, . . . , tN}, X0 and Y0 are given. Let further-
more (εi)i=0,1,... be an i.i.d. sequence of Bernoulli (
1
2
)-distributed random variables that are
independent of σ(
⋃
t≥0Ft). Then the liquidation costs of ξ ∈ X (X0,T) given η ∈ X (Y0,T)
are defined as
CT(ξ|η) = X0S00 +
N∑
k=0
(λ
2
ξ2k − Sξ,ηtk ξk + εkλξkηk + θξ2k
)
, (3.2)
and the liquidation costs of η given ξ are
CT(η|ξ) = Y0S00 +
N∑
k=0
(λ
2
η2k − Sξ,ηtk ηk + (1− εk)λξkηk + θη2k
)
.
The term X0S
0
0 corresponds to the face value of the position X0 at time t = 0.
When the position X0 could be liquidated at face value, one would incur the expenses
−X0S00 . Therefore, the liquidation costs as defined in (3.2) are the difference of the actual
accumulated expenses, as represented by the sum on the right-hand side of (3.2), and the
expenses for liquidation at face value. In the following two remarks we comment on our
model assumptions from an economic point of view.
Remark 3.1.3. The market impact model we are using here has often been linked to
the placement of market orders in a block-shaped limit order book modeled in Obizhaeva
and Wang [2013], Alfonsi et al. [2008]. In the model version we use here, this picture is
simplified by neglecting bid-ask spread. As argued in Alfonsi et al. [2008], Alfonsi and
Schied [2010], this simplification is irrelevant for strategies that consist exclusively of buy
orders or exclusively of sell orders. For oscillatory strategies between buy and sell orders,
however, neglecting the bid-ask spread will be unrealistic as long as these strategies consist
exclusively of market orders. But in reality, strategies will involve a variety of different
order types and one should think of the costs (3.2) as the costs aggregated over order types.
For instance, while one may have to pay the spread when placing a market buy order,
one essentially earns it back when a limit sell order is executed. Moreover, high-frequency
traders often have access to a variety of more exotic order types that actually can pay
rebates when executed, and they can use crossing networks or dark pools in which orders
are executed at mid price. So for a setup of high-frequency trading, taking the bid-ask
spread as zero is probably not unrealistic. The existence of hot-potato games in real-world
markets, such as the one quoted from CFTC-SEC [2010], can be regarded as an empirical
justification of the zero-spread assumption, because such a trading behavior could never
be profitable when each trader had to pay the full spread upon each execution of an order.
As a matter of fact, even though high-frequency traders engaged in a hot-potato game
during the Flash Crash, Kirilenko et al. [2010, Figure 6] find that:
High Frequency Traders are consistently profitable although they never accu-
mulate a large net position. This does not change on May 6 as they appear to
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have been even more successful despite the market volatility observed on that
day.
Remark 3.1.4. We admit that we have chosen quadratic transaction costs because this
choice makes our model mathematically tractable. Yet, there are several aspects why
quadratic transaction costs may not be completely implausible from an economic point of
view. For instance, these costs can be regarded as arising from temporary price impact in
the spirit of Bertsimas and Lo [1998], Almgren and Chriss [2000], which is also quadratic
in order size. Moreover, these costs can model a transaction tax that is subject to tax
progression. With such a tax, small orders, such as those placed by small investors, are
taxed at a lower rate than large orders, which may be placed with the intention of moving
the market.
3.1.2 Nash equilibrium under transient price impact
We suppose now that each agent starts with a given initial position and minimizes the
expected costs over admissible strategies. Obizhaeva and Wang [2013] considered this
optimization problem when there is just one agent in the market; see Figure 3.2 for its
solution. Suppose now that there are two agents, X and Y . In a partial equilibrium,
only X has full knowledge of Y ’s strategy, whereas Y has no knowledge about X. The
strategy of agent Y will then create dynamic price impact, which will be perceived as
additional drift by agent X. So the optimization problem of agent X is equivalent to
minimizing the expected costs for an unaffected price process with additional drift. This
problem has been solved by Lorenz and Schied [2012] in a continuous-time version of the
model considered here and under the assumption θ = 0. They find that optimal strategies
for agent X often may not exist, and if they do, they may strongly depend on the time
derivative of the drift. It is shown in particular that agent X can make arbitrarily large
expected profits when Y uses the strategy from Obizhaeva and Wang [2013] and X has
slightly more time for closing the position than Y . This observation already indicates a
certain instability of the transient price impact model without transaction costs.
Here we will assume that both agents X and Y have full knowledge of the other’s
trading strategy and maximize the expected liquidation costs of their strategies accord-
ingly. In this situation, it is natural to define an optimality through the following notion
of Nash equilibrium.
Definition 3.1.5. For given time grid T and initial values X0, Y0 ∈ R, a Nash equilibrium
is a pair (ξ∗,η∗) of strategies in X (X0,T)×X (Y0,T) such that
E[ CT(ξ∗|η∗) ] = inf
ξ∈X (X0,T)
E[ CT(ξ|η∗) ] and E[ CT(η∗|ξ∗) ] = inf
η∈X (Y0,T)
E[ CT(η|ξ∗) ].
The existence of a unique Nash equilibrium in the class of deterministic strategies is
first shown in Scho¨neborn [2008, Theorem 9.1]. Here we extend this result first by includ-
ing transaction costs and giving an explicit form of the deterministic Nash equilibrium
and then by showing that this Nash equilibrium is also the unique Nash equilibrium in
the class of adapted strategies.
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To state out formula for this Nash equilibrium, we need to introduce the following
notation. For a fixed time grid T = {t0, . . . , tN}, we define the (N + 1)× (N + 1)-matrix
G by
Gi+1,j+1 = e
−ρ|ti−tj |, i, j = 0, . . . , N. (3.3)
We furthermore define the lower triangular matrix G˜ by
G˜ij =

Gij, if i > j;
1
2
, if i = j;
0, otherwise.
(3.4)
We will write 1 for the vector (1, . . . , 1)> ∈ RN+1. We furthermore define the two vectors
v =
1
1>(λG+ λG˜+ 2θ Id)−11
(λG+ λG˜+ 2θ Id)−11,
w =
1
1>(λG− λG˜+ 2θ Id)−11(λG− λG˜+ 2θ Id)
−11.
(3.5)
It will be proved in Lemma 3.1.8 below that the occurring matrices are invertible and
that the denominators in (3.5) are strictly positive so that v and w are well-defined.
A strategy ζ = (ζ0, . . . , ζN) ∈ X (Z0,T) will be identified with the (N + 1)-dimensional
random vector (ζ0, . . . , ζN)
>. Conversely, any vector z = (z1, . . . , zN+1)> ∈ RN+1 can be
identified with the deterministic strategy ζ with ζk = zk−1.
We can now state the following result on the existence and uniqueness of a Nash
equilibrium. As explained above, this result extends Scho¨neborn [2008, Theorem 9.1].
Theorem 3.1.6. Let ρ > 0, λ > 0, and θ ≥ 0 be given. For any time grid T and initial
values X0, Y0 ∈ R, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium (ξ∗,η∗) ∈ X (X0,T)×X (Y0,T).
The optimal strategies ξ∗ and η∗ are deterministic and given by
ξ∗ =
1
2
(X0 + Y0)v +
1
2
(X0 − Y0)w,
η∗ =
1
2
(X0 + Y0)v − 1
2
(X0 − Y0)w.
(3.6)
In order to prove Theorem 3.1.6, we state the following series of lemmas.
Lemma 3.1.7. The expected costs of an admissible strategy ξ ∈ X (X0,T) given another
admissible strategy η ∈ X (Y0,T) are
E[ CT(ξ|η) ] = E
[ 1
2
ξ>(λG+ 2θ Id)ξ + ξ>λG˜η
]
. (3.7)
Proof. Since the sequence (εi)i=0,1,... is independent of σ(
⋃
t≥0Ft) and the two strategies ξ
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and η are measurable with respect to this σ-field, we get E[ εkλξkηk ] = λ2E[ ξkηk ]. Hence,
E[ CT(ξ|η) ]−X0S00 = E
[ N∑
k=0
(λ
2
ξ2k − Sξ,ηtk ξk + εkλξkηk + θξ2k
)]
= E
[ N∑
k=0
(
λ
2
ξ2k +
λ
2
ξkηk − ξk
(
S0tk − λ
k−1∑
m=0
(ξm + ηm)e
−ρ(tk−tm)
)
+ θξ2k
)]
= E
[
−
N∑
k=0
ξkS
0
tk
+
λ
2
N∑
k=0
ξ2k + λ
N∑
k=0
ξk
k−1∑
m=0
ξme
−ρ(tk−tm)
+
N∑
k=0
(
ξk
(λ
2
ηk + λ
k−1∑
m=0
ηme
−ρ(tk−tm)
)
+ θξ2k
)]
.
Since each ξk is Ftk-measurable and S0 is a martingale, we get from condition 2 in Defi-
nition 3.1.1 that
E
[ N∑
k=0
ξkS
0
tk
]
= E
[ N∑
k=0
ξkS
0
T
]
= X0E[S0T ] = X0S00 .
Moreover,
λ
2
N∑
k=0
ξ2k + λ
N∑
k=0
ξk
k−1∑
m=0
ξme
−ρ(tk−tm) =
λ
2
N∑
k,m=0
ξkξme
−ρ|tk−tm| =
1
2
ξ>λGξ,
and
N∑
k=0
ξk
(λ
2
ηk + λ
k−1∑
m=0
ηme
−ρ(tk−tm)
)
= ξ>λG˜η.
Putting everything together yields the assertion.
We will use the convention of calling an n×n-matrix A positive definite when x>Ax >
0 for all nonzero x ∈ Rn, even when A is not necessarily symmetric. Clearly, for a positive
definite matrix A there is no nonzero x ∈ Rn for which Ax = 0, and so A is invertible.
Moreover, writing a given nonzero x ∈ Rn as x = Ay for y = A−1x 6= 0, we see that
x>A−1x = y>A>y = y>Ay > 0. So the inverse of a positive definite matrix is also
positive definite.
Lemma 3.1.8. For τ ≥ 0, the matrices G, G˜, G + G˜ + τ Id, G − G˜ + τ Id are positive
definite. In particular, all terms in (3.5) are well-defined and the denominators in (3.5)
are strictly positive.
Proof. That G is positive definite is easy to see; two different proofs are given for instance
in Theorem 3.3 of Alfonsi et al. [2008] or in Example 1 of Alfonsi et al. [2012]. Therefore,
for nonzero x ∈ RN+1,
0 < x>Gx = x>(G˜+ G˜>)x = x>G˜x+ x>G˜>x = 2x>G˜x,
which shows that G˜ is strictly positive definite. Next, G − G˜ = G˜> and so this matrix
is also strictly positive definite. Clearly, the sum of two positive definite matrices is also
positive definite, which shows that G+ G˜+ τ Id and G− G˜+ τ Id are positive definite for
τ ≥ 0.
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Lemma 3.1.9. For given time grid T and initial values X0 and Y0 there exists at most
one Nash equilibrium in the class X (X0,T)×X (Y0,T).
Proof. We suppose by way of contradiction that there exist two distinct Nash equilibria
(ξ0,η0) and (ξ1,η1) in X (X0,T)×X (Y0,T). Then we define for α ∈ [0, 1]
ξα := αξ1 + (1− α)ξ0 and ηα := αη1 + (1− α)η0.
We furthermore let
f(α) := E
[
CT(ξα|η0) + CT(ηα|ξ0) + CT(ξ1−α|η1) + CT(η1−α|ξ1)
]
.
According to Lemma 3.1.8 the matrix λG+ 2θ Id is positive definite, the functional
ξ 7−→ E[ CT(ξ|η) ] = E
[ 1
2
ξ>(λG+ 2θ Id)ξ + ξ>λG˜η
]
is strictly convex with respect to ξ. Since the two Nash equilibria (ξ0,η0) and (ξ1,η1) are
distinct, f(α) must also be strictly convex in α and have its unique minimum in α = 0.
That is,
f(α) > f(0) for α > 0. (3.8)
It follows that
lim
h↓0
f(h)− f(0)
h
=
df(α)
dα
∣∣∣
α=0+
≥ 0. (3.9)
Let us introduce the shorthand notation M := λG+ 2θ Id. Then, by the symmetry of M ,
E[ CT(ξα|η) ] = E
[ 1
2
(ξα)>Mξα + (ξα)>λG˜η
]
= E
[
1
2
α2(ξ1)>Mξ1 + α(1− α)(ξ1)>Mξ0 + 1
2
(1− α)2(ξ0)>Mξ0
+α(ξ1)>λG˜η + (1− α)(ξ0)>λG˜η
]
.
Therefore,
d
dα
∣∣∣
α=0+
E[ CT(ξα|η) ] = E
[
(ξ1 − ξ0)>Mξ0 + (ξ1 − ξ0)>λG˜η
]
.
Hence, it follows that
d
dα
∣∣∣
α=0+
f(α)
= E
[
(ξ1 − ξ0)>Mξ0 + (ξ1 − ξ0)>λG˜η0 + (ξ0 − ξ1)>Mξ1 + (ξ0 − ξ1)>λG˜η1
+ (η1 − η0)>Mη0 + (η1 − η0)>λG˜ξ0 + (η0 − η1)>Mη1 + (η0 − η1)>λG˜ξ1
]
= −E
[
(ξ1 − ξ0)>M(ξ1 − ξ0) + (η1 − η0)>M(η1 − η0)
]
+ E
[
(ξ1 − ξ0)>λG˜(η0 − η1) + (ξ1 − ξ0)>λG˜>(η0 − η1)
]
= −E
[
(ξ1 − ξ0)>M(ξ1 − ξ0) + (η1 − η0)>M(η1 − η0)
]
− E
[
(ξ1 − ξ0)>λG(η1 − η0)
]
.
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Now,
(ξ1 − ξ0)>λG(η1 − η0) + 1
2
(
(ξ1 − ξ0)>M(ξ1 − ξ0) + (η1 − η0)>M(η1 − η0)
)
≥ 1
2
(
(ξ1 − ξ0 + η1 − η0)>λG(ξ1 − ξ0 + η1 − η0)
)
≥ 0.
Therefore, and because the two Nash equilibria (ξ0,η0) and (ξ1,η1) are distinct, we have
d
dα
∣∣∣
α=0+
f(α) ≤ −1
2
E
[
(ξ1 − ξ0)>λG(ξ1 − ξ0) + (η1 − η0)>λG(η1 − η0)
]
< 0,
which contradicts (3.9). Therefore, there can exist at most one Nash equilibrium in the
class X (X0,T)×X (Y0,T).
Now let us introduce the class
Xdet(Z0,T) :=
{
ζ ∈ X (Z0,T)
∣∣∣ ζ is deterministic}
of deterministic strategies in X (Z0,T). A Nash equilibrium in the class Xdet(X0,T) ×
Xdet(Y0,T) is defined in the same way as in Definition 3.1.5.
Lemma 3.1.10. A Nash equilibrium in the class Xdet(X0,T)×Xdet(Y0,T) of deterministic
strategies is also a Nash equilibrium in the class X (X0,T)×X (Y0,T) of adapted strategies.
Proof. Assume that (ξ∗,η∗) is a Nash equilibrium in the class Xdet(X0,T) × Xdet(Y0,T)
of deterministic strategies. We need to show that ξ∗ minimizes E[ CT(ξ|η∗) ] and η∗ mini-
mizes E[ CT(η|ξ∗) ] in the respective classes X (X0,T) and X (Y0,T) of adapted strategies.
To this end, let ξ ∈ X (X0,T) be given. We define ξ ∈ Xdet(X0,T) by ξk = E[ ξk ] for
k = 0, 1, . . . , N .
Using once again the shorthand notation M := λG + 2θ Id and applying Jensen’s
inequality to the convex function RN+1 3 x 7→ x>Mx, we obtain
E[ CT(ξ|η∗) ] = E
[1
2
ξ>Mξ + ξ>λG˜η∗
]
= E
[1
2
ξ>Mξ
]
+ ξ
>
λG˜η∗
≥ 1
2
ξ
>
Mξ + ξ
>
λG˜η∗ = E[ CT(ξ|η∗) ]
≥ E[ CT(ξ∗|η∗) ].
This shows that ξ∗ minimizes E[ CT(ξ|η∗) ] over ξ ∈ X (X0,T). One can show analogously
that η∗ minimizes E[ CT(η|ξ∗) ] over η ∈ X (Y0,T), which completes the proof.
Remark 3.1.11. Before proving Theorem 3.1.6, we briefly explain how to derive the
explicit form (3.6) of the equilibrium strategies. By Lemma 3.1.7 and the method of
Lagrange multipliers, a necessary condition for (ξ∗,η∗) to be a Nash equilibrium in
Xdet(X0,T)×Xdet(Y0,T) is the existence of α, β ∈ R, such that{
Mξ∗ + λG˜η∗ = α1;
Mη∗ + λG˜ξ∗ = β1,
(3.10)
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where M := λG+ 2θ Id. By adding the equations in (3.10) we obtain
(M + λG˜)(ξ∗ + η∗) = (α + β)1. (3.11)
By Lemma 3.1.8, the matrix M + λG˜ is positive definite and hence invertible, so that
(3.11) can be solved for ξ∗ + η∗. Since we must also have 1>(ξ∗ + η∗) = X0 + Y0, we
obtain
ξ∗ + η∗ =
X0 + Y0
1>(M + λG˜)−11
(M + λG˜)−11 = (X0 + Y0)v.
Similarly, subtracting one equation from the other in (3.10) yields
(M − λG˜)(ξ∗ − η∗) = (α− β)1.
It follows again from Lemma 3.1.8 that (M − λG˜) is invertible, and so we have
ξ∗ − η∗ = X0 − Y0
1T (M − λG˜)−11(M − λG˜)
−11 = (X0 − Y0)w.
Thus, ξ∗ and η∗ must necessarily be given by (3.6).
Proof of Theorem 3.1.6. By Lemmas 3.1.9 and 3.1.10 all we need to show is that (3.6)
defines a Nash equilibrium in the class Xdet(X0,T)×Xdet(Y0,T) of deterministic strategies.
For (ξ,η) ∈ Xdet(X0,T)×Xdet(Y0,T) we have, using the shorthand notation M := λG+
2θ Id,
E[ CT(ξ|η) ] = 1
2
ξ>Mξ + ξ>λG˜η. (3.12)
Therefore minimizing E[ CT(ξ|η) ] over ξ ∈ Xdet(X0,T) is equivalent to the minimization
of the quadratic form on the right-hand side of (3.12) over ξ ∈ RN+1 under the constraint
1>ξ = X0.
Now we prove that the strategies ξ∗ and η∗ given by (3.6) are indeed optimal. We
have
Mξ∗ + λG˜η∗ =
1
2
(X0 + Y0)(M + λG˜)v +
1
2
(X0 − Y0)(M − λG˜)w = µ1, (3.13)
where
µ =
X0 + Y0
21>(M + λG˜)1
+
X0 − Y0
21>(M − λG˜)1 .
Now let ξ ∈ Xdet(X0,T) be arbitrary and define ζ := ξ − ξ∗. Then we have ζ>1 = 0.
Hence, by the symmetry of M ,
1
2
ξ>Mξ + ξ>λG˜η∗ =
1
2
(ξ∗)>Mξ∗ +
1
2
ζ>Mζ + ζ>Mξ∗ + (ξ∗)>λG˜η∗ + ζ>λG˜η∗
=
1
2
(ξ∗)>Mξ∗ + (ξ∗)>λG˜η∗ +
1
2
ζ>Mζ + µζ>1
≥ 1
2
(ξ∗)>Mξ∗ + (ξ∗)>λG˜η∗,
where in the last step we have used thatM is positive definite and that ζ>1 = 0. Therefore
ξ∗ minimizes (3.12) in the class Xdet(X0,T) for η = η∗. In the same way, one shows that
η∗ minimizes E[ CT(η|ξ∗) ] over η ∈ Xdet(X0,T).
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3.1.3 Effects of transaction costs
We now turn toward a qualitative analysis of the equilibrium strategies. By means of
numerical simulations and the analysis of a particular example, Scho¨neborn [2008, Section
9.3] observes that the equilibrium strategies may exhibit strong oscillations when θ = 0;
see Figure 3.1 for illustrations. In Scho¨neborn [2008], these oscillations are interpreted as a
way of hedging against predatory trading by the other agent. The subsequent proposition
implies that such oscillations will always occur in a Nash equilibrium with X0 = −Y0 and
θ = 0 when the trading frequency is sufficiently high. Note that this Nash equilibrium is
completely determined by the vector w. Throughout this subsection, we will concentrate
on equidistant time grids,
TN :=
{kT
N
∣∣∣ k = 0, 1, . . . , N}, N ∈ N. (3.14)
Proposition 3.1.12. Suppose that ρ, λ, T > 0 and N ∈ N are fixed, and TN is as in
(3.14).
1. For θ = 0, there exists N0 ∈ N such that for N ≥ N0 the entries of the vector
w = (w1, . . . , wN+1) are nonzero and have alternating signs: wkwk+1 < 0 for k =
1, . . . , N .
2. For N ≥ N0 there exists δ > 0 such that for 0 ≤ θ < δ the entries of the vector
w = (w1, . . . , wN+1) are nonzero and have alternating signs.
Proof. We need to compute the inverse of the matrix (λG − λG˜ + 2θ Id). Setting κ :=
2θ/λ+ 1
2
, this matrix is equal to 1
λ
(G− G˜+ (κ− 1
2
) Id)−1. Setting furthermore a := e−ρT ,
we have
λG− λG˜+ λ
(
κ− 1
2
)
Id = λ

κ a
1
N a
2
N · · · aN−1N a
0 κ a
1
N · · · aN−2N aN−1N
0
. . . . . . . . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . . . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . . . . κ a
1
N
0 · · · · · · · · · 0 κ

.
It is easy to verify that the inverse of this matrix is given by
ΓN :=
1
λ

1
κ
−a 1N
κ2
−a 2N (κ−1)
κ3
· · · −a
N−1
N (κ−1)N−2
κN
−aNN (κ−1)N−1
κN+1
0 1
κ
−a 1N
κ2
· · · −a
N−2
N (κ−1)N−3
κN−1
−aN−1N (κ−1)N−2
κN
0
. . . . . . . . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . . . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . . . . 1
κ
−a 1N
κ2
0 · · · · · · · · · 0 1
κ

. (3.15)
Let us denote by u = (u1, u2, . . . , uN+1) ∈ RN+1 the vector λΓN1. Then we have uN+1 = 1κ
3.1. THE PRIMARY MODEL 47
and, for n = 1, . . . , N , un = un+1 − a(N+1−n)/N(κ− 1)N−n/κN+2−n. That is,
un =
1
κ
− a
1
N
κ2
N∑
m=n
(a 1N (κ− 1)
κ
)N−m
=
1
κ
− a
1
N
κ2
N−n∑
k=0
(a 1N (κ− 1)
κ
)k
=
1
κ
[
1− a
1
N
κ(1− a 1N ) + a 1N + (−1)
N+1−n a
1
N
κ(1− a 1N ) + a 1N
(a 1N (1− κ)
κ
)N+1−n]
.
(3.16)
When θ = 0, we have
un = 2
[
1− 2a
1
N
1 + a
1
N
+ (−1)N+1−n2a
N+2−n
N
1 + a
1
N
]
. (3.17)
Since a < 1, we have
0 ≤ 1− 2a
1
N
1 + a
1
N
< 1− a 1N −→ 0, as N ↑ ∞.
On the other hand, we have
2a
N+2−n
N
1 + a
1
N
≥ aN+2−nN ≥ aN+1N −→ a, as N ↑ ∞.
Therefore, the signs of un will alternate as soon asN is large enough to have 1−a 1N < aN+1N .
This proves part (a). As for part (b), since the expression (3.16) is continuous in κ, the
signs of un will still alternate if, for fixed N ≥ N0, we take κ slightly larger than 1/2.
(Note however that the term (1− κ)N/κN tends to zero faster than 1− a 1N , so we cannot
get this result uniformly in N).
We refer to the right-hand panel of Figure 3.1 for an illustration of the oscillations
of the vector w. As shown in the left-hand panel of the same figure, similar oscillations
occur for the vector v. The mathematical analysis for v, however, is much harder than
for w, and at this time we are not able to prove a result that could be an analogue of
Proposition 3.1.12 for the vector v.
Remark 3.1.13. Alfonsi et al. [2012] discover similar oscillations for the trade execution
strategies of a single trader under transient price impact when price impact does not
decay as a convex function of time. These oscillations, however, result from an attempt
to exploit the delay in market response to a large trade, and they disappear when price
impact decays as a convex function of time, see Alfonsi et al. [2012, Theorem 1]. In
particular, when there is just one agent active in our market impact model then for each
time grid T there exists a unique optimal strategy, which consists either of all buy trades
or of all sell trades. As a matter of fact, there is an explicit formula for this strategy when
θ = 0; see Alfonsi et al. [2008] and Figure 3.2.
We can now turn to present one of the main results in this chapter. It is concerned
with the oscillations of both v and w when the parameter θ increases. Intuitively it is
clear that increased transaction costs will penalize trading oscillations and thus lead to a
smoothing of the equilibrium strategies. The following theorem shows that there exists a
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Figure 3.1: Vectors v (left) and w (right) for the equidistant time grid T50 and parameters
λ = ρ = 1 and θ = 0. By (3.6), (v,v) is the equilibrium for X0 = Y0 = 1, and (w,−w)
is the equilibrium for X0 = −Y0 = 1. Yet, some individual components of both v and w
exceed in either direction 60% of the sizes of the initial positions X0 and Y0.
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
Figure 3.2: Optimal strategies with parameters θ = 0 (left) and θ = 0.25 (right) for the
case in which there is just one agent active in the market. We have used the equidistant
time grid T50, the initial condition Z0 = 1, and parameters λ = ρ = 1 and θ = 0.
critical value θ∗ at which all oscillations of v and w disappear but below which oscillations
are present. That is, for θ ≥ θ∗ all equilibrium strategies for X0 = Y0 or X0 = −Y0 consist
exclusive of all buy trades or of all sell trades. For θ < θ∗, the corresponding equilibrium
strategies will contain both buy and sell trades as soon as resilience between two trades
is sufficiently small. We can even determine the precise critical value θ∗ at which the
transition between oscillation and monotonicity occurs: it is given by θ∗ = λ/4.
Theorem 3.1.14. Suppose that λ, T > 0 are fixed and TN is as in (3.14). Then the
following conditions are equivalent.
(a) For every N ∈ N and ρ > 0, all components of v are nonnegative.
(b) For every N ∈ N and ρ > 0, all components of w are nonnegative.
(c) θ ≥ θ∗ = λ/4.
Proof of (c)⇔(b) in Theorem 3.1.14. Recall from the proof of Proposition 3.1.12 the no-
tations a := e−ρT and κ = 2θ/λ + 1
2
and the definition of the vector u = (u1, . . . , uN+1),
which has only nonnegative entries if and only if w has only nonnegative entries. Our
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Figure 3.3: Vectors v (left) and w (right) for the equidistant time grid T50 and parameters
λ = ρ = 1 and θ = 0.25. In contrast to the equilibrium strategies in Figure 3.1, these
strategies consist of only buy trades.
condition (c) is equivalent to κ − 1 ≥ 0. Therefore, when (c) holds, we get with (3.16)
that
un =
1
κ
− a
1
N
κ2
N−n∑
m=0
(a 1N (κ− 1)
κ
)m
≥ 1
κ
− 1
κ2
∞∑
m=0
(κ− 1
κ
)m
= 0.
This establishes (c)⇒(b).
For the proof of the converse implication, we observe that κ < 1 and limN↑+∞ a
1
N = 1
imply that
uN =
1
κ
− a
1
N
κ2
must be strictly negative for sufficiently large N or sufficiently small ρ. This shows that
we cannot have (b) without (c).
Proof of (a)⇒(c) in Theorem 3.1.14. We consider the case N = 2 and show that v2 < 0
for θ < λ/4 when ρ is sufficiently small. Setting a := e−ρT and τ := 3/2 + 2θ/λ, we have
M :=
1
λ
(
λG+ λG˜+ 2θ Id
)
=
 τ √a a2√a τ √a
2a 2
√
a τ
 .
A straightforward calculation verifies that
M−1 =
1
detM
 τ 2 − 2a √a(2a− τ) a− aτ2√a(a− τ) τ 2 − 2a2 √a(2a− τ)
−2a(τ − 2) 2√a(a− τ) τ 2 − 2a
 ,
where
detM = τ 3 − (4a+ 2a2)τ + 6a2. (3.18)
Therefore, the second component of the vector (λG+ λG˜+ 2θ Id)−11 is given by
1
λ detM
(
τ 2 − 3τ + 2). (3.19)
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It is easy to see from (3.18) that detM is increasing in τ for τ ≥ 3/2. Hence,
detM ≥
(3
2
)3
− 6a+ 3a2 ≥
(3
2
)3
− 3 = 0.375 > 0.
One therefore sees that (3.19) is strictly negative for all τ ∈ [3/2, 2), which shows that we
cannot have v2 ≥ 0 when θ < λ/4.
We will now prepare for the proof of the implication (c)⇒(a) in Theorem 3.1.14. This
proof relies results on so-called M -matrices given in the book Berman and Plemmons
[1994]. We first introduce some notations. When A is a matrix or vector, we will write
1. A ≥ 0 if each entry of A is nonnegative;
2. A > 0 if A ≥ 0 and at least one entry is strictly positive;
3. A 0 if each entry of A is strictly positive.
Definition 3.1.15 (Definition 1.2 in Chapter 6 of Berman and Plemmons [1994]). A
matrix A ∈ Rn×n is called a nonsingular M-matrix if it is of the form A = s Id−B, where
the matrix B ∈ Rn×n satisfies B ≥ 0 and the parameter s > 0 is strictly larger than the
spectral radius of B.
Also recall that a matrix A ∈ Rn×n is called a Z-matrix if all its off-diagonal elements
are nonpositive. Berman and Plemmons [1994] give 50 equivalent characterizations of the
fact that a given Z-matrix is a nonsingular M -matrix. We will need two of them here
and summarize them in the following statement.
Theorem 3.1.16 (From Theorem 2.3 in Chapter 6 of Berman and Plemmons [1994]).
For a Z-matrix A ∈ Rn×n, the following conditions are equivalent.
1. A is a nonsingular M-matrix.
2. All the leading principal minors of A are positive.
3. A is inverse-positive; that is, A−1 exists and A−1 ≥ 0.
4. A+ α Id is nonsingular for all α ≥ 0.
Proof of (c)⇒(a) in Theorem 3.1.14. In the first step, we show that the matrix
M := (λG)−1(2θ Id + λG˜)
is a nonsingular M -matrix when θ ≥ λ
4
. To this end, will also once again use the shorthand
notations a := e−ρT and κ = 2θ/λ+ 1
2
and we will use the explicit form of G−1, which has
been derived in Alfonsi et al. [2008, Theorem 3.4]:
G−1 =
1
1− a 2N

1 −a 1N 0 · · · · · · 0
−a 1N 1 + a 2N −a 1N 0 · · · 0
0
. . . . . . . . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . . . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . −a 1N 1 + a 2N −a 1N
0 · · · · · · 0 −a 1N 1

.
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Thus, M = (λG)−1(2θ Id + λG˜) is equal to
G−1 ·

κ 0 · · · · · · · · · 0
a
1
N κ 0 · · · · · · 0
a
2
N a
1
N
. . . . . . . . .
...
...
...
. . . . . . 0
...
a
N−1
N a
N−2
N
. . . . . . κ 0
a
N
N a
N−1
N · · · · · · a 1N κ

=
1
1− a 2N

κ− a 2N −κa 1N 0 · · · · · · 0
−a 1N (κ− 1) a 2N (κ− 1) + κ −κa 1N 0 · · · 0
0
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
...
...
. . . 0 −a 1N (κ− 1) a 2N (κ− 1) + κ −κa 1N
0 · · · · · · 0 −a 1N (κ− 1) κ

.
Our condition (c) is equivalent to κ ≥ 1, which by the preceding matrix identity is in
turn equivalent to the fact that M is a Z-matrix. By Theorem 3.1.16, M will thus be
an M -matrix if and only if all its leading principal minors M[n], n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N + 1},
are positive. Using the following identity for M[n], which will be shown below in Lemma
3.1.18, we obtain that for n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}
M[n] =
1
(1− a 2N )n
(
κn −
n−1∑
k=0
κn−1−k(κ− 1)ka 2(k+1)N
)
>
1
(1− a 2N )n
(
κn −
n−1∑
k=0
κn−1−k(κ− 1)k
)
=
(κ− 1)n
(1− a 2N )n
≥ 0.
And M[N+1] =
κN+1
(1−a 2N )N
> 0. Therefore, M = (λG)−1(2θ Id + λG˜) is a nonsingular M -
matrix. It can hence be written as s Id − B, where B is non-negative and s is strictly
larger than the spectral radius, ρ(B), of B. It follows that the matrix
Id + (λG)−1(2θ Id + λG˜) = (s+ 1) Id−B
is also a nonsingular M -matrix. By Theorem 3.1.16, every nonsingular M -matrix is
inverse-positive. Since
(λG)−11 =
1
λ(1 + a
1
N )
(
1, 1− a 1N , . . . , 1− a 1N , 1
)T
 0,
we thus have(
λG+ 2θ Id + λG˜
)−1
1 =
(
Id + (λG)−1(2θ Id + λG˜)
)−1
(λG)−11 ≥ 0.
This concludes the proof.
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Lemma 3.1.17. For n ≥ 3, let Tn be the n× n-tridiagonal matrix
Tn =

a1 b1 0 · · · · · · 0
c1 a2 b2 0
. . . 0
0 c2 a3 b3 · · · 0
...
. . . . . . . . . . . .
...
0 · · · · · · cn−2 an−1 bn−1
0 · · · · · · 0 cn−1 an

.
Its determinant can be computed recursively as follows
detTn = an detTn−1 − bn−1cn−1 detTn−2.
Proof. We develop the determinant first via the cofactors of the last row and then by the
cofactors of the last column to get
detTn = (−1)2n−1cn−1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
a1 b1 0 · · · · · · 0
c1 a2 b2 0
. . . 0
0 c2 a3 b3 · · · 0
...
. . . . . . . . . . . .
...
0 · · · · · · cn−3 an−2 0
0 · · · · · · 0 cn−2 bn−1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
+ (−1)2nan
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
a1 b1 0 · · · · · · 0
c1 a2 b2 0
. . . 0
0 c2 a3 b3 · · · 0
...
. . . . . . . . . . . .
...
0 · · · · · · cn−3 an−2 bn−2
0 · · · · · · 0 cn−2 an−1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= (−1)2n−1(−1)2(n−1)bn−1cn−1 detTn−2 + an detTn−1
= an detTn−1 − bn−1cn−1 detTn−2.
Lemma 3.1.18. The leading principal minors of the matrix M = (λG)−1(2θ Id+λG˜) are
given by
M[n] =

1
(1− a 2N )n
(
κn −
n−1∑
k=0
κn−1−k(κ− 1)ka 2(k+1)N
)
, for n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N},
κN+1
(1− a 2N )N , for n = N + 1.
(3.20)
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Proof. We proceed by induction on n. First, we clearly have
M[1] =
κ− a 2N
1− a 2N ,
M[2] =
1
(1− a 2N )2
(
(κ− a 2N )(a 2N (κ− 1) + κ)− κa 2N (κ− 1))
=
1
(1− a 2N )2
(
κ2 − κa 2N − (κ− 1)a 4N
)
,
M[3] =
1
(1− a 2N )3
(
κ3 − κ2a 6N − κ2a 4N − κ2a 2N + 2a 6N κ+ κa 4N − a 6N
)
=
1
(1− a 2N )3
(
κ3 − κ2a 2N − κ(κ− 1)a 4N − (κ− 1)2a 6N
)
.
These formulas coincide with (3.20) for n = 1, 2, 3.
Now we assume that for some 3 ≤ n ≤ N − 1,
M[m] =
1
(1− a 2N )m
(
κm −
m−1∑
k=0
κm−1−k(κ− 1)ka 2(k+1)N
)
, where m = n− 1, n.
By Lemma (3.1.17), M[n+1] can be computed via M[n] and M[n−1]:
M[n+1] =
a
2
N (κ− 1) + κ
1− a 2N
M[n] −
κa
2
N (κ− 1)
(1− a 2N )2
M[n−1]
=
a
2
N (κ− 1) + κ
(1− a 2N )n+1
(
κn −
n−1∑
k=0
κn−1−k(κ− 1)ka 2(k+1)N
)
− κa
2
N (κ− 1)
(1− a 2N )n+1
(
κn−1 −
n−2∑
k=0
κn−2−k(κ− 1)ka 2(k+1)N
)
=
1
(1− a 2N )n+1
(
κ(κ− 1)a 2N + κn+1 −
n−1∑
k=0
κn−1−k(κ− 1)k+1a 2(k+2)N
−
n−1∑
k=0
κn−k(κ− 1)ka 2(k+1)N − κna 2N (κ− 1) +
n−2∑
k=0
κn−1−k(κ− 1)k+1a 2(k+2)N
)
= κn+1 − (κ− 1)na 2(n+1)N −
n−1∑
k=0
κn−k(κ− 1)ka 2(k+1)N
= κn+1 −
n∑
k=0
κn−k(κ− 1)ka 2(k+1)N ,
which also coincides with (3.20).
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In the last step, we compute M[N+1]. To this end, we use once again Lemma 3.1.17:
M[N+1] =
κ
1− a 2N
M[N ] −
κa
2
N (κ− 1)
(1− a 2N )2
M[N−1]
=
κ
(1− a 2N )N+1
(
κN −
N−1∑
k=0
κN−1−k(κ− 1)ka 2(k+1)N
)
− κa
2
N (κ− 1)
(1− a 2N )n+1
(
κN−1 −
N−2∑
k=0
κN−2−k(κ− 1)ka 2(k+1)N
)
=
κ
(1− a 2N )N+1
(
κN+1 −
N−1∑
k=0
κN−k(κ− 1)ka 2(k+1)N
− κNa 2N (κ− 1) +
N−2∑
k=0
κN−1−k(κ− 1)k+1a 2(k+2)N
)
=
κ
(1− a 2N )N+1
(
κN+1 −
N−1∑
k=0
κN−k(κ− 1)ka 2(k+1)N
− κNa 2N (κ− 1) +
N−1∑
k=0
κN−k(κ− 1)ka 2(k+1)N
)
=
κ
(1− a 2N )N+1
(
κN+1 − κNa 2N − κN+1a 2N + κNa 2N
)
=
κN+1
(1− a 2N )N
.
This completes the proof.
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Figure 3.4: Expected costs E[ CT1000(ξ∗|η∗) ] = E[ CT1000(η∗|ξ∗) ] as a function of θ. The
costs decrease steeply from the value of 0.7472 for θ = 0 to 0.7398 for θ = 0.06. From then
on there is a moderate and almost linear increase with, e.g., a value of 0.7403 at θ = 0.5.
We take the equidistant time grid T1000, initial values X0 = Y0 = 1, and λ = ρ = 1.
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Figure 3.5: Expected costs E[ CT
2N
(ξ∗|η∗) ] = E[ CT
2N
(η∗|ξ∗) ] as a function of N with the
equidistant time grids T2N (left) and TN (right) and parameters λ = ρ = 1, X0 = Y0 = 1.
Due to our explicit formulas (3.5) and (3.6), it is easy to analyze the Nash equilibrium
numerically. These numerical simulations exhibit a striking effect: it is possible that the
individual costs for each agent are lower in a model with nonzero transaction costs than
in the corresponding model without transaction costs. Figure 3.4 shows the expected
costs E[ CT(ξ∗|η∗) ] = E[ CT(η∗|ξ∗) ] for X0 = Y0 as a function of θ. When θ increases
from the value θ = 0, these costs start to decline steeply toward a minimum, after which
there is a slow and steady increase. Even more interesting is the behavior illustrated in
Figure 3.5, where the same expected costs are plotted for θ = 0 and θ = θ∗ as a function
of N . For θ = θ∗ the costs are decreasing in N , whereas they are increasing for θ = 0
(modulo a sawtooth pattern corresponding to odd and even values of N). In particular the
observation that the expected costs are increasing for θ = 0 is very surprising, because
a higher trading frequency suggests greater flexibility and the possibility to use more
efficient trading strategies.
So why are the costs then increasing in N? The answer is that a higher trading
frequency increases also the possibility for the competitor to conduct predatory strategies
at the expense of the other agent. In reaction, the other needs to take stronger protective
measures against predatory trading. The hot-potato game, thus, is the result of the
need of protection against predatory trading by competitors. When transaction costs
increase, predatory trading becomes less profitable, and so both agents need less protection
against possible assaults by their competitor. As a result, both can choose more efficient
strategies than before and thus benefit from an increase in trading frequency. Therefore,
the expected costs are decreasing in N when θ = θ∗. The same effect is responsible for
the steep initial decrease of the expected costs as a function of θ, which is illustrated in
Figure 3.4.
3.1.4 Analysis of the high-frequency limit
In this subsection, we analyze the possible convergence of the equilibrium strategies when
the trading frequency tends to infinity. To this end, we consider the equidistant time
grids TN as defined in (3.14) for varying N ∈ N and write v(N) = (v(N)1 , . . . , v(N)N+1) and
w(N) = (w
(N)
1 , . . . , w
(N)
N+1) for the vectors in (3.5) to make the dependence on N explicit.
We start with the following proposition, which analyzes the convergence of the individual
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components of w(N) when N ↑ ∞. By (3.6), a Nash equilibrium with X0 = −Y0 is
completely determined by w(N).
Proposition 3.1.19. Suppose that n is fixed.
1. When θ = 0, we have
lim
N↑∞
w(2N)n = (−1)n+1
2a
2ρT + a+ 1
and lim
N↑∞
w(2N+1)n = (−1)n
2a
2ρT − a+ 1 ,
(3.21)
as well as
lim
N↑∞
w
(2N)
2N+1−n = (−1)n
2
2ρT + a+ 1
and lim
N↑∞
w
(2N+1)
2N+2−n = (−1)n
2
2ρT − a+ 1 .
(3.22)
2. When θ > 0, we have
lim
N↑∞
w(N)n = 0,
and
lim
N↑∞
w
(N)
N+1−n =
(4θ − λ
4θ + λ
)n 2λ
(ρT + 1)(4θ + λ)
. (3.23)
Lemma 3.1.20. Let ΓN be as in (3.15) and let us denote by u
(N) = (u
(N)
1 , u
(N)
2 , . . . , u
(N)
N+1) ∈
RN+1 the vector λΓN1. When n ∈ {1, . . . , N + 1}, then
n∑
m=1
u(N)m =
1
κ
[
n
(
1− a
1
N
κ(1− a 1N ) + a 1N
)
+
a
1
N
κ(1− a 1N ) + a 1N
(a 1N (κ− 1)
κ
)N+1−n (a 1N (κ−1)
κ
)n − 1
a
1
N (κ−1)
κ
− 1
]
.
Proof. The assertion follows from (3.16) by noting that
n∑
m=1
(a 1N (κ− 1)
κ
)N+1−m
=
(a 1N (κ− 1)
κ
)N+1−n (a 1N (κ−1)
κ
)n − 1
a
1
N (κ−1)
κ
− 1
.
Proof of Proposition 3.1.19. Let ΓN and u
(N) be as in Lemma 3.1.20. We need to nor-
malize the vector u(N) with 1>λΓN1 = 1>u(N) to get w(N). Taking n = N + 1 in Lemma
3.1.20 yields
1>λΓN1 =
N+1∑
n=1
u(N)n
=
1
κ
[
(N + 1)
(
1− a
1
N
κ(1− a 1N ) + a 1N
)
+
a
1
N
κ(1− a 1N ) + a 1N ·
(a 1N (κ−1)
κ
)N+1 − 1
a
1
N (κ−1)
κ
− 1
]
.
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Note that
(N + 1)
(
1− a
1
N
κ(1− a 1N ) + a 1N
)
−→ −κ log a = κρT as N ↑ ∞. (3.24)
Moreover, κ ≥ 1/2 implies that |κ − 1|/κ ≤ 1 with equality if and only if κ = 1/2. We
therefore get that for κ = 1/2, which is the same as θ = 0,
lim
N↑∞
1>λΓ2N1 = ρT +
1 + a
2κ
= ρT + a+ 1,
lim
N↑∞
1>λΓ2N+11 = ρT +
1− a
2κ
= ρT − a+ 1.
(3.25)
For κ > 1/2, we have
lim
N↑∞
1>λΓN1 = ρT + 1. (3.26)
The assertions now follow easily by taking limits in (3.17) and (3.16).
The preceding proposition gives further background on the oscillations of equilibrium
strategies in the regime θ < λ/4. In particular, (3.21) shows that in a Nash equilibrium
with X0 = −Y0 and with θ = 0 the trades of both agents asymptotically oscillate be-
tween ±const and that the sign of each trade also depends on whether N is odd or even.
Moreover, (3.23) implies that, for K ∈ N fixed and N ↑ ∞, the terminal K trades in an
equilibrium strategy asymptotically oscillate between ±const if and only if θ < λ/4.
Now we consider the Nash equilibrium (ξ∗,(N),η∗,(N)) with initial positions X0, Y0 and
time grid TN . We define the asset positions of the two agents via
X
(N)
t := X0 −
dNt
T
e∑
k=1
ξ
∗,(N)
k , Y
(N)
t := Y0 −
dNt
T
e∑
k=1
η
∗,(N)
k , t ≥ 0. (3.27)
In the case X0 = −Y0, we have X(N) = −Y (N) = X0W (N), where
W
(N)
t = 1−
dNt
T
e∑
k=1
w
(N)
k , t ≥ 0. (3.28)
Proposition 3.1.21. When θ > 0, we have for t < T
lim
N↑∞
W
(N)
t =
ρ(T − t) + 1
ρT + 1
(3.29)
and Wt = 0 for t > T .
Proof. Let nt := dNt/T e. Then, with the notation introduced in the proof of Proposition
3.1.19,
W
(N)
t = 1−
1
1>λΓN1
nt∑
k=1
u
(N)
k .
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Figure 3.6: The function V (N) for N = 1000 with parameters θ = 0.5 and λ = ρ = 1.
For θ > 0 and t < T it follows from Lemma 3.1.20 that(a 1N (κ− 1)
κ
)N+1−nt −→ 0 as N ↑ ∞.
Therefore, with (3.24),
lim
N↑∞
nt∑
k=1
u
(N)
k =
1
κ
lim
N↑∞
nt
(
1− a
1
N
κ(1− a 1N ) + a 1N
)
= ρt.
The assertion now follows with (3.26).
Note that the limiting function in (3.29) is independent of θ as long as θ > 0. Let
V
(N)
t = 1−
dNt
T
e∑
k=1
v
(N)
k , t ≥ 0. (3.30)
The asymptotic analysis for V (N) is much more difficult than for W (N). The numerical
simulation in Figure 3.6 suggests that V (N) converges for θ ≥ λ/4 to a function V (∞),
which has a jump at t = 0 and is otherwise a nonlinear function of time.
3.2 Three extensions of the primary model
3.2.1 Incorporation of permanent impact
The first extension of the primary model is an incorporation of permanent impact. In
comparison with transient impact, permanent impact affects the asset prices during the
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whole execution period and does not decay. It is accumulated by all transactions until
the current transaction time. We assume that when the two financial agents X and Y
apply respective strategies ξ ∈ X (X0,T) and η ∈ X (Y0,T), the asset prices are given by
Sξ,ηt = S
0
t − λ
∑
tk<t
e−ρ(t−tk)(ξk + ηk)− γ
∑
tk<t
(ξk + ηk). (3.31)
As it has been described in Subsection 3.1.1, S0 = (S0t )t≥0 is a right-continuous martin-
gale on a filtered probability space (Ω, (Ft)t≥0,F ,P), for which F0 is P-trivial. In this
subsection, we still assume that none of the two agents has an advantage in latency over
the other. At each execution time, the execution priority is given to that agent who wins
an independent coin toss if both agents place nonzero orders at that time. Note that this
assumption affects not only the combined liquidity costs caused by transient impact but
also the costs caused by permanent impact.
Suppose that just one agent, say X, places a nonzero order at time tk, then the price is
moved from Sξ,ηtk to S
ξ,η
tk+
= Sξ,ηtk −(λ+γ)ξk and the trade ξk incurs the following expenses:∫ Sξ,ηtk −(λ+γ)ξk
Sξ,ηtk
z
λ+ γ
dz =
λ+ γ
2
ξ2k − Sξ,ηtk ξk.
Now suppose that the order ηk of agent Y is executed immediately after the order ξk.
Then the price is moved from Sξ,ηtk − (λ + γ)ξk to Sξ,ηtk − (λ + γ)(ξk + ηk), and agent Y
incurs the expenses∫ Sξ,ηtk −(λ+γ)(ξk+ηk)
Sξ,ηtk
−(λ+γ)ξk
z
λ+ γ
dz =
λ+ γ
2
η2k − Sξ,ηtk ηk + (λ+ γ)ξkηk.
Therefore, each agent has the combined liquidation costs of (λ + γ)ξkηk/2 at time tk in
expectation if they are equally split.
Furthermore, for each trade ξk and ηk the quadratic transaction costs of θξ
2
k and θη
2
k
are still imposed, where θ is nonnegative. Now we give the definition of the liquidation
costs by each agent in this extended model.
Definition 3.2.1. Suppose that T = {t0, t1, . . . , tN}, X0 and Y0 are given. Let further-
more (εi)i=0,1,... be an i.i.d. sequence of Bernoulli (
1
2
)-distributed random variables that are
independent of σ(
⋃
t≥0Ft). Then the liquidation costs of ξ ∈ X (X0,T) given η ∈ X (Y0,T)
are defined as
CT(ξ|η) = X0S00 +
N∑
k=0
(λ+ γ
2
ξ2k − Sξ,ηtk ξk + εk(λ+ γ)ξkηk + θξ2k
)
, (3.32)
and the liquidation costs of η given ξ are
CT(η|ξ) = Y0S00 +
N∑
k=0
(λ+ γ
2
η2k − Sξ,ηtk ηk + (1− εk)(λ+ γ)ξkηk + θη2k
)
. (3.33)
We assume that both agents X and Y have full knowledge of the other’s trading
strategy and minimize the expected costs of their strategies accordingly. The optimality
for both agents is described through a Nash equilibrium defined in Definition 3.1.5.
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To simplify our notation, we define the (N + 1) × (N + 1)-matrix H and its lower
triangular matrix H˜ for a fixed time grid T = {t0, . . . , tN} by
Hij = 1 for all i, j; H˜ij =

1 if i > j,
1
2
if i = j,
0 otherwise.
Lemma 3.2.2. The expected liquidation costs of an admissible strategy ξ ∈ X (X0,T)
given another admissible strategy η ∈ X (Y0,T) are
E
[
CT(ξ|η)
]
= E
[1
2
ξ>(λG+ 2θ Id)ξ + ξ>(λG˜+ γH˜)η
]
+
γ
2
X20 , (3.34)
and the expected liquidation costs of η given ξ are
E
[
CT(η|ξ)
]
= E
[1
2
η>(λG+ 2θ Id)η + η>(λG˜+ γH˜)ξ
]
+
γ
2
Y 20 . (3.35)
Proof. We refer to the proof of Lemma 3.2.11, which shows a more general case.
Theorem 3.2.3. Given ρ > 0, λ > 0 and θ > 0. For any time grid T and initial
asset positions X0, Y0 ∈ R, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium (ξ∗,η∗) ∈ X (X0,T)×
X (Y0,T). The optimal strategies ξ∗ and η∗ are deterministic.
Proof. We refer to the proof of Theorem 3.2.12, which shows a more general case.
Remark 3.2.4. To derive the optimal strategies in Theorem 3.2.3 explicitly, one can
use the method stated in Remark 3.1.11. By Lemma 3.2.2 and the method of Lagrange
multipliers, a necessary condition for (ξ∗,η∗) to be a Nash equilibrium in Xdet(X0,T) ×
Xdet(Y0,T) is the existence of α, β ∈ R, such that
Pξ∗ +Qη∗ = α1,
Pη∗ +Qξ∗ = β1,
1>ξ∗ = X0,
1>η∗ = Y0,
(3.36)
where
P = λG+ 2θ Id, Q = λG˜+ γH˜.
As the existence and uniqueness of optimal strategies are guaranteed by Theorem 3.2.3,
the linear equation system(3.36) has a unique solution.
Moreover, if the matrices P ±Q are invertible and 1>(P ±Q)−11 6= 0, we define the
following two vectors
v =
(P +Q)−11
1>(P +Q)−11
=
(λG+ 2θ Id + λG˜+ γH˜)−11
1>(λG+ 2θ Id + λG˜+ γH˜)−11
,
w =
(P −Q)−11
1>(P −Q)−11 =
(λG˜> + 2θ Id− γH˜)−11
1>(λG˜> + 2θ Id− γH˜)−11 .
(3.37)
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In this case, by the same method in Remark 3.1.11, the optimal strategies in a Nash
equilibrium are given by
ξ∗ =
1
2
(
(X0 + Y0)v + (X0 − Y0)w
)
,
η∗ =
1
2
(
(X0 + Y0)v − (X0 − Y0)w
)
.
(3.38)
Moreover, since H(ξ ± η) = (X0 ± Y0)1 for all admissible strategies (ξ,η) ∈ X (X0,T)×
X (Y0,T), the conditions (3.36) can be written as
(P +Q− γH)(ξ∗ + η∗) = (α−X0 − Y0)1,
(P −Q+ γH)(ξ∗ + η∗) = (α +X0 + Y0)1,
1>ξ∗ = X0,
1>η∗ = Y0.
(3.39)
If the matrices P ±Q∓ γH are invertible and 1>(P ±Q∓ γH)−11 6= 0, we have
v =
(P +Q− γH)−11
1>(P +Q− γH)−11 =
(
λG+ 2θ Id + λG˜− γH˜>
)−1
1
1>
(
λG+ 2θ Id + λG˜− γH˜>
)−1
1
,
w =
(P −Q+ γH)−11
1>(P −Q+ γH)−11 =
(
λG˜> + 2θ Id + γH˜>
)−1
1
1>
(
λG˜> + 2θ Id + γH˜>
)−1
1
.
(3.40)
After deriving the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria, we analyze the effects
of transaction costs. The aim of imposing transaction costs is to avoid unstable optimal
strategies exhibiting oscillations. As stated in Subsection 3.1.3, oscillations disappear
completely, if transaction costs are sufficiently large, i.e., θ ≥ λ/4. In comparison to
transient impact, permanent impact affects asset prices constantly during a trading period.
In the following theorem, we see that the critical value of transaction costs increases if
there exists permanent impact.
Theorem 3.2.5. Given λ, T > 0 and TN :=
{
kT
N
∣∣∣ k = 0, 1, . . . , N}. The following
conditions are equivalent.
(a) For every N ∈ N and ρ > 0, all components of v are nonnegative.
(b) For every N ∈ N and ρ > 0, all components of w are nonnegative.
(c) θ ≥ θ∗ = (λ+ γ)/4.
To prove (c)⇒(a) in Theorem 3.2.5, we need the following auxiliary lemmas
Lemma 3.2.6. A triangular Z-matrix A ∈ Rn×n with positive diagonal is an M-matrix.
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Proof. Let
A =

a11 a12 · · · a1n
0 a22 · · · a2n
...
. . . . . .
...
0 · · · · · · ann

be an upper triangular Z-matrix with positive diagonal. Then all of its leading principle
minors are positive:
A[k] =
k∏
i=1
aii > 0, for k ∈ 1, 2, . . . , N.
By Theorem 3.1.16, A is an M -matrix.
To state out the following lemmas, we define Ĝ = G˜+ 1
2
Id.
Lemma 3.2.7. For α ≥ 0, the inverse of the matrix Ĝ+ αG is equal to
ω −a 1N µω2 −a 2N µω3 · · · −aN−1N µωN − aα1+αωN
−a 1N ω (1 + (1− a 4N )α)ω2 −a 1N µνω3 · · · −aN−2N µνωN −aN−1N µωN
0 −a 1N ω (1 + (1− a 4N )α)ω2 · · · −aN−3N µνωN−1 −aN−2N µωN−1
0 0
. . .
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
. . . −a 1N ω (1 + (1− a 4N )α)ω2 −a 1N µω2
0 · · · · · · 0 −a 1N ω ω

,
where
ω =
(
1 + (1− a 2N )α)−1, µ = (1− a 2N )α, ν = (1− a 2N )(1 + α).
Proof. Let the matrix in the statement be denoted by D. We rewrite D as
Dij =

ω, if (i = j = 1) ∨ (i = j = N + 1);
(1 + (1− a 4N )α)ω2, if i = j ∈ {2, . . . , N};
−a 1N ω, if i− j = 1;
−a kN ωk+2µν, if (j − i =: k ∈ {1, . . . , N − 2}) ∧ (i 6= 1) ∧ (j 6= N + 1);
−a kN ωk+1µ, if (j − i =: k ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1}) ∧ ((i = 1) ∨ (j = N + 1));
− aα
1+α
ωN , if (i = 1) ∧ (j = N + 1);
0, if i ≥ j + 2.
On the other hand, the matrix Ĝ+ αG can be written as
(Ĝ+ αG)ij =

1 + α, if i = j;
αa
j−i
N , if i < j;
(1 + α)a
i−j
N , if i > j.
Checking
N+1∑
k=1
Dik(Ĝ+ αG)kj =
N+1∑
k=1
(Ĝ+ αG)ikDkj = δij
for each case completes the proof.
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Let Ĥ := H˜> − 1
2
Id.
Lemma 3.2.8. The matrix G−1
(
Ĝ− γ
λ
Ĥ
)
is a Z-matrix and a nonsingular M-matrix.
Proof. It was shown in [Alfonsi et al., 2008, Theorem 3.4] that
G−1 =
1
1− a 2N

1 −a 1N 0 · · · · · · 0
−a 1N 1 + a 2N −a 1N 0 · · · 0
0
. . . . . . . . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . . . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . −a 1N 1 + a 2N −a 1N
0 · · · · · · 0 −a 1N 1

. (3.41)
The matrix Ĝ− γ
λ
Ĥ is equal to
1 −γ
λ
−γ
λ
· · · · · · −γ
λ
a
1
N 1 −γ
λ
· · · · · · −γ
λ
a
2
N
. . . . . . . . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . . . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . a
1
N 1 −γ
λ
a · · · · · · a 2N a 1N 1

.
A straightforward computation now yields that the matrix (1−a 2N )G−1(Ĝ− γ
λ
Ĥ
)
is equal
to
1− a
2
N −a
1
N − γ
λ
−(1− a
1
N ) γ
λ
−(1− a
1
N ) γ
λ
· · · −(1− a
1
N ) γ
λ
0 1 + a
1
N γ
λ
−a
1
N − (1− a
1
N + a
2
N ) γ
λ
−(1− a
1
N )2 γ
λ
· · · −(1− a
1
N )2 γ
λ
0 0 1 + a
1
N γ
λ
−a
1
N − (1− a
1
N + a
2
N ) γ
λ
· · · −(1− a
1
N )2 γ
λ
0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. .
.
. .
.
. .
.
. .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. −(1− a
1
N )2 γ
λ
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. 0 1 + a
1
N γ
λ
−a
1
N − (1− a
1
N + a
2
N ) γ
λ
0 · · · · · · 0 0 1 + a
1
N γ
λ

,
which is an upper triangular Z-matrix with positive diagonal. By Lemma 3.2.6, G−1
(
Ĝ−
γ
λ
Ĥ
)
is hence a nonsingular M -matrix.
Lemma 3.2.9. For δ ≥ 0 the matrix M := G−1(Ĝ − γ
λ
Ĥ
)
+ δG−1 is a nonsingular
M-matrix.
Proof. For δ = 0 this assertion is proved by Lemma 3.2.8. We consider now only for
δ > 0. Note that M is a Z-matrix since both G−1
(
Ĝ− γ
λ
Ĥ
)
and G−1 are Z matrices by
Lemma 3.2.8 and (3.41), respectively. Hence condition (4) of Theorem 3.1.16 will imply
that M is a nonsingular M -matrix as soon as we can show that M +α Id is invertible for
all α ≥ 0.
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In a first step, we note that taking γ = 0 in Lemma 3.2.8 yields that G−1Ĝ is a
nonsingular M -matrix. Hence (α Id +G−1Ĝ)−1 ≥ 0 for all α ≥ 0. It follows that(
Ĝ+ αG
)−1
1 =
(
Id + (αG)−1Ĝ
)−1
(αG)−11 =
(
α Id +G−1Ĝ
)−1
G−11 > 0.
By [Alfonsi et al., 2008, Example 3.5], we obtain
G−11 =
1
1 + a
1
N
(
1, 1− a 1N , . . . , 1− a 1N , 1
)T
 0. (3.42)
Since moreover (Ĝ+ αG)−1 is a Z-matrix by Lemma 3.2.7, it follows that (Ĝ+ αG)−1 is
a diagonally dominant Z-matrix for all α ≥ 0.
In the next step, we show that the matrix
Q := (Ĝ+ αG)−1
(
δ Id− γ
λ
Ĥ
)
is a Z-matrix. Denoting P := (Ĝ+ αG)−1, we get
Qij = δPij − γ
λ
j−1∑
k=1
Pik,
with the convention that
∑0
k=1 ak = 0. It follows that Qii ≥ 0 for all i, because Pii ≥ 0
and γ
λ
∑i−1
k=1 Pik ≤ 0 by the fact that P is a Z-matrix. Since P is diagonally dominant, we
have
∑j−1
k=1 Pik ≥ 0 for any j > i and hence Qij = δPij − γλ
∑j−1
k=1 Pik ≤ 0 for j > i. Using
the fact that Pik = 0 for k ≤ i− 1, we get that for j < i
Qij = δPij − γ
λ
j−1∑
k=1
Pik = δPij ≤ 0.
This shows that Q is a Z-matrix.
We show next that Q is a nonsingular M -matrix. To this end, we note first that the
triangular matrix
(
δ Id − γ
λ
Ĥ
)
is invertible. An easy calculation verifies that its inverse
is given by
1
δ

1 σ σ(1 + σ) · · · σ(1 + σ)N−2 σ(1 + σ)N−1
0 1 σ σ(1 + σ) · · · σ(1 + σ)N−2
0 0 1 σ · · · σ(1 + σ)N−3
0
. . . . . . . . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . . . . 1 σ
0 · · · · · · · · · 0 1

≥ 0,
where σ := γ
λδ
> 0. Hence,
Q−1 =
(
δ Id− γ
λ
Ĥ
)−1
(Ĝ+ αG) ≥ 0.
So Theorem 3.1.16 (3) shows that Q is a nonsingular M -matrix.
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For the final step, we note first that Theorem 3.1.16 (4) implies that Id + Q is a
nonsingular M -matrix. In particular, ( Id +Q)−1 exists, and so we can define the matrix(
Id + (Ĝ+ αG)−1
(
δ Id− γ
λ
Ĥ
))−1
(Ĝ+ αG)−1G
=
(
δ Id + Ĝ+ αG− γ
λ
Ĥ
)−1
G
=
(
Id + (δG−1)−1
(
G−1(Ĝ− γ
λ
Ĥ) + α Id
))−1
(δG−1)−1
=
(
G−1
(
Ĝ− γ
λ
Ĥ
)
+ δG−1 + α Id
)−1
= (M + α Id)−1.
This completes the proof.
Lemma 3.2.10. Let A be an invertible matrix and suppose that α ∈ R is such that A+αH
is invertible. Then the vector A−11 is proportional to (A+ αH)−11.
Proof. Note that Hx is proportional to 1 for any vector x. Hence,
(A+ αH)A−11 = ( Id + αHA−1)1 = (1 + β)1
for some constant β. Applying (A + αH)−1 to both sides of this equation yields the
result.
Proof of (c)⇔(a) in Theorem 3.2.5. Let
θ ≥ λ+ γ
4
and δ :=
4θ − (λ+ γ)
2λ
≥ 0.
It is clear that
G˜+
2θ
λ
Id− γ
λ
H˜> = Ĝ− γ
λ
Ĥ + δ Id.
Lemma 3.2.9 yields that the matrix λG + 2θ Id + λG˜ − γH˜> is invertible, its inverse is
given by (
λG+ 2θ Id + λG˜− γH˜>
)−1
=
(
Id + (λG)−1
(
2θ Id + λG˜− γH˜>
))−1
(λG)−1
=
(
Id +G−1
(
G˜+
2θ
λ
Id− γ
λ
H˜>
))−1
(λG)−1
=
(
Id +G−1
(
Ĝ− γ
λ
Ĥ + δ Id
))−1
(λG)−1.
It also follows by Lemma 3.2.9 that the matrix
G−1
(
Ĝ− γ
λ
Ĥ + δ Id
)
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is a nonsingular M -matrix. By Theorem 3.1.16, we obtain that(
Id +G−1
(
Ĝ− γ
λ
Ĥ + δ Id
))−1
≥ 0.
As it has been shown in the proof of Theorem 3.1.14 that G−11 0, it yields that(
λG+ 2θ Id + λG˜− γH˜>
)−1
1 ≥ 0.
Therefore, the vector v stated in (3.40) in this case is well defined. This establishes
(c)⇒(a).
To show (c)⇐(a), we consider the case N = 1. By definition, v is proportional to the
vector
2 det(λG+ 2θ Id + G˜) · (λG+ 2θ Id + G˜)−11 =
(
λ(3− 2a) + γ + 4θ
λ(3− 4a)− γ + 4θ
)
.
Clearly, the first component of this vector is positive for all a ∈ (0, 1) and θ ≥ 0. By
sending a ↑ 1 one sees, however, that the second component is negative for θ < θ∗ and a
sufficiently close to 1. Thus, we cannot have v ≥ 0 in this case.
Proof of (c)⇔(b) in Theorem 3.2.5. We assume that θ ≥ (λ+ γ)/4. Note that
(H˜> +
1
2
Id)−1 =

1 1 1 · · · 1 1
0 1 1 · · · 1 1
0
. . . . . . . . . . . .
...
0
. . . . . . . . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . . . . 1 1
0 · · · · · · · · · 0 1

−1
=

1 −1 0 · · · 0 0
0 1 −1 0 · · · 0
0
. . . . . . . . . . . .
...
0
. . . . . . . . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . . . . 1 −1
0 · · · · · · · · · 0 1

.
Let κ := 1
2
+ 2θ
λ
− γ
2λ
. It follows that
γ
λ
(
γH˜> +
γ
2
Id
)−1(
λG˜> +
(
2θ − γ
2
)
Id
)
=
(
H˜> +
1
2
Id
)−1(
G˜> +
(
κ− 1
2
)
Id
)
=

1 −1 0 · · · 0 0
0 1 −1 0 · · · 0
0
. . . . . . . . . . . .
...
0
. . . . . . . . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . . . . 1 −1
0 · · · · · · · · · 0 1


κ a
1
N a
2
N · · · aN−1N a
0 κ a
1
N · · · aN−2N aN−1N
0
. . . . . . . . . . . .
...
0
. . . . . . . . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . . . . κ a
1
N
0 · · · · · · · · · 0 κ

.
(3.43)
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A straightforward computation yields that (3.43) is equal to
λ
γ

κ a
1
N − κ (a 1N − 1)a 1N · · · (a 1N − 1)aN−2N (a 1N − 1)aN−1N
0 κ a
1
N − κ (a 1N − 1)a 1N · · · (a 1N − 1)aN−2N
0
. . . . . . . . . . . .
...
0
. . . . . . . . . . . . (a
1
N − 1)a 1N
...
. . . . . . . . . κ a
1
N − κ
0 · · · · · · · · · 0 κ

.
If θ ≥ (λ + γ)/4, we have κ − 1 ≥ 0. Because a 1N < 1 for all N ∈ N, the matrix
(γH˜> + γ
2
Id)−1
(
λG˜> +
(
2θ − γ
2
)
Id
)
is a Z-matrix. By Lemma 3.2.6, it is an M -matrix.
Therefore, by Theorem 3.1.16, the matrix
A := Id +
(
γH˜> +
γ
2
Id
)−1(
λG˜> +
(
2θ − γ
2
)
Id
)
is also an M -matrix, which is inverse-positive. We have(
γH˜> +
γ
2
Id
)
A = γH˜> + λG˜> + 2θ Id = λG− λG˜− γH˜ + 2θ Id + γH
= λG˜> + 2θ Id + γH˜>.
It follows that the latter matrix is invertible. An application of Lemma 3.2.10 therefore
yields that w is proportional to the vector(
λG˜> + 2θ Id + γH˜>
)−1
1
=
(
Id +
(
γH˜> +
γ
2
Id
)−1(
λG˜> +
(
2θ − γ
2
)
Id
))−1(
γH˜> +
γ
2
Id
)−1
1
=
1
γ
(
Id +
(
γH˜> +
γ
2
Id
)−1(
λG˜> +
(
2θ − γ
2
)
Id
))−1

1 −1 0 · · · 0 0
0 1 −1 0 · · · 0
0
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . .
. . . 1 −1
0 · · · · · · · · · 0 1


1
1
...
1
1

=
1
γ
(
Id +
(
γH˜> +
γ
2
Id
)−1(
λG˜> +
(
2θ − γ
2
)
Id
))−1 · (0, 0, . . . , 0, 1)> ≥ 0.
This establishes (c)⇒(b).
To show (c)⇐(b), we assume N = 1 and w ≥ 0 for all a ∈ (0, 1). It follows that the
determinant of the matrix λG˜> + 2θ Id + γH˜> is given by
D :=
1
4
(γ + 4θ + λ)2 > 0.
We obtain then
(λG˜> + 2θ Id + γH˜>)−11 =
1
2D
(
(1− 2a)λ− γ + 4θ
γ + 4θ + λ
)
=:
(
w1
w2
)
.
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We assume by way of contradiction that θ < (λ+ γ)/4. Then we have
λ− γ + 4θ
2λ
< 1.
For a ∈ (λ−γ+4θ
2λ
, 1) we obtain w2 < 0. Since w1 + w2 = 8θ + 2(1− a)λ > 0, it yields that
w = ( w1
w1+w2
, w2
w1+w2
)> is not nonnegative. This completes the proof.
In Figures 3.7 and 3.8, we see the interaction between permanent impact γ and trans-
action costs θ in the vectors v andw, i.e., when X0 = Y0 = 1 and X0 = −Y0 = 1. For both
vectors, oscillations exist when there exists permanent impact and no transactions costs;
on the other hand, oscillations can be completely avoided when θ = θ∗ = (λ+γ)/4 = 0.75.
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Figure 3.7: Optimal strategies in the equilibrium for the equidistant time grid T50 with
parameters θ = 0 (left), θ = 0.75 (right) and ρ = 1, λ = 1, γ = 2, initial values
X0 = Y0 = 1.
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Figure 3.8: Optimal strategies in the equilibrium for the equidistant time grid T50 with
parameters θ = 0 (left), θ = 0.75 (right) and ρ = 1, λ = 1, γ = 2, initial values
X0 = −Y0 = 1.
3.2.2 Splitting of combined liquidation costs
In Subsections 3.1.1 and 3.2.1, we assume none of the two agents has an advantage in
latency over the other. Their execution priorities are determined by an i.i.d. sequence of
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Bernoulli (1
2
)-distributed random variables. As a result, the additional expected liquida-
tion costs E[λξkηk] or E[(λ + γ)ξkηk] occurred jointly by the two agents at time point tk
are split equally for each tk ∈ T. Now we assume the two agents have different advantages
in latency in our model. The main consequence of such unsymmetrical latency priority is
that the combined liquidation costs are not split equally.
In this subsection, we derive the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria for un-
equal splitting of combined liquidity costs. As stated in Subsection 3.2.1, the price process
is given by
Sξ,ηt = S
0
t − λ
∑
tk<t
e−ρ(t−tk)(ξk + ηk)− γ
∑
tk<t
(ξk + ηk).
To describe the splitting of combined liquidity costs, we assume the execution priorities
of the two agents are determined by an independent sequence of Bernoulli (qi)-distributed
random variables (εi)i=0,1,... that are independent of σ(∪t≥0Ft) with E[εi] = qi for qi ∈ [0, 1]
and each i ∈ N. Without transaction costs, the liquidation costs of ξ ∈ X (X0,T) given
η ∈ X (Y0,T) are defined as
CT(ξ|η) = X0S00 +
N∑
k=0
(λ+ γ
2
ξ2k − Sξ,ηtk ξk + εk(λ+ γ)ξkηk
)
,
and the liquidation costs of η given ξ are
CT(η|ξ) = Y0S00 +
N∑
k=0
(λ+ γ
2
η2k − Sξ,ηtk ηk + (1− εk)(λ+ γ)ξkηk
)
.
Lemma 3.2.11. The expected liquidation costs of an admissible strategy ξ ∈ X (X0,T)
given another admissible strategy η ∈ X (Y0,T) are
E[CT(ξ|η)] = E
[1
2
ξ>λGξ + ξ>(λG˜q + γH˜q)η
]
+
γ
2
X20 ,
and the expected liquidation costs of η given ξ are
E[CT(η|ξ)] = E
[1
2
η>λGη + η>
(
λ(G− G˜q)> + γ(H − H˜q)>
)
ξ
]
+
γ
2
Y 20 ,
where G˜q is the lower-triangular matrices of G with (G˜q)nn = qn and H˜q is the lower-
triangular matrices of H with (H˜q)nn = qn.
Proof. We note that
E[CT(ξ|η)] = E
[ N∑
n=0
(
− ξnSξ,ηtn +
λ+ γ
2
ξ2n + εn(λ+ γ)ξnηn
)]
+X0S
0
0
= E
[ N∑
n=0
(
− ξnS0tn +
(
ξn
n−1∑
m=0
ξmλe
−ρ(tn−tm) + ξn
n−1∑
m=0
γξm +
λ+ γ
2
ξ2n
)
+
(
ξn
n−1∑
m=0
ηmλe
−ρ(tn−tm) + ξn
n−1∑
m=0
γηm + qn(λ+ γ)ξnηn
))]
+X0S
0
0 .
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By the proof of Lemma 3.1.7, we have
E
[ N∑
n=0
ξnS
0
tn
]
= E
[ N∑
n=0
ξnS
0
T
]
= X0E[S0T ] = X0S00 .
Moreover, it holds that
ξn
n−1∑
m=0
ξmλe
−ρ(tn−tm) + ξn
n−1∑
m=0
γξm +
λ+ γ
2
ξ2n
= ξ>(λG˜+ γH˜)ξ =
1
2
ξ>(λG+ γH)ξ =
1
2
ξ>λGξ +
γ
2
X20 ,
and
ξn
n−1∑
m=0
ηtmλe
−ρ(tn−tm) + ξn
n−1∑
m=0
γηm + qn(λ+ γ)ξnηn = ξ
>(λG˜q + γH˜q)η.
It follows that
E[CT(ξ|η)] = E
[1
2
ξ>λGξ + ξ>(λG˜q + γH˜q)η
]
+
γ
2
X20 .
The proof for E[CT(η|ξ)] is analogous.
Theorem 3.2.12. Given ρ > 0, λ > 0 and γ > 0. For any time grid T and initial values
X0, Y0 ∈ R, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium (ξ∗,η∗) ∈ X (X0,T)×X (Y0,T) in the
class of adapted strategies. The optimal strategies ξ∗ and η∗ are deterministic.
Proof. First we prove that for each sequence (qn)n∈{0,1,...,N} for qn ∈ [0, 1], there exists
at least one Nash equilibrium in the class of deterministic strategies. To this end, we
follow the idea of the proof of Rosen [1965, Theorem 1]. Note that the set Xdet(X0,T)
is convex and closed for each X0 ∈ R. We define the convex and closed set EX0×Y0 :=
Xdet(X0,T)×Xdet(Y0,T) and the function ρ by
ρ : EX0×Y0 × EX0×Y0 → R, ρ
((
x
y
)
,
(
ξ
η
))
= CT(ξ|y) + CT(η|x). (3.44)
It is clear that ρ is continuous in
(
x
y
)
and
(
ξ
η
)
with respect to Euclidean norm. By
the strict convexity of CT(ξ|y) and CT(η|x) in ξ and η, we obtain for α ∈ [0, 1] and(
ξ0
η0
)
,
(
ξ1
η1
) ∈ EX0×Y0 that
ρ
((
x
y
)
, α
(
ξ0
η0
)
+ (1− α)
(
ξ1
η1
))
= CT(αξ0 + (1− α)ξ1|y) + CT(αη0 + (1− α)η1|x)
≤ αCT(ξ0 |y) + (1− α)CT(ξ1|y) + αCT(η0|x) + (1− α)CT(η1|x)
= αρ
((
x
y
)
,
(
ξ0
η0
))
+ (1− α)ρ
((
x
y
)
,
(
ξ1
η1
))
,
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which means ρ is convex in
(
ξ
η
)
. Then we consider the point-to-set function Γ :
(
x
y
) ∈
EX0×Y0 7→ Γ
(
x
y
) ⊂ EX0×Y0 with
Γ
(
x
y
)
:=
{(
ξ∗
η∗
)
∈ EX0×Y0
∣∣∣∣ ρ((xy
)
,
(
ξ∗
η∗
))
= min
(ξη)∈EX0×Y0
ρ
((
x
y
)
,
(
ξ
η
))}
.
We claim that for each
(
x
y
) ∈ EX0×Y0 , Γ(xy) is a non-empty, convex and closed set in
EX0×Y0 . To this end, first note that again due to the strict convexity of CT(ξ |y) and
CT(η|x) in ξ and η, there exist ξ∗ ∈ Xdet(X0,T) and η∗ ∈ Xdet(Y0,T) which minimize
CT(ξ|y) and CT(η|x) respectively. Hence, Γ
(
x
y
)
is non-empty.
Let
(
ξ0
η0
)
,
(
ξ1
η1
) ∈ Γ(x
y
)
, i.e.,
ρ
((
x
y
)
,
(
ξ0
η0
))
= ρ
((
x
y
)
,
(
ξ1
η1
))
= min
(ξη)∈EX0×Y0
ρ
((
x
y
)
,
(
ξ
η
))
.
For α ∈ [0, 1], due to the convexity of ρ in (ξ
η
)
, we obtain
min
(ξη)∈EX0×Y0
ρ
((
x
y
)
,
(
ξ
η
))
≤ ρ
((
x
y
)
, α
(
ξ0
η0
)
+ (1− α)
(
ξ1
η1
))
≤ αρ
((
x
y
)
,
(
ξ0
η0
))
+ (1− α)ρ
((
x
y
)
,
(
ξ1
η1
))
= min
(ξη)∈EX0×Y0
ρ
((
x
y
)
,
(
ξ
η
))
,
which shows α
(
ξ0
η0
)
+ (1− α)(ξ1
η1
) ∈ Γ(x
y
)
, i.e., Γ
(
x
y
)
is convex.
To show Γ
(
x
y
)
is closed, let
(
ξn
ηn
) ∈ Γ(x
y
)
for each n ∈ N and (ξn
ηn
)→ (ξ∗
η∗
)
in EX0×Y0 for
n→∞. Since ρ is continuous in (ξ
η
)
, we get
(
ξ∗
η∗
) ∈ Γ(x
y
)
.
By the Kakutani fixed point theorem, see Kakutani et al. [1941], there exists a point(
x∗
y∗
) ∈ EX0×Y0 such that(
x∗
y∗
)
∈ Γ
(
x∗
y∗
)
i.e., ρ
((
x∗
y∗
)
,
(
x∗
y∗
))
= min
(ξη)∈EX0×Y0
ρ
((
x∗
y∗
)
,
(
ξ
η
))
.
We now prove that
(
x∗
y∗
)
is a Nash equilibrium in EX0×Y0 . Suppose by way of contra-
diction there exists y˜ ∈ Xdet(Y0,T) such that CT(y˜|x∗) < CT(y∗|x∗), it follows that
ρ
((
x∗
y∗
)
,
(
x∗
y˜
))
= CT(x∗|y∗) + CT(y˜|x∗) < CT(x∗|y∗) + CT(y∗|x∗) = ρ
((
x∗
y∗
)
,
(
x∗
y∗
))
,
which contradicts (3.44).
In the second step we show that for each sequence (qn)n∈N with qn ∈ [0, 1] for all n ∈ N,
there exists at most one Nash equilibrium in the class of adapted strategies. To this end,
we use the same method which is used to proved Lemma 3.1.9. We define
ξα := αξ1 + (1− α)ξ0, ηα := αη1 + (1− α)η0, where α ∈ [0, 1];
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and
f(α) := CT(ξα|η0) + CT(ηα|ξ0) + CT(ξ1−α|η1) + CT(η1−α|ξ1).
Since the matrix λG is strictly positive definite, the cost functional CT(ξ|η) is strictly
convex with respect to ξ. Hence, we obtain
f(α) > f(0) for α > 0.
It follows that
lim
h↓0
f(h)− f(0)
h
=
df(α)
dα
∣∣∣
α=0+
≥ 0. (3.45)
On the other hand, it holds that
d
dα
CT(ξα|η)
∣∣∣
α=0
= E
[
(ξ1 − ξ0)>λGξ0 + (ξ1 − ξ0)>(λG˜q + γH˜q)η
]
,
d
dα
CT(ηα|ξ)
∣∣∣
α=0
= E
[
(η1 − η0)>λGη0 + (η1 − η0)>(λ(G− G˜q)> + γ(H − H˜q)>)ξ].
Note that
ξ>(λG˜q + γH˜q)η + η>
(
λ(G− G˜q)> + γ(H − H˜q)>
)
ξ = ξ>(λG+ γH)η.
Hence, it follows that
d
dα
f(α)
∣∣∣
α=0+
= −E
[
(ξ1 − ξ0)>λG(ξ1 − ξ0) + (η1 − η0)>λG(η1 − η0)
]
− E
[
(ξ1 − ξ0)>λG(η1 − η0)
]
,
−E
[
(ξ1 − ξ0)>λH(η1 − η0)
]
< −1
2
E
[
(ξ1 − ξ0)>λG(ξ1 − ξ0) + (η1 − η0)>λG(η1 − η0)
]
< 0,
which contradicts (3.45). Therefore, there exists at most one Nash equilibrium in the
class of adapted strategies.
In the last step, by the same method which is used to prove Lemma 3.1.10, we show
that a Nash equilibrium in the class of deterministic strategies is also a Nash equilibrium
in the class of adapted strategies.
Remark 3.2.13. We explain how to derive explicit equilibrium strategies for the model.
By the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium and the fact that a Nash equilibrium in the class
of deterministic strategies is also a Nash equilibrium in the class of adapted strategies, we
consider only deterministic strategies. We assume that there exists a Nash equilibrium
(ξ∗,η∗) ∈ Xdet(x,T)×Xdet(y,T), such that
1
2
(ξ∗)>λGξ∗ + (ξ∗)>(λG˜q + γH˜q)η∗ → min,
1
2
(η∗)>λGη∗ + (η∗)>
(
λ(G− G˜q)> + γ(H − H˜q)>
)
ξ∗ → min .
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By the method of Lagrange multipliers, a necessary condition for (ξ∗,η∗) is the exis-
tence of α, β ∈ R, such that{
λGξ∗ + (λG˜q + γH˜q)η∗ = α1,
λGη∗ +
(
λ(G− G˜q)> + γ(H − H˜q)>
)
ξ∗ = β1,
(3.46)
which can be re-written as(
λG λG˜q + γH˜q
λ(G− G˜q)> + γ(H − H˜q)> λG
)(
ξ∗
η∗
)
=
(
α1
β1
)
. (3.47)
To simplify our notation, we define
U := λG, Vq := λG˜q + γH˜q, V1−q := λ(G− G˜q)> + γ(H − H˜q)>.
If the matrix
U − V1−qU−1Vq
is invertible, see Bernstein [2005, Page 44], the block matrix on the left side of (3.47) is
invertible with the inverse(
A B
C D
)
:=
(
U−1 + U−1Vq(U − V1−qU−1Vq)−1V1−qU−1 −U−1Vq(U − V1−qU−1Vq)−1
−(U − V1−qU−1Vq)−1V1−qU−1 (U − V1−qU−1Vq)−1
)
.
Therefore, we obtain {
ξ∗ = αA1 + βB1,
η∗ = αC1 + βD1.
By the constraints that
1>ξ∗ = X0, 1>η∗ = Y0;
and if ad− bc 6= 0, it follows that(
α
β
)
=
1
ad− bc
(
d −b
−c a
)(
X0
Y0
)
,
where
a = 1>A1, b = 1>B1, c = 1>C1, d = 1>D1.
Now we give numerical simulations of unequal splitting of combined liquidation costs.
For all scenarios in this subsection, we set X0 = 2, Y0 = 1, ρ = λ = 1, γ = 0 and use the
equidistant time grid T50.
In Figure 3.9, we see that if agent X has a complete advantage in latency, i.e., qn = 0
for all execution time points, a large portion will be liquidated at the beginning since
agent X’s initial value is larger than Y ’s and all combined costs occurred by the large
liquidation have to be paid by agent Y . On the contrary, agent Y will not hesitate to
liquidate almost whole position given a complete advantage in latency, i.e., qn = 1 for all
execution time points while the agent X has to liquidate a large portion at the end of
time grid to minimize the price impact.
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Figure 3.10 describes the equilibria when the advantage in latency for one agent in-
creases or decreases as the execution time goes on. If the advantage in latency for agent
X decreases, i.e., qn increases with respect to n, the beginning part of asset positions for
both agents is similar to the left part of Figure 3.9, since agent X still has advantage in
latency. However, as execution time goes on, due to the increase of advantage in latency
for agent Y , our simulation shows that agent X will minimize the liquidation costs by
a small round trip near the end of the trading. On the other hand, if the advantage in
latency for agent Y decreases, i.e., qn decreases with respect to n, agent Y will liquidate
a larger amount of stock at the beginning of trading in comparison to the right part of
Figure 3.9 to have a short position. Note that although agent Y losses the advantage at
the end of trading, i.e., q50 = 0, a large purchase at the time point still reduces the costs
because agent X has a sell-order at that time, the “combined costs” turn to be a profit,
i.e., (1− q50)λξ50η50 < 0.
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Figure 3.9: Optimal asset positions in the equilibrium with parameters qn = 0 (left) and
qn = 1 (right).
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Figure 3.10: Optimal asset positions in the equilibrium with parameters qn = (
n
50
)2 (left)
and qn = (1− n50)2 (right).
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Figure 3.11: Optimal asset positions in the equilibrium qn =
1
2
(
1 + (−1)n) (left) and
qn =
1
2
(
1 + (−1)n+1) (right).
Figure 3.11 shows a simulation of asset positions in Nash equilibria when the advantage
in latency fluctuates. One sees that fluctuations of the advantages in latency lead to
fluctuations of asset positions. The design of qn makes that two agents have complete
advantage in latency alternatively. In the left part of the figure, agent X has a complete
advantage in latency first, i.e., q0 = 0. Both of the two agents use “hot-potato” strategies
to protect themselves. In particular, agent Y holds a larger amount of stock than agent
X although agent Y has smaller initial asset position. In contract to the left part, the
fluctuation of asset positions is reduced if agent Y has a complete advantage in latency
first, i.e., q0 = 1 and agent X always holds a larger asset position during the whole trading.
3.2.3 Closed-loop strategies
So far we have looked at various models of Nash equilibria in open-loop setup. That is,
at each execution time, trading strategies do not depend on previous trades of the other
trader. In this subsection, we take a quick view of closed-loop strategies. In a closed-loop
model, at each execution time tn all trades of the other agent at t1, t2, . . . , tn−1 will be
considered.
For a general time grind T = {t0, t1, . . . , tN} with 0 = t0 < t1 < · · · < tN = T , when
the strategies ξ and η by the agents X and Y are applied, we assume that the price
process is given by
Sξ,ηt = S
0
t − λ
∑
tk<t
e−ρ(t−tk)(ξk + ηk)− γ
∑
tk<t
(ξk + ηk).
Furthermore, we assume the execution priority at each time is determined by a sequence
of Bernoulli (q)-distributed i.i.d. random variables (εi)i=0,1,...,N which are independent of
σ(
⋃
t≥0Ft) with E[εi] = q for all {i = 0, 1, . . . , N}, q ∈ [0, 1]. We define the liquidation
costs of ξ and η as
CT(ξ|η) = X0S00 +
N∑
k=0
(λ+ γ
2
ξ2k − Sξ,ηtk ξk + εk(λ+ γ)ξkηk + θξ2k
)
,
CT(η|ξ) = Y0S00 +
N∑
k=0
(λ+ γ
2
η2k − Sξ,ηtk ηk + (1− εk)(λ+ γ)ξkηk + θη2k
)
,
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where the transaction costs are denoted by θ. Both of the two agents minimize the ex-
pected costs of their strategies accordingly. As it is applied to analyze the optimal closed-
loop strategies for a similar case in Scho¨neborn [2008], we use dynamic programming to
derive a unique Nash equilibrium in this closed-loop model.
Theorem 3.2.14. There exists a unique Nash equilibrium (ξ∗,η∗) in the class of closed-
loop strategies. At each execution time point tn, the optimal orders are linear in remained
asset positions Xn, Yn, and transient impact In, i.e.,
ξ∗n = A
X
n Xn +B
X
n Yn + C
X
n In, η
∗
n = A
Y
nXn +B
Y
n Yn + C
Y
n In. (3.48)
The cost functionals of the Nash equilibrium (ξ∗,η∗) for n ∈ 0, 1, . . . , N are
JXn (Xn, Yn, In)
=aXn X
2
n + b
X
n Y
2
n + c
X
n I
2
n + u
X
n XnYn + v
X
n XnIn + w
X
n YnIn + γ(X0 + Y0)Xn,
JYn (Xn, Yn, In)
=aYnX
2
n + b
Y
n Y
2
n + c
Y
n I
2
n + u
Y
nXnYn + v
Y
nXnIn + w
Y
n YnIn + γ(X0 + Y0)Yn.
(3.49)
All of the coefficients
AXn , B
X
n , C
X
n , a
X
n , b
X
n , c
X
n , u
X
n , v
X
n , w
X
n , A
Y
n , B
Y
n , C
Y
n , a
Y
n , b
Y
n , c
Y
n , u
Y
n , v
Y
n , w
Y
n ∈ R
can be recursively computed for each time tn, n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}.
Proof. We use a backward induction to prove that the optimal strategies (ξ∗,η∗) and
their cost functionals JX , JY can be expressed in the way stated in the assertion. Let
n = N , both agents have no choice but liquidate their remained asset positions, since
they are at the last execution time point. It follows that the equations (3.48) and (3.49)
hold for the following coefficients:
AXN = 1, B
X
N = C
X
N = 0, a
X
N =
λ− γ
2
+ θ, bXN = c
X
N = w
X
N = 0, u
X
N = q(λ+ γ)− γ, vXN = 1;
BYN = 1, A
Y
N = C
Y
N = 0, b
Y
N =
λ− γ
2
+ θ, aYN = c
Y
N = v
Y
N = 0, u
Y
N = λ− q(λ+ γ), wYN = 1.
Then we assume that the equations (3.48) and (3.49) hold for n+ 1. Given an arbitrary
strategy η, the cost functionals for X starting at tn should be determined by
JXn (Xn, Yn, In |η) = inf
ξn∈R
{
FX(ξn, ηn)
}
:= inf
ξn∈R
{
− ξn
(− In − γ(X0 −Xn + Y0 − Yn))+ (λ+ γ
2
+ θ)ξ2n
+ q(λ+ γ)ξnηn + J
X
n+1(Xn − ξn, Yn − ηn,
(
In + λ(ξn + ηn)
)
e−ρ(tn+1−tn))
}
,
which is the minimum of the quadratic function FX(ξn, ηn) with respect to ξn. Therefore,
we obtain the optimal strategy for X
ξ∗n = ϕ
X
n Xn + ψ
X
n Yn + µ
X
n In + ν
X
n ηn, (3.50)
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where
ϕXn =
2aXn+1 + γ − λvXn+1e−(tn+1−tn)
2
(
aXn+1 +
γ+λ
2
+ cXn+1λ
2e−2(tn+1−tn) − λvXn+1e−(tn+1−tn) + θ
) ,
ψXn =
uXn+1 + γ − λwXn+1e−(tn+1−tn)
2
(
aXn+1 +
γ+λ
2
+ cXn+1λ
2e−2(tn+1−tn) − λvXn+1e−(tn+1−tn) + θ
) ,
µXn =
vXn+1e
−(tn+1−tn) − 2cXn+1λe−2(tn+1−tn) − 1
2
(
aXn+1 +
γ+λ
2
+ cXn+1λ
2e−2(tn+1−tn) − λvXn+1e−(tn+1−tn) + θ
) ,
νXn =
λvXn+1e
−ρ(tn+1−tn) − 2cXn+1λ2e−2ρ(tn+1−tn) + λwXn+1e−ρ(tn+1−tn) − q(λ+ γ)− uXn+1
2
(
aXn+1 +
γ+λ
2
+ cXn+1λ
2e−2(tn+1−tn) − λvXn+1e−(tn+1−tn) + θ
) .
In the same way, we obtain the optimal strategy for Y given an arbitrary ξ,
η∗n = ϕ
Y
nXn + ψ
Y
n Yn + µ
Y
n In + ν
Y
n ξn. (3.51)
Therefore, there exists a Nash equilibrium (ξ∗,η∗) if and only if ξ∗ and η∗ satisfy (3.50)
and (3.51), i.e.,
ξ∗n = ϕ
X
n Xn + ψ
X
n Yn + µ
X
n In + ν
X
n ηn,
η∗n = ϕ
Y
nXn + ψ
Y
n Yn + µ
Y
n In + ν
Y
n ξ
∗
n.
We then obtain the unique solution for each n ∈ 0, 1, . . . , N − 1,
ξ∗n =
µXn In + ν
X
n µ
Y
n In + ϕ
X
n Xn + ν
X
n ϕ
Y
nXn + ψ
X
n Yn + ν
X
n ψ
Y
n Yn
1− νXn νYn
,
η∗n =
µYn In + ν
Y
n µ
X
n In + ϕ
Y
nXn + ν
Y
n ϕ
X
n Xn + ψ
Y
n Yn + ν
Y
n ψ
X
n Yn
1− νXn νYn
.
Note that the optimal orders ξ∗n and η
∗
n are linear in Xn, Yn, In for each n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N}.
We define
JXn (Xn, Yn, In) := J
X
n (Xn, Yn, In |η∗) = inf
ξn∈R
{
FX(ξn, η
∗
n)
}
= FX(ξ∗n, η
∗
n),
JYn (Xn, Yn, In) := J
Y
n (Xn, Yn, In | ξ∗) = inf
ηn∈R
{
F Y (ξ∗n, ηn)
}
= F Y (ξ∗n, η
∗
n).
JXn (Xn, Yn, In) and J
Y
n (Xn, Yn, In) are quadratic in Xn, Yn, In and satisfy (3.49) for each
n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N}. This completes our proof.
Now we give numerical simulations to compare optimal strategies in Nash equilibria
between open-loop and closed-loop models. In all examples we use the equidistant time
grid T50 and set λ = ρ = T = 1.
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Figure 3.14: Accumulated asset positions of optimal open-loop (left) and closed-loop
(right) strategies with parameters γ = 0, θ = 1
4
, q = 1
2
and initial values X0 = 2, Y0 = −1.
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Figure 3.12: Accumulated asset positions of optimal open-loop (left) and closed-loop
(right) strategies with parameters γ = 0, θ = 0, q = 1
2
and initial values X0 = −Y0 = 1.
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Figure 3.13: Accumulated asset positions of optimal open-loop (left) and closed-loop
(right) strategies with parameters γ = 0, θ = 0.01, q = 1
2
and initial values X0 = −Y0 = 1.
Figure 3.12 shows that optimal closed-loop strategies coincide with optimal open-loop
strategies in the trivial case for X0 = −Y0 = 1. The optimal strategies consist of strong
oscillations and form a hot-potato game. In this simulation, taking previous trading of
each agent into account does not lead to more efficient equilibrium strategies. The absence
of transaction costs and equal splitting of combined liquidation costs facilitate oscillatory
strategies.
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However, once transaction costs are imposed, oscillations in the equilibrium strategies
are reduced. We see that in Figure 3.13 there is little oscillation in closed-loop strategies
than in open-loop strategies, especially at the end of trading. This phenomenon shows
that taking account of previous trading at each execution time helps to improve the
efficiency of the trading and leads to certain cooperation. Both agents do not need to
use strong oscillations. Figure 3.14 also supports this point of view by showing that the
last jump in optimal closed-loop strategies is smaller than in open-loop strategies. In
closed-loop model both agents do not need to wait until the last execution time to buy or
sell a large amount of asset, they can achieve their goals earlier by smoother strategies.
In Figures 3.15 and 3.16 we compare equilibrium strategies within the closed-loop
model. Figure 3.15 shows the situation when the combined liquidation costs are not split
equally. As same as in Figure 3.9, if agent X has a complete advantage in latency, a large
amount of the asset will be liquidated at the beginning. Having a smaller initial asset
position, agent Y holds the position at approximately 0.6 for quite a long time after a
large liquidation at the beginning. If agent Y has a complete advantage in latency, a large
amount of the asset will be also liquidated and a low position is kept during the trading.
Note that in both situations there are cooperations between the two agents at the end of
trading. That is, they hold opposite positions before the last trade to obtain a negative
price impact at the last trade even if there are transaction costs.
In Figure 3.16, we see that transaction costs play a similar role as they do in open-loop
models. That is, there are no oscillations in the equilibrium strategies if the transaction
costs are sufficiently large. However, in comparison to open-loop models the critical value
of transaction costs for removing oscillations in this simulation is smaller.
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Figure 3.15: Accumulated asset positions of optimal closed-loop strategies with parame-
ters q = 0 (left), q = 1 (right), γ = 0, θ = 1
4
and initial values X0 = 2, Y0 = 1.
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Figure 3.16: Accumulated asset positions of optimal closed-loop strategies with parame-
ters θ = 0 (left), θ = 1
4
(right), γ = 1, q = 1
2
and initial values X0 = 2, Y0 = 1.
3.3 Continuous-time version of the primary model
3.3.1 Model setup
We consider a continuous-time version of the primary model. The market we consider
consists of only one risky asset. We assume there are two financial agents X and Y
who can affect the asset prices by their trading. When X and Y are not active, the
price process is described by a martingale (S0t )t≥0 defined on a filtered probability space
(Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0,P). The trading strategies used by the two large traders are stochastic
processes (Xt)t≥0 and (Yt)t≥0, which are defined on the same probability space.
Definition 3.3.1. A strategy (Zt)t≥0− is called admissible, if it satisfies the following
conditions:
• the function t 7→ Zt is right-continuous, adapted and bounded;
• the function t 7→ Zt has finite and P-a.s. bounded total variation;
• there exists T > 0 such that Zt = 0 P-a.s. for all t ≥ T .
We denote the class of all admissible strategies Z with an initial asset position Z0− = z
in the time horizon [0, T ] by X (z, [0, T ]). When X and Y are active, the affected price
SX,Y is assumed to be the sum of the unaffected asset price S0 and the market impact
caused by the two agents:
SX,Yt = S
0
t + λ
∫
[0,t)
e−ρ(t−s) dXs + λ
∫
[0,t)
e−ρ(t−s) dYs.
This model we describe is an extended version of the continuous-time model introduced in
Gatheral et al. [2012] with the exponential decay G(t) = e−ρt for two agents. This model
can also be regarded as the continuous-time version of the model introduced in Section
3.1 that comes from Obizhaeva and Wang [2013] originally.
Now we prepare to define the liquidation costs for X and Y . Through the following
two different approaches, we will obtain the same expression of liquidation costs.
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First, to derive the liquidation costs that are consistent to our primary model, we con-
sider an approximation from the discrete-time case. To this end, let X ∈ X (x, [0, T ]) and
Y ∈ X (y, [0, T ]) be admissible strategies and let TN := {tNk | tNk = kTN , k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N}}
be an equidistant time grid. We define the following discrete trades
ξN0 := X0 −X0− and ξNk := XtNk −XtNk−1 for k = {1, 2, . . . , N};
ηN0 := Y0 − Y0− and ηNk := YtNk − YtNk−1 for k = {1, 2, . . . , N}.
Then ξN := (ξNk ) and η
N := (ηNk ) are admissible strategies in sense of Definition 3.1.1,
i.e., ξN ∈ X (x,TN) and ηN ∈ X (y,TN). Furthermore, for each N ∈ N let (εNk )k∈{0,1,...,N}
be a sequence of i.i.d. Bernoulli (1
2
)-distributed random variables that are independent of
σ(
⋃
t≥0Ft). According to Definition 3.1.2, we get the liquidation costs for ξN and ηN :
CN(ξN |ηN) :=xS00− +
N∑
k=0
(λ
2
(ξNk )
2 − SξN ,ηN
tNk
ξNk + ε
N
k λξ
N
k η
N
k + θ(ξ
N
k )
2
)
,
CN(ηN |ξN) :=yS00− +
N∑
k=0
(λ
2
(ηNk )
2 − SξN ,ηN
tNk
ηNk + (1− εNk )λξNk ηNk + θ(ηNk )2
)
.
(3.52)
In the following lemma we obtain the convergence of the expected liquidation costs.
Lemma 3.3.2. As N ↑ ∞, we have
E[CN(ξN |ηN)] −→E
[
1
2
∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,T ]
λe−ρ|t−s| dXs dXt +
∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,t)
λe−ρ(t−s) dYs dXt
+
λ
2
∑
t∈[0,T ]
∆Xt∆Yt + θ
∑
t∈[0,T ]
(∆Xt)
2
]
,
E[CN(ηN |ξN)] −→E
[
1
2
∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,T ]
λe−ρ|t−s| dYs dYt +
∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,t)
λe−ρ(t−s) dXs dYt
+
λ
2
∑
t∈[0,T ]
∆Xt∆Yt + θ
∑
t∈[0,T ]
(∆Yt)
2
]
.
(3.53)
Proof. We first note that
CN(ξN |ηN) = xS00− −
N∑
k=0
ξNk S
0
tNk
+ λ
N∑
k=0
k−1∑
m=0
ξNk ξ
N
me
−ρ(tNk −tNm) +
λ
2
N∑
k=0
(ξNk )
2
+ λ
N∑
k=0
εNk ξ
N
k η
N
k + λ
N∑
k=0
k−1∑
m=0
ξNk η
N
me
−ρ(tNk −tNm) + θ
N∑
k=0
(ξNk )
2.
The proof of Lorenz and Schied [2012, Lemma 1] yields that, as N ↑ ∞,
N∑
k=0
ξNk S
0
tNk
−→
∫
[0,T ]
S0t− dXt + [S
0, X]T ,
N∑
k=0
(ξNk )
2 −→ [X]T ,
N∑
k=0
k−1∑
m=0
ξNk ξ
N
me
−ρ(tNk −tNm) −→
∫
[0,T ]
e−ρt
∫
[0,t)
eρs dXs dXt,
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in probability. Similarly, we have
N∑
k=0
k−1∑
m=0
ξNk η
N
me
−ρ(tNk −tNm) −→
∫
[0,T ]
e−ρt
∫
[0,t)
eρs dYs dXt, as N ↑ ∞,
in probability.
Furthermore, by Protter [2004, Theorem II.6.23], we have
∑N
k=0 ξ
N
k η
N
k −→ [X, Y ]T in
probability. Since εNk is independent of σ(
⋃
t≥0Ft) for every N and k, we obtain that
E
[ N∑
k=0
εNk ξ
N
k η
N
k
]
=
1
2
E
[ N∑
k=0
ξNk η
N
k
]
−→ 1
2
E
[
[X, Y ]T
]
, as N ↑ ∞.
As it has been explained in Lorenz and Schied [2012, Remark 3], the integration by parts
formula for stochastic integrals can be stated as
XtYt = X0−Y0− +
∫
[0,t]
Xs− dYs +
∫
[0,t]
Ys− dXs + [X, Y ]t,
for semi-martingales X and Y . Hence,
E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
S0t− dXt + [S
0, X]T
]
= E
[
XTS
0
T −X0−S00− −
∫
[0,T ]
Xt− dS0t
]
= −xS00−.
Since X and Y are of P-a.s. bounded variation by Definition 3.3.1, we have
E
[
[X]T
]
= E
[ ∑
t∈[0,T ]
(∆Xt)
2
]
and E
[
[X, Y ]T
]
= E
[ ∑
t∈[0,T ]
∆Xt∆Yt
]
.
It also holds that∫
[0,T ]
e−ρt
∫
[0,t)
eρs dXs dXt +
1
2
∑
t∈[0,T ]
(∆Xt)
2 =
1
2
∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,T ]
e−ρ|t−s| dXs dXt.
Putting everything together yields
E[CN(ξN |ηN)] −→E
[
1
2
∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,T ]
λe−ρ|t−s| dXs dXt +
∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,t)
λe−ρ(t−s) dYs dXt
+
λ
2
∑
t∈[0,T ]
∆Xt∆Yt + θ
∑
t∈[0,T ]
(∆Xt)
2
]
, as N ↑ ∞.
It is similar to prove the convergence of E[CN(ηN |ξN)]. This completes the proof.
Now we verify the liquidation costs through an intuitive consideration. If X ∈
X (x, [0, T ]) and Y ∈ X (y, [0, T ]) are continuous in t for all t ∈ [0, T ], the total costs
for X are∫
[0,T ]
SX,Yt dXt =
∫
[0,T ]
S0t dXt +
∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,t)
λe−ρ(t−s) dXs dXt +
∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,t)
λe−ρ(t−s) dYs dXt.
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If X has several jumps and Y is still continuous, there are quadratic transaction costs
and additional liquidation costs incurred by linear transient impact. The total liquidation
costs of X become ∫
[0,T ]
SX,Yt dXt +
(
θ +
λ
2
) ∑
t∈[0,T ]
(∆Xt)
2.
Now if there are jumps in both of X and Y , and some of them are at the same time, the
liquidation costs are incurred jointly, i.e.,
λ
∑
t∈[0,T ]
∆Xt∆Yt 6= 0.
These combined costs will be taken completely by one agent, whose trading is only slightly
slower than the other’s, if both of them execute “jump trades” at the same time. As same
as the primary model, we assume that none of the two agents has an advantage in latency
over the other. The execution priority is determined by an independent coin toss if both
agents executes jump trades at the same time. In this sense, the liquidation costs of X
and Y can be defined as
C˜(X|Y )
= xS00− +
∫
[0,T ]
SX,Yt dXt + λ
∑
t∈[0,T ]
εt(∆Xt∆Yt) +
λ
2
∑
t∈[0,T ]
(∆Xt)
2 + θ
∑
t∈[0,T ]
(∆Xt)
2,
C˜(Y |X)
= yS00− +
∫
[0,T ]
SX,Yt dYt + λ
∑
t∈[0,T ]
(1− εt)(∆Xt∆Yt) + λ
2
∑
t∈[0,T ]
(∆Yt)
2 + θ
∑
t∈[0,T ]
(∆Yt)
2;
where (εt)t∈[0,T ] is an i.i.d. sequence of Bernoulli (12)-distributed random variables that
are independent of σ(
⋃
t≥0Ft). In the following lemma, we see that the two approaches
give the same expression of liquidation costs in expectation.
Lemma 3.3.3. For X ∈ X (x, [0, T ]) and Y ∈ X (y, [0, T ]), it holds that
E
[
C˜(X|Y )
]
= E
[
1
2
∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,T ]
λe−ρ|t−s| dXs dXt +
∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,t)
λe−ρ(t−s) dYs dXt
+
λ
2
∑
t∈[0,T ]
∆Xt∆Yt + θ
∑
t∈[0,T ]
(∆Xt)
2
]
,
E
[
C˜(Y |X)
]
= E
[
1
2
∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,T ]
λe−ρ|t−s| dYs dYt +
∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,t)
λe−ρ(t−s) dXs dYt
+
λ
2
∑
t∈[0,T ]
∆Xt∆Yt + θ
∑
t∈[0,T ]
(∆Yt)
2
]
.
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Proof.
E
[
C˜(X|Y )
]
= xS00− + E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
(
S0t + λ
∫
[0,t)
e−ρ(t−s) dXs + λ
∫
[0,t)
e−ρ(t−s) dYs
)
dXt
+
λ
2
∑
t∈[0,T ]
(
(∆Xt)
2 + (∆Xt∆Yt)
)
+ θ
∑
t∈[0,T ]
(∆Xt)
2
]
= xS00− + E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
S0t dXt
]
+ E
[( ∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,t)
e−ρ(t−s) dXs dXt +
λ
2
∑
t∈[0,T ]
(∆Xt)
2
)
+
(∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,t)
e−ρ(t−s) dYs dXt +
λ
2
∑
t∈[0,T ]
(∆Xt∆Yt)
)
+ θ
∑
t∈[0,T ]
(∆Xt)
2
]
.
Gatheral et al. [2012, Lemma 2.3] yields that
xS00− + E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
S0t dXt
]
= 0.
Moreover it holds that
E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,t)
e−ρ(t−s) dXs dXt +
λ
2
∑
t∈[0,T ]
(∆Xt)
2
]
= E
[
1
2
∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,T ]
λe−ρ|t−s| dXs dXt
]
.
Therefore, we obtain
E
[
C˜(X|Y )
]
= E
[
1
2
∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,T ]
λe−ρ|t−s| dXs dXt +
∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,t)
λe−ρ(t−s) dYs dXt
+
λ
2
∑
t∈[0,T ]
∆Xt∆Yt + θ
∑
t∈[0,T ]
(∆Xt)
2
]
.
It is analogous to show the equation of E[C˜(Y |X)]. This completes the proof.
Following the two approaches discussed above, we define the liquidation costs.
Definition 3.3.4. Given initial asset positions x, y ∈ R and T > 0. The liquidation costs
of X ∈ X (x, [0, T ]) given Y ∈ X (y, [0, T ]) are defined as
C(X|Y ) = 1
2
∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,T ]
λe−ρ|t−s| dXs dXt +
∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,t)
λe−ρ(t−s) dYs dXt
+
λ
2
∑
t∈[0,T ]
∆Xt∆Yt + θ
∑
t∈[0,T ]
(∆Xt)
2,
and the liquidation costs of Y ∈ X (y, [0, T ]) given X ∈ X (x, [0, T ]) are defined as
C(Y |X) = 1
2
∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,T ]
λe−ρ|t−s| dYs dYt +
∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,t)
λe−ρ(t−s) dXs dYt
+
λ
2
∑
t∈[0,T ]
∆Xt∆Yt + θ
∑
t∈[0,T ]
(∆Yt)
2.
3.3. CONTINUOUS-TIME VERSION 85
Then we assume the two agents X and Y are competing against each other. There
is no cooperation between them and both of them use open-loop strategies. Given initial
asset positions, they minimize their expected liquidation costs accordingly. In such a
situation, the optimality for both of them is defined again through Nash equilibrium.
Definition 3.3.5. For a given time horizon [0, T ] and initial asset positions x, y ∈ R, a
Nash equilibrium is a pair (X∗, Y ∗) of strategies in X (x, [0, T ])×X (y, [0, T ]) such that
E[ C(X∗|Y ∗) ] = inf
X∈X (x,[0,T ])
E[ C(X|Y ∗) ] and E[ C(Y ∗|X∗) ] = inf
Y ∈X (y,[0,T ])
E[ C(Y |X∗) ].
3.3.2 Critical value of transaction costs
Now we analyze the existence of Nash equilibria and effects of transaction costs. Lorenz
and Schied [2012] find that in a single-agent continuous-time model without transaction
costs, there exists an optimal strategy only when the derivative of the price drift is ab-
solutely continuous. On the other hand, we have seen in Section 3.1 that transaction
costs help to eliminate oscillations and lead to the convergence of optimal strategies in
the primary model. In the following theorem, we see that for any nontrivial case, a unique
Nash equilibrium exits if and only if the transaction costs are exactly equal to a critical
value.
Theorem 3.3.6. Given ρ > 0, λ > 0, T > 0 and x, y ∈ R with x 6= 0 or y 6= 0. There
exists a unique Nash equilibrium (X∗, Y ∗) in the class X (x, [0, T ])×X (y, [0, T ]) of adapted
strategies if and only if θ = λ/4. The optimal strategies X∗ and Y ∗ are deterministic and
given by
X∗t =
1
2
(x+ y)Vt +
1
2
(x− y)Wt,
Y ∗t =
1
2
(x+ y)Vt − 1
2
(x− y)Wt,
(3.54)
where
Vt =
e3ρT
(
6ρ(T − t) + 4)− 4e3ρt
2e3ρT (3ρT + 5)− 1 if t ∈ [0, T ], and V0− = 1,
Wt =
ρ(T − t) + 1
ρT + 1
if t ∈ [0, T ), and W0− = 1, WT = 0.
(3.55)
We use several lemmas to prove Theorem 3.3.6. Let Xdet(z, [0, T ]) denote the class of
all deterministic strategies in X (z, [0, T ]). First we derive in Lemma 3.3.7 an equivalent
condition for the optimality of a deterministic strategy X∗ ∈ Xdet(x, [0, T ]) given another
deterministic strategy Y ∈ Xdet(y, [0, T ]). This condition helps us to find Nash equilibria
in the class Xdet(x, [0, T ]) × Xdet(y, [0, T ]) of deterministic strategies. Then we find by
Lemma 3.3.8 a Nash equilibrium in Xdet(x, [0, T ])×Xdet(y, [0, T ]) if the transaction costs
θ are exactly equal to λ/4. In Lemmas 3.3.11 and 3.3.12, we show that this deterministic
Nash equilibrium is also a Nash equilibrium in the class of adapted strategies and it is
unique. At last we show by way of contradiction that there exists no Nash equilibrium in
the class of adapted strategies X (x, [0, T ])×X (y, [0, T ]) if θ 6= λ/4.
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To simplify the notations, we define for the rest part of this section that
C(Y,X) := E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,T ]
λe−ρ|t−s| dYs dXt
]
,
C1(Y,X) := E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,t)
λe−ρ|t−s| dYs dXt
]
, C2(Y,X) := E
[ ∑
t∈[0,T ]
∆Xt∆Yt
]
.
(3.56)
Lemma 3.3.7. Given an admissible deterministic strategy Y ∈ Xdet(y, T ), there exists an
optimal deterministic strategy X∗ ∈ Xdet(x, T ) minimizing the liquidation costs C(X|Y )
in Xdet(x, [0, T ]) if and only if there exists a constant η ∈ R such that for all t ∈ [0, T ],∫
[0,T ]
λe−ρ|t−s| dX∗s +
∫
[0,t)
λe−ρ(t−s) dYs +
λ
2
∆Yt + 2θ∆X
∗
t = η. (3.57)
Proof. We follow the proof of Gatheral et al. [2012, Theorem 2.11]. By the notation
defined in (3.56) we rewrite the liquidation costs C(X|Y ) as follows:
C(X|Y ) = 1
2
C(X) + C1(Y,X) +
λ
2
C2(Y,X) + θC2(X,X).
Necessity. We refer to the proof of Lemma 3.3.13, which shows a more general case.
Sufficiency. Assume that X∗ ∈ Xdet(x, [0, T ]) satisfies (3.57). Let Z ∈ Xdet(0, [0, T ]) be a
round trip. Then we have:
C(X∗ + Z|Y )
=
1
2
C(X∗ + Z,X∗ + Z) + C1(Y,X∗ + Z) +
λ
2
C2(Y,X
∗ + Z) + θC2(X∗ + Z,X∗ + Z)
=
1
2
C(X∗, X∗) + C1(Y,X∗) +
λ
2
C2(Y,X
∗) +
1
2
C(Z,Z) + θC2(X
∗, X∗)
+ C(X∗, Z) + C1(Y, Z) +
λ
2
C2(Y, Z) + 2θC2(X
∗, Z) + θC2(Z,Z).
Since
1
2
C(X∗, X∗) + C1(Y,X∗) +
λ
2
C2(Y,X
∗) + θC2(X∗, X∗) = C(X∗|Y )
and
C(Z,Z) ≥ 0, C2(Z,Z) ≥ 0,
it holds that
C(X∗ + Z|Y )
≥ C(X∗|Y ) + C(X∗, Z) + C1(Y, Z) + λ
2
C2(Y, Z) + 2θC2(X
∗, Z)
= C(X∗|Y ) +
∫
[0,T ]
(∫
[0,T ]
λe−ρ|t−s| dXt +
∫
[0,s)
λe−ρ|t−s| dYt +
λ
2
∆Ys + 2θ∆X
∗
s
)
dZs
= C(X∗|Y ) + η(ZT − Z0) = C(X∗|Y ).
Since every strategy X ∈ Xdet(x, [0, T ]) can be written as X∗ + Z for some round trip Z,
this shows the optimality of X∗.
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Lemma 3.3.8. Given ρ > 0, λ > 0, T > 0 and initial asset positions x, y ∈ R. If θ = λ
4
,
there exists a Nash equilibrium (X∗, Y ∗) ∈ Xdet(x, [0, T ]) × Xdet(y, [0, T ]) in the class of
deterministic strategies. The optimal strategies X∗ and Y ∗ are given by
X∗t =
1
2
(x+ y)Vt +
1
2
(x− y)Wt,
Y ∗t =
1
2
(x+ y)Vt − 1
2
(x− y)Wt,
(3.58)
where
Vt =
e3ρT
(
6ρ(T − t) + 4)− 4e3ρt
2e3ρT (3ρT + 5)− 1 if t ∈ [0, T ], and V0− = 1,
Wt =
ρ(T − t) + 1
ρT + 1
if t ∈ [0, T ), and W0− = 1,WT = 0.
(3.59)
Proof. A straightforward computation yields that, for all t ∈ [0, T ],∫
[0,T ]
λe−ρ|t−s| dX∗s +
∫
[0,t)
λe−ρ(t−s) dY ∗s +
λ
2
∆Y ∗t + 2θ∆X
∗
t
= −1
2
(λ(x− y)
ρT + 1
+
18λ(x+ y)
10 + 6ρT − e−3ρT
)
,∫
[0,T ]
λe−ρ|t−s| dY ∗s +
∫
[0,t)
λe−ρ(t−s) dX∗s +
λ
2
∆X∗t + 2θ∆Y
∗
t
= −1
2
( 18λ(x+ y)
10 + 6ρT − e−3ρT −
λ(x− y)
ρT + 1
)
.
Applying Lemma 3.3.7 completes this proof.
Remark 3.3.9 (Heuristic derivation of W and V ). We explain how we heuristicly derive
the formula of W and V in Lemma 3.3.8.
First we show the derivation of W . According to Lemma 3.3.7, there exit η1, η2 ∈ R
such that for all t ∈ [0, T ],∫
[0,T ]
λe−ρ|t−s| dX∗s +
∫
[0,t)
λe−ρ(t−s) dY ∗s +
λ
2
∆Y ∗t + 2θ∆X
∗
t = η1,∫
[0,T ]
λe−ρ|t−s| dY ∗s +
∫
[0,t)
λe−ρ(t−s) dX∗s +
λ
2
∆X∗t + 2θ∆Y
∗
t = η2.
(3.60)
We define W through X∗t − Y ∗t = (x − y)Wt. Then we have W0− = 1 and WT = 0. By
subtracting the second equation in (3.60) from the first, we obtain∫
[0,T ]
λe−ρ|t−s| dWs −
∫
[0,t)
λe−ρ(t−s) dWs +
(
2θ − λ
2
)
∆Wt = η1 − η2, for all t ∈ [0, T ].
(3.61)
Setting t = T yields (
2θ +
λ
2
)
∆WT = η1 − η2. (3.62)
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We assume in addition that X∗ and Y ∗ are absolutely continuous in (0, T ). Then we have
∆Wt = 0 for t ∈ (0, T ) and∫
[0,T ]
λe−ρ|t−s| dWs −
∫
[0,t)
λe−ρ(t−s) dWs + (2θ − λ
2
)∆Wt
=
∫
(t,T ]
λe−ρ(s−t) dWs =
∫
(t,T )
λe−ρ(s−t) dWs + λe−ρ(T−t)∆WT
= λ
(
e−ρ(s−t)Ws
∣∣∣T−
t+
+ ρ
∫
(t,T )
Wse
−ρ(s−t) ds+ e−ρ(T−t)∆WT
)
= λ
(
− e−ρ(T−t)∆WT −Wt + ρ
∫
(t,T )
Wse
−ρ(s−t) ds+ e−ρ(T−t)∆WT
)
= η1 − η2.
By (3.61) and (3.62), the latter expression must be equal to
(
2θ+ λ
2
)
∆WT . It then follows
that
λWt = λρ
∫
(t,T )
Wse
−ρ(s−t) ds−
(
2θ +
λ
2
)
∆WT , for all t ∈ (0, T ). (3.63)
Since
lim
t→T−
Wt = WT− = −∆WT , lim
t→T−
∫
(t,T )
Wse
−ρ(s−t) ds = 0,
we obtain
λ∆WT =
(
2θ +
λ
2
)
∆WT .
This implies that θ = λ/4 or ∆WT = 0. If ∆WT = 0, it holds that
Wt = ρ
∫
(t,T )
Wse
−ρ(s−t) ds, for all t ∈ (0, T ). (3.64)
Since Wt is absolutely continuous, we may differentiate both sides of (3.64) with respect
to t and get
W ′t = ρ
(
ρeρt
∫
(t,T )
Wse
−ρs ds− eρtWte−ρt
)
= −ρ(Wt −Wt) = 0,
which means Wt = c ∈ R, for almost all t ∈ (0, T ). Since ∆WT = 0, it follows that c = 0
and ∆W0 = −1. However, by setting t = 0 in (3.61), we obtain(
2θ +
λ
2
)
∆W0 + λe
−ρT∆WT +
∫
(0,T )
λe−ρs dWs = η1 − η2 =
(
2θ +
λ
2
)
∆WT . (3.65)
This implies ∆W0 = 0 and shows ∆WT 6= 0. Therefore, we must have θ = λ/4.
Now let θ = λ/4. Note that∫
(0,T )
e−ρs dWs
= e−ρsWs
∣∣∣T−
0+
+ ρ
∫
(0,T )
Wse
−ρs ds = −e−ρT∆WT − (∆W0 + 1) + ρ
∫
(0,T )
Wse
−ρs ds.
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Thus, equation (3.65) becomes
ρ
∫
(0,T )
Wse
−ρs ds− 1 = ∆WT .
Putting this result into (3.63) yields
Wt = ρ
∫
(t,T )
Wse
−ρ(s−t) ds+ 1− ρ
∫
(0,T )
Wse
−ρs ds, for all t ∈ (0, T ).
Taking the derivative with respect to t yields
W ′t = ρ
(
ρ
∫
(0,T )
Wse
−ρs ds− 1
)
∈ R. (3.66)
Solving (3.66) yields
Wt =
ρ(T − t) + 1
ρT + 1
if t ∈ [0, T ), and WT = 0.
Now we show the derivation of V . Assume that θ = λ/4. By Lemma 3.3.7, there
exists a constant η ∈ R, such that for all t ∈ [0, T ], it holds∫
[0,T ]
e−ρ|t−s| dVs +
∫
[0,t)
e−ρ(t−s) dVs + ∆Vt = η, (3.67)
where V is defined through X∗t + Y
∗
t = (x+ y)Vt. And we have V0− = 1 and VT = 0. We
furthermore assume that Vt is absolutely continuous in (0, T ). Then (3.67) turns to be
2e−ρt∆V0 + 2
∫
(0,t)
e−ρ(t−s) dVs +
∫
(t,T )
e−ρ(s−t) dVs = η.
Then we have∫
(0,t)
e−ρ(t−s) dVs
= e−ρ(t−s)Vs
∣∣∣s=t−
s=0+
− ρ
∫
(0,t)
Vse
−ρ(t−s) ds = Vt − e−ρt − e−ρt∆V0 − ρ
∫
(0,t)
Vse
−ρ(t−s) ds,∫
(t,T )
e−ρ(s−t) dVs
= e−ρ(t−s)Vs
∣∣∣s=T−
s=t+
+ ρ
∫
(t,T )
Vse
−ρ(s−t) ds = −e−ρ(T−t)∆VT − Vt + ρ
∫
(t,T )
Vse
−ρ(t−s) ds.
Hence, we obtain
Vt − 2e−ρt − 2ρ
∫
(0,t)
Vse
−ρ(t−s) ds+ ρ
∫
(t,T )
Vse
−ρ(s−t) ds = η, if t ∈ (0, T ). (3.68)
Similarly,
∆V0 − 1 + ρ
∫
(0,T )
Vse
−ρs ds = η, if t = 0;
−2e−ρT − 2ρ
∫
(0,T )
Vse
−ρ(T−s) ds = η, if t = T .
(3.69)
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Note that limt→T− Vt = VT− = −∆VT and limt→T−
∫
(t,T )
Vse
−ρ(s−t) ds = 0. We obtain
−∆VT − 2e−ρT − 2ρ
∫
(0,T )
Vse
−ρ(T−s) ds = η = −2e−ρT − 2ρ
∫
(0,T )
Vse
−ρ(T−s) ds.
This shows ∆VT = 0.
We assume in addition V is twice differentiable in (0, T ). By differentiating (3.68)
twice with respect to t, we get
V ′′t + ρ
2
(
− 2e−ρt− 2ρ
∫
(0,t)
Vse
−ρ(t−s) ds+ ρ
∫
(t,T )
Vse
−ρ(s−t) ds
)
− 3ρV ′t + ρ2Vt = 0. (3.70)
Putting (3.68) into (3.70) yields that
V ′′t − 3ρV ′t + ρ2η = 0, (3.71)
which has the solution
Vt =
e3ρt
3ρ
c1 +
ηρt
3
+ c2, c1, c2 ∈ R.
Applying the terminal condition VT = 0 yields
Vt =
−(T − t)ρ2η + c
(
e3ρt − e3ρT
)
3ρ
, c ∈ R. (3.72)
The constants c and η can be derived explicitly by putting (3.72) into (3.69):
c = − 12ρ
6ρTe3ρT + 10e3ρT − 1 , η = −
18e3ρT
6ρTe3ρT + 10e3ρT − 1 .
Therefore we obtain
Vt =
e3ρT
(
6ρ(T − t) + 4)− 4e3ρt
2e3ρT (3ρT + 5)− 1 if t ∈ (0, T ], and V0 = 1.
In the end, one can validate V by checking∫
[0,T ]
e−ρ|t−s| dVs +
∫
[0,t)
e−ρ(t−s) dVs + ∆Vt = − 18e
3ρT
6ρTe3ρT + 10e3ρT − 1 , for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Lemma 3.3.10. Given T > 0, ρ > 0, λ > 0, θ ≥ 0, initial asset positions x, y ∈ R and
an admissible strategy Y ∈ X (y, [0, T ]), the functional E[C(X|Y )] is strictly convex with
respect to X ∈ X (x, [0, T ]).
Proof. Let α ∈ (0, 1) and X0, X1 ∈ X (x, [0, T ]) be two distinct admissible strategies.
Since the function t 7→ λe−ρt is positive definite, we obtain
E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,T ]
λe−ρ|s−t| d
(
X1s −X0s
)
d
(
X1t −X0t
)]
> 0.
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Hence,
C(αX1 + (1− α)X0, αX1 + (1− α)X0)
< C(αX1 + (1− α)X0, αX1 + (1− α)X0) + α(1− α)C(X1 −X0, X1 −X0)
= α2C(X1, X1) + (1− α)2C(X0, X0) + 2α(1− α)C(X1, X0)
+ α(1− α)C(X1, X1)− 2α(1− α)C(X1, X0) + α(1− α)C(X0, X0)
= αC(X1, X1) + (1− α)C(X0, X0).
By the same way, we have∑
t∈[0,T ]
(
∆
(
αX1t + (1− αX0t )
))2
< α
∑
t∈[0,T ]
(
∆X1t
)2
+ (1− α)
∑
t∈[0,T ]
(
∆X0t
)2
.
Therefore,
E
[
C(αX1 + (1− α)X0|Y )
]
< αE
[
C(X1|Y )
]
+ (1− α)E
[
C(X0|Y )
]
for all α ∈ (0, 1).
Lemma 3.3.11. Given T > 0, ρ > 0, λ > 0, θ ≥ 0 and initial asset positions x, y ∈ R,
there exists at most one Nash equilibrium in the class X (x, [0, T ])×X (y, [0, T ]) of adapted
strategies.
Proof. We assume by way of contradiction that there exist two distinct Nash equilibria
(X0, Y 0) and (X1, Y 1) in X (x, [0, T ])×X (y, [0, T ]). Then we define for α ∈ [0, 1]
Xα := αX1 + (1− α)X0 and Y α := αY 1 + (1− α)Y 0.
We furthermore let
f(α) := E
[
C(Xα|Y 0) + C(Y α|X0) + C(X1−α|Y 1) + C(Y 1−α|X1)
]
.
According to Lemma 3.3.10, each term of f(α) is strictly convex in α. Since the two Nash
equilibria (X0, Y 0) and (X1, Y 1) are distinct, f(α) must also be convex in α and have its
unique minimun in α = 0. That is
f(α) ≥ f(0) for α > 0.
It follows that
lim
h↓0
f(h)− f(0)
h
=
df(α)
dα
∣∣∣
α=0+
≥ 0. (3.73)
On the other hand, we have
d
dα
E[C(Xα|Y 0)]
∣∣∣
α=0
= C(X0, X1 −X0) + C1(Y 0, X1 −X0)
+
λ
2
C2(Y
0, X1 −X0) + 2θC2(X0, X1 −X0).
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In the same way, we take derivatives of E[C(Y α|X0)], E[C(X1−α|Y 1)] and E[C(Y 1−α|X1)]
with respect to α, set α = 0 and then put them together. Then we have
df(α)
dα
∣∣∣
α=0
= −C(X1 −X0, X1 −X0)− C(Y 1 − Y 0, Y 1 − Y 0)− C(Y 1 − Y 0, Y 1 − Y 0)
− 2θ
(
C2(X
1 −X0, X1 −X0) + C2(Y 1 − Y 0, Y 1 − Y 0)
)
< −1
2
C(X1 −X0, X1 −X0)− 1
2
C(Y 1 − Y 0, Y 1 − Y 0)− 1
2
C(Y 1 − Y 0, X1 −X0)
< 0,
which contradicts (3.73). Therefore, there exists at most one Nash equilibrium in the
class X (x, [0, T ])×X (y, [0, T ]) of adapted strategies.
Lemma 3.3.12. A Nash equilibrium in the class Xdet(x, [0, T ])× Xdet(y, [0, T ]) of deter-
ministic strategies is also a Nash equilibrium in the class X (x, [0, T ]) × X (y, [0, T ]) of
adapted strategies.
Proof. Let (X∗, Y ∗) ∈ Xdet(x, [0, T ]) × X (y, [0, T ]) be a Nash equilibrium in the class of
deterministic strategies. For any strategy X ∈ X (x, [0, T ]), we have
C(X(ω)|Y ∗)) ≥ C(X∗|Y ∗) for almost all ω ∈ Ω.
Therefore we obtain E[C(X|Y ∗)] ≥ C(X∗|Y ∗) with equality if and only if C(X|Y ∗) =
C(X∗|Y ∗) P-a.s. This shows the optimality of X∗ within the class X (x, [0, T ]) of adaptive
strategies. Analogous we obtain the optimality of Y ∗ within the class X (y, [0, T ]) of
adaptive strategies. This completes the proof.
Lemma 3.3.13. Given an adapted strategy Y ∈ X (y, [0, T ]), if there exists an optimal
strategy X∗ minimizing the expected liquidation costs E[C(X|Y )] in X (x, [0, T ]), then for
any stopping time τ ∈ [0, T ], there exists an Fτ -measurable random variable η such that
X∗ solves the following integral equation P-a.s., for all stopping time σ ∈ [τ, T ],
E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
λe−ρ|σ−t| dX∗t +
∫
[0,σ)
λe−ρ(σ−t) dYt +
λ
2
∆Yσ + 2θ∆X
∗
σ
∣∣∣Fτ] = η.
Proof. We first note that
E[C(X|Y )] = 1
2
C(X,X) + C1(Y,X) +
λ
2
C2(Y,X) + θC2(X,X).
Let τ ∈ [0, T ], σ ∈ [τ, T ] be stopping time, δ be Dirac measure and A ∈ Fτ . We define a
round trip Z by
dZt = 1A
(
δτ (dt)− δσ(dt)
)
.
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For α ∈ R, we have
E[C(X + αZ|Y )]
=
1
2
C(X + αZ,X + αZ) + C1(Y,X + αZ) +
λ
2
C2(Y,X + αZ) + θC2(X + αZ,X + αZ)
=
1
2
(
C(X,X) + 2αC(Z,X) + α2C(Z,Z)
)
+ C1(Y,X) + αC1(Y, Z) +
λ
2
C2(Y,X)
+
λ
2
αC2(Y, Z) + θ
(
C2(X,X) + 2αC2(X,Z) + α
2C2(Z,Z)
)
.
We take the derivative with respect to α at α = 0. Hence, a necessary condition for the
optimality is:
0 = C(Z,X) + C1(Y, Z) +
λ
2
C2(Y, Z) + 2θC2(X,Z). (3.74)
We have
C(Z,X) = E
[
1A
(∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,T ]
λe−ρ|t−s| dZs dXt
)]
= E
[
1A
(∫
[0,T ]
(
λe−ρ|τ−t| − λe−ρ|σ−t|) dXt)],
C1(Y, Z) = E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,t)
λe−ρ|t−s| dYs dZt
]
= E
[
1A
(∫
[0,τ)
λe−ρ|τ−t| dYt −
∫
[0,σ)
λe−ρ|σ−t| dYt
)]
,
λ
2
C2(Y, Z) = E
[
λ
2
∫
[0,T ]
∆Yt dZt
]
= E
[
λ
2
1A
(
∆Yτ −∆Yσ
)]
,
2θC2(X,Z) = E
[
2θ1A
(
∆Xτ −∆Xσ
)]
.
Then (3.74) becomes
0 =E
[
1A
(∫
[0,T ]
(
λe−ρ|τ−t| − λe−ρ|σ−t|) dXt + ∫
[0,τ)
λe−ρ|τ−t| dYt −
∫
[0,σ)
λe−ρ|σ−t| dYt
+
λ
2
(∆Yτ −∆Yσ) + 2θ (∆Xτ −∆Xσ)
)]
.
This implies that for all A ∈ Fτ and for all σ ≥ τ ,
E
[
1A
(∫
[0,T ]
λe−ρ|σ−t| dX∗t +
∫
[0,σ)
λe−ρ(σ−t) dYt +
λ
2
∆Yσ + 2θ∆X
∗
σ
)]
=E
[
1A
(∫
[0,T ]
λe−ρ|τ−t| dX∗t +
∫
[0,τ)
λe−ρ(τ−t) dYt +
λ
2
∆Yτ + 2θ∆X
∗
τ
)]
.
By the definition of conditional expectation, there exists a Fτ -measurable random variable
η, such that X∗ solves the following integral equation for all stopping time σ ∈ [τ, T ]
E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
λe−ρ|σ−t| dX∗t +
∫
[0,σ)
λe−ρ(σ−t) dYt +
λ
2
∆Yσ + 2θ∆X
∗
σ
∣∣∣Fτ] = η, P-a.s.
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Proof of Theorem 3.3.6. Putting Lemmas 3.3.8, 3.3.12 and 3.3.11 together shows that if
θ = λ/4, the strategies (X∗, Y ∗) ∈ Xdet(x, [0, T ]) × Xdet(y, [0, T ]) stated in (3.58) form a
unique Nash equilibrium in the class X (x, [0, T ])×X (y, [0, T ]) of adapted strategies.
Now we show that if θ 6= λ/4, there exists no Nash equilibrium in the class of adapted
strategies. To this end, we suppose by contradiction that there exists a Nash equilibrium
(X∗, Y ∗) ∈ X (x, [0, T ]) × X (y, [0, T ]) and θ 6= λ/4. By Lemma 3.3.13, for any stopping
time τ ∈ [0, T ], there exists an Fτ -measurable random variable η, such that X∗ solves the
following integral equation for all stopping time σ ∈ [τ, T ]
E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
λe−ρ|σ−s| dX∗s +
∫
[0,σ)
λe−ρ(σ−s) dY ∗s +
λ
2
∆Y ∗σ + 2θ∆X
∗
σ
∣∣∣Fτ] = η. (3.75)
We define a stopping time τ := inf{t |∆X∗t 6= 0}. If τ < T , let (τn)n∈N be a sequence
of stopping time with ∆X∗τn = 0 and τn ↓ τ as n ↑ ∞. This sequence (τn)n∈N is well
defined because by Definition 3.3.1 admissible strategies are of bounded total variation
and there are at most only countable many jumps in [0, T ].
Since E[
∫
[0,T ]
λe−ρ|t−s| dX∗s ] is continuous with respect to t, we have
lim
n↑∞
E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
λe−ρ|τn−s| dX∗s
]
= E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
λe−ρ|τ−s| dX∗s
]
. (3.76)
Furthermore, it holds that for all n ∈ N∣∣∣∣ ∫
[0,τn)
λe−ρ(τn−s) dY ∗s
∣∣∣∣ ≤ λ|y| <∞.
By dominated convergence theorem, we have
E
[
lim
n↑∞
∫
[0,τn)
λe−ρ(τn−s) dY ∗s
]
= E
[ ∫
[0,τ)
λe−ρ(τ−s) dY ∗s
]
. (3.77)
Putting (3.75), (3.76) and (3.77) together yields that
η = lim
n→∞
E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
λe−ρ|τn−s| dX∗s +
∫
[0,τn)
λe−ρ(τn−s) dY ∗s +
λ
2
∆Y ∗τn + 2θ∆X
∗
τn
∣∣∣Fτ]
= E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
λe−ρ|τ−s| dX∗s +
∫
[0,τ ]
λe−ρ(τ−s) dY ∗s
∣∣∣Fτ]. (3.78)
On the other hand, setting σ = τ in (3.75) yields that
η = E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
λe−ρ|τ−s| dX∗s +
∫
[0,τ)
λe−ρ(τ−s) dY ∗s +
λ
2
∆Y ∗τ + 2θ∆X
∗
τ
∣∣∣Fτ]. (3.79)
By subtracting (3.79) from (3.78), we obtain
E
[λ
2
∆Y ∗τ + 2θ∆X
∗
τ
∣∣∣Fτ] = λ
2
∆Y ∗τ + 2θ∆X
∗
τ = 0. (3.80)
By the same way, we obtain
λ
2
∆X∗τ + 2θ∆Y
∗
τ = 0. (3.81)
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Combining (3.80) and (3.81) yields(λ
2
− 2θ
)
(∆X∗τ −∆Y ∗τ ) = 0,(λ
2
+ 2θ
)
(∆X∗τ + ∆Y
∗
τ ) = 0.
(3.82)
Since θ 6= λ/4 and λ > 0, we must have
∆X∗τ = ∆Y
∗
τ = 0.
This contradicts the definition of τ . Therefore, X∗t must be continuous for t ∈ [0, T ).
Similarly, Y ∗t must be also continuous for t ∈ [0, T ).
In the next step we show ∆X∗T = ∆Y
∗
T = 0 if θ 6= λ/4. To this end, let (τn)n∈N
be a sequence of stopping time in [0, T ) with limn↑∞ τn = T , P-a.s. For each n ∈ N,
let
(
σ
(n)
m
)
m∈N be a sequence of stopping time in [τn, T ) with limm↑∞ σ
(n)
m = T , P-a.s. By
Lemma 3.3.13, for each n ∈ N there exists an Fτn-measurable random variable ηn such
that X∗ solves the following integral equation for all
(
σ
(n)
m
)
m∈N,
ηn = E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
λe−ρ|σ
(n)
m −s| dX∗s +
∫
[0,σ
(n)
m )
λe−ρ(σ
(n)
m −s) dY ∗s +
λ
2
∆Y ∗
σ
(n)
m
+ 2θ∆X∗
σ
(n)
m
∣∣∣Fτn]
= E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
λe−ρ|σ
(n)
m −s| dX∗s +
∫
[0,σ
(n)
m )
λe−ρ(σ
(n)
m −s) dY ∗s
∣∣∣Fτn].
Since X∗t and Y
∗
t are continuous for t ∈ [0, T ), we have
ηn = lim
m↑∞
E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
λe−ρ|σ
(n)
m −s| dX∗s +
∫
[0,σ
(n)
m )
λe−ρ(σ
(n)
m −s) dY ∗s
∣∣∣Fτn]
= E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
λe−ρ|T−s| dX∗s +
∫
[0,T )
λe−ρ(T−s) dY ∗s
∣∣∣Fτn]. (3.83)
On the other hand, we also have
ηn = E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
λe−ρ|T−s| dX∗s +
∫
[0,T )
λe−ρ(T−s) dY ∗s +
λ
2
∆Y ∗T + 2θ∆X
∗
T
∣∣∣Fτn]. (3.84)
Comparing (3.83) and (3.84) yields that
E
[λ
2
∆Y ∗T + 2θ∆X
∗
T
∣∣∣Fτn] = 0. (3.85)
Analogously, we also obtain that
E
[λ
2
∆X∗T + 2θ∆Y
∗
T
∣∣∣Fτn] = 0. (3.86)
Note that
σ
( ∞⋃
n=0
Fτn
)
⊂ FT−, ∆X∗T = −X∗T−, ∆Y ∗T = −Y ∗T− are FT−-measurable.
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Since ∣∣∣λ
2
∆Y ∗T + 2θ∆X
∗
T
∣∣∣ <∞, ∣∣∣λ
2
∆X∗T + 2θ∆Y
∗
T
∣∣∣ <∞,
martingale convergence theorem, see Theorem 7.23 in Kallenberg [2002], yields that
lim
n↑∞
E
[λ
2
∆Y ∗T + 2θ∆X
∗
T
∣∣∣Fτn] = E[λ2 ∆Y ∗T + 2θ∆X∗T ∣∣∣FT−] = λ2 ∆Y ∗T + 2θ∆X∗T = 0,
lim
n↑∞
E
[λ
2
∆X∗T + 2θ∆Y
∗
T
∣∣∣Fτn] = E[λ2 ∆X∗T + 2θ∆Y ∗T ∣∣∣FT−] = λ2 ∆X∗T + 2θ∆Y ∗T = 0.
(3.87)
Since θ 6= λ/4, by the same argument of (3.82), we must have
∆X∗T = ∆Y
∗
T = 0.
Therefore, X∗ and Y ∗ must be continuous in [0, T ].
By Lemma 3.3.13 again and choosing the same stopping time τ ∈ [0, T ) for X∗ and
Y ∗, there exist Fτ -measurable random variables η1 and η2 such that X∗ and Y ∗ solve the
following integral equations for all stopping time σ ∈ [τ, T ],
E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
λe−ρ|σ−t| dX∗t +
∫
[0,σ)
λe−ρ(σ−t) dY ∗t
∣∣∣Fτ] = η1,
E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
λe−ρ|σ−t| dY ∗t +
∫
[0,σ)
λe−ρ(σ−t) dX∗t
∣∣∣Fτ] = η2. (3.88)
Subtracting one equation of (3.88) from the other yields
E
[ ∫
[σ,T ]
λe−ρ(t−σ) d(X∗t − Y ∗t )
∣∣∣Fτ] = η1 − η2.
Setting σ = T and the continuity of X∗ and Y ∗ yield that η1 − η2 = 0. Hence,
E
[ ∫
[σ,T ]
λe−ρ(t−σ) d(X∗t − Y ∗t )
∣∣∣Fτ] = 0 for all σ ≥ τ .
Setting σ = τ yields
E
[ ∫
[τ,T ]
λe−ρt d(X∗t − Y ∗t )
∣∣∣Fτ]eρτ = 0.
Hence,
E
[ ∫
[τ,T ]
e−ρt d(X∗t − Y ∗t )
∣∣∣Fτ] = 0 for all τ ∈ [0, T ].
Since X∗ − Y ∗ is continuous and e−ρt > 0, we have X∗t = Y ∗t P-a.s. for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Hence, X∗ and Y ∗ are indistinguishable and it must hold that x = y. Therefore, it
suffices to consider only the deterministic case, i.e., X∗, Y ∗ ∈ Xdet(x, [0, T ]). Note that
(3.88) becomes ∫
[0,T ]
λe−ρ|s−t| dX∗t +
∫
[0,s)
λe−ρ(s−t) dX∗t = η, (3.89)
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where s ∈ [0, T ] is arbitrary and η ∈ R. Hence, for all u, s ∈ [0, T ] with u > s, we have∫
[0,T ]
λ
(
e−ρ|u−t| − e−ρ|s−t|)
u− s dX
∗
t +
∫
[0,u)
λe−ρ(u−t) dX∗t −
∫
[0,s)
λe−ρ(s−t) dX∗t
u− s = 0. (3.90)
Since ∣∣∣∣ ∫
[0,T ]
λ
(
e−ρ|u−t| − e−ρ|s−t|)
u− s dX
∗
t
∣∣∣∣ ≤ K, for some K > 0,
the proof of Gatheral et al. [2012, Theorem 2.23] yields that
lim
s↓0
lim
u↓s
∫
[0,T ]
λ
(
e−ρ|u−t| − e−ρ|s−t|)
u− s dX
∗
t
= lim
s↓0
(∫
[0,s]
−λρe−ρ(s−t) dX∗t +
∫
(s,0]
λρe−ρ(t−s) dX∗t
)
=
∫
[0,T ]
λρe−ρt dX∗t <∞.
(3.91)
Furthermore, the function s 7→ ∫
[0,s)
λe−ρ(s−t) dX∗t is continuous in [0, T ]. It follows that
Q := lim
s↓0
lim
u↓s
∫
[0,u)
λe−ρ(u−t) dX∗t −
∫
[0,s)
λe−ρ(s−t) dX∗t
u− s <∞. (3.92)
Putting (3.91) and (3.92) into (3.90) yields that∫
[0,T ]
λρe−ρt dX∗t +Q = 0. (3.93)
On the other hand, (3.89) can be written as
2
∫
[0,T ]
λe−ρ|s−t| dX∗t −
∫
[s,T ]
λe−ρ(t−s) dX∗t = η.
Since
− ∫
[u,T ]
λe−ρ(t−u) dX∗t +
∫
[s,T ]
λe−ρ(t−s) dX∗t
u− s =
∫
[0,u)
λe−ρ(u−t) dX∗t −
∫
[0,s)
λe−ρ(s−t) dX∗t
u− s ,
by the same method used above, we have
2
∫
[0,T ]
λρe−ρt dX∗t +Q = 0. (3.94)
Comparing (3.93) and (3.94) yields∫
[0,T ]
λρe−ρt dX∗t = 0. (3.95)
Setting s = 0 in (3.89) yields ∫
[0,T ]
λe−ρt dX∗t = η,
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then we have η = 0 by (3.95). This implies for any s ∈ [0, T ], it holds that∫
[0,T ]
λe−ρ|s−t| dX∗t +
∫
[0,s)
λe−ρ(s−t) dX∗t = 0.
It then follows that
C(X∗|Y ∗) = C(Y ∗|X∗)
=
1
2
∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,T ]
λe−ρ|t−s| dX∗s dX
∗
t +
∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,t)
λe−ρ(t−s) dX∗s dX
∗
t
≤
∫
[0,T ]
(∫
[0,T ]
λe−ρ|t−s| dX∗s +
∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,t)
λe−ρ(t−s) dX∗s
)
dX∗t
= 0.
On the other hand, we have
C(X∗|Y ∗) = C(Y ∗|X∗)
=
1
2
∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,T ]
λe−ρ|t−s| dX∗s dX
∗
t +
∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,t)
λe−ρ(t−s) dX∗s dX
∗
t
=
∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,T ]
λe−ρ|t−s| dX∗s dX
∗
t ≥ 0.
This implies C(X∗|Y ∗) = C(Y ∗|X∗) = 0, which holds if and only if X∗t = Y ∗t = 0 for all
t ∈ [0, T ]. The continuity of X∗ and Y ∗ implies then x = y = 0. This completes the
proof.
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Figure 3.17: Comparison of optimal strategies in discrete-time model with parameters
θ = 0.01, θ = 0.25 (left) and θ = 1, θ = 0.25 (right). We have used the equidistant
time grid T50, the initial condition x = y = 1, and parameters λ = ρ = 1. The optimal
strategies with θ 6= λ/4 consist growing jumps near t = 0, while the optimal strategy with
θ = λ/4 coincides with the function V stated in Theorem 3.3.6.
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Figure 3.18: Comparison of optimal strategies in discrete-time model with parameters
θ = 0.01, θ = 0.25 (left) and θ = 1, θ = 0.25 (right). We have used the equidistant time
grid T50, the initial condition x = −y = 1, and parameters λ = ρ = 1. The optimal
strategies with θ 6= λ/4 consist of growing jumps near t = T , while the optimal strategy
with θ = λ/4 is linear and coincides with the function W stated in Theorem 3.3.6.
Remark 3.3.14. Figures 3.17 and 3.18 of the primary model suggest an intuitive ex-
planation for the nonexistence of Nash equilibia when θ 6= θ∗: when θ < θ∗, oscillatory
strategies are not convergent to a continuous-time strategy; when θ > θ∗, numerical com-
putations suggest that the components v and w defined in (3.5) are convergent to the
functions V and W defined in (3.55). However, strategies consisted of V and W as stated
in (3.54) form a Nash equilibrium if and only if θ = θ∗.
3.3.3 Review of single-agent models
In this subsection we analyze the effects of transaction costs in single-agent models. First
we impost the transaction costs in the discrete-time model of Obizhaeva and Wang [2013].
Given a discrete time grid T = {t0, t1, . . . , tN}, where 0 = t0 < t1 < · · · < TN = T , an
admissible trading strategy for T and an initial asset position x ∈ R used by the signal
agent X is described by a vector2 ξ = (ξ0, . . . , ξN) ∈ RN+1 with
∑N
k=0 ξk = x. If the agent
X is active, the affected price process St is given by
St = S
0
t − λ
∑
tk<t
e−ρ(t−tk)ξk,
where the unaffected price process S0t is defined as same as at the beginning of Subsection
3.3.1. For each execution ξk, k ∈ {0, 1 . . . , N}, there are additional transaction costs θξ2k
for θ ≥ 0. This model is a single-agent version of the model stated in Section 3.1. The
liquidation costs are defined as
C(ξ) = 1
2
ξ>λ(G+ 2θ Id)ξ,
where
Gi+1,j+1 = e
−ρ|ti−tj |, i, j = 0, . . . , N.
2We consider only deterministic strategies since one can verify that the unique optimal strategy in the
class of adapted strategies is deterministic by Lemma 3.3.12.
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Figure 3.19: Optimal strategies with parameters θ = 1 (left) and θ = 10 (right). We use
the equidistant time grid T50, the initial value x = 1, and parameters λ = ρ = 1. The
optimal strategy tends to have a constant trading rate as the transaction costs increase.
For this model, the unique optimal strategy can be obtained by following Alfonsi et al.
[2008, Theorem 3.1]
ξ∗ = x
(
λ(G+ 2θ Id)
)−1
1
1T
(
λ(G+ 2θ Id)
)−1
1
, for all θ ≥ 0.
The addition of transaction costs does not affect the existence of optimal strategy, see
Figure 3.19. As the transaction costs increase, the optimal strategy tends to be more
similar to the trivial strategy.
We turn to analyze the effects of transaction costs in the continuous-time version of
the single-agent model. We assume that if the agent X is active, the affected price St is
St = S
0
t +
∫
[0,t)
λe−ρ(t−s) dXs.
If there are no transaction costs, the liquidation costs are defined as
C(X) := 1
2
∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,T ]
λe−ρ|t−s| dXs dXt =
1
2
∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,T ]
λe−ρ|t−s| dXs dXt, (3.96)
which is a special case in Gatheral et al. [2012]. This model is a continuous-time variant
of the simplified version of the limit order book model of Obizhaeva and Wang [2013],
which is introduced by Alfonsi et al. [2008] and Alfonsi et al. [2010]. It has been shown in
Obizhaeva and Wang [2013] that the unique optimal strategy X∗ ∈ X (x, T ) is given by
dX∗s =
−x
ρT + 2
(
δ0(ds) + ρ ds+ δT (ds)
)
.
Now we assume that there are quadratic transaction costs associated with jumps of
strategies. Then the liquidation costs are
C(X) := 1
2
(∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,T ]
λe−ρ|t−s| dXs dXt + 2θ
∑
t∈[0,T ]
(
∆Xt
)2)
, θ > 0.
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This formula can be regarded as the costs with respected to a decay kernel g(t) which has
a jump at t = 0, i.e.,
C(X) := 1
2
(∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,T ]
g(|t− s|) dXs dXt
)
, g(t) =
{
λe−ρt, if t ∈ (0, T ];
λ+ 2θ, for t = 0.
Gatheral et al. [2012, Theorem 2.11] gives an equivalent condition for the existence of
an optimal strategy minimizing the liquidation costs
1
2
∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,T ]
h(|t− s|) dXs dXt,
for a continuous decay kernel h : [0,∞) → [0,∞). In the following proposition we find
that this equivalent condition does not hold if the decay kernel is not continuous at zero.
Proposition 3.3.15. Let h : [0,∞) → [0,∞) be a positive definite decay kernel. If h(t)
is continuous in (0,∞) but h(0) 6= limt↓0 h(t), then for all strategies X ∈ Xdet(x, [0, T ])
there is no constant η ∈ R, such that X solves the generalized Fredholm integral equation,∫
[0,T ]
h(|t− s|) dXs = η.
Proof. Suppose by way of contradiction that there exits a constant η ∈ R and a strategy
X∗ ∈ Xdet(x, [0, T ]) that solves the generalized Fredholm integral equation∫
[0,T ]
h(|t− s|) dX∗s = η, for all t ∈ [0, T ].
We assume
X∗ = Xc +Xd
where Xc denotes the continuous part of X∗ and Xd := X∗ − Xc. Since X∗t has finite
and P-a.s. bounded total variation, the support J := supp dXd must be countable.
Furthermore, we define
h˜(t) =
{
h(t), if t ∈ (0, T ];
limt↓0 h(t), for t = 0;
as a continuous version of h(t). It holds that for all t ∈ [0, T ],∫
[0,T ]
h(|t− s|) dX∗s
=
∫
[0,T ]
h(|t− s|) dXcs +
∫
[0,T ]
h˜(|t− s|) dXds +
(
h(0)− h˜(0)) ∫
[0,T ]
1{t}(s) dXds = η.
Now let t0 ∈ J and a sequence (tn)n∈N such that limn→∞ tn = t0 and tn /∈ J for all n ∈ N.
Since the terms ∫
[0,T ]
h(|t− s|) dXcs and
∫
[0,T ]
h˜(|t− s|) dXds
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are continuous with respect to t. We have∫
[0,T ]
h(|t0 − s|) dX∗s
= lim
n→∞
(∫
[0,T ]
h(|tn − s|) dXcs +
∫
[0,T ]
h˜(|tn − s|) dXds +
(
h(0)− h˜(0)) ∫
[0,T ]
1{tn}(s) dX
d
s
)
= lim
n→∞
(∫
[0,T ]
h(|tn − s|) dXcs +
∫
[0,T ]
h˜(|tn − s|) dXds
)
=
∫
[0,T ]
h(|t0 − s|) dXcs +
∫
[0,T ]
h˜(|t0 − s|) dXds = η.
On the other hand, it holds that∫
[0,T ]
h(|t0 − s|) dX∗s
=
∫
[0,T ]
h(|t0 − s|) dXcs +
∫
[0,T ]
h˜(|t0 − s|) dXds +
(
h(0)− h˜(0))∆Xdt0 = η,
with h(0)− h˜(0) 6= 0. This shows that J = ∅. For a continuous strategy X, its liquidation
costs become
C(X) = 1
2
∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,T ]
h(|t− s|) dXs dXt = 1
2
∫
[0,T ]
∫
[0,T ]
h˜(|t− s|) dXs dXt.
However, Theorem 2.23 in Gatheral et al. [2012] asserts that an optimal strategy minimiz-
ing the liquidation costs with a continuous decay kernel must have jumps at t ∈ {0, T}.
This shows there is no optimal strategy in the class Xdet(x, [0, T ]) of deterministic strate-
gies and completes the proof.
Corollary 3.3.16. Given λ > 0, ρ > 0, T > 0, θ > 0 and an initial asset position x 6= 0.
There is no optimal strategy in the class Xdet(x, [0, T ]) of deterministic strategies.
Proof. This assertion is obtained directly through Proposition 3.3.15.
We see the key point for the nonexistence of optimal strategies is that the decay kernel
g(t) is not continuous at t = 0. Due to this discontinuity, the term∫
[0,T ]
g(|t− s|) dXs
is not a continuous function with respect to t. Therefore, the optimal cost functional
C(ξ(N)) in discrete-time model does not converge to a cost functional C(X∗) with respect
to the weak topology as N ↑ ∞, where ξ(N) denotes the optimal strategy with a time grid
TN consisting of N points and X∗ ∈ Xdet(x, [0, T ]).
Intuitively, in the continuous-time model one would try to use continuous strategies
to approximate jumps infinitesimally to avoid the quadratic transaction costs incurred by
jumps. However it has been shown in Gatheral et al. [2012] that the optimal strategy
X∗ ∈ Xdet(x, [0, T ]) with x 6= 0 must have jumps at t = 0 and t = T in case θ = 0. These
two conflicting situations lead to the nonexistence of optimal strategy.
Chapter 4
Outlook
In this thesis, we combine market impact models and Nash equilibria to analyze the
competing behavior of two or more large traders in a financial market. In Chapter 2
we consider n risk-averse agents who compete for liquidity in an Almgren–Chriss market
impact model. In Chapter 3 motivated by the observation that high-frequency traders
may use oscillatory trading strategies, we propose quadratic transaction costs in order
to make the market more stable and efficient. Moreover, we extend this model in three
aspects and introduce a continuous-time version of the model.
Possible further research could be carried out based on the two main concepts of this
thesis. From the side of market impact models, we assume in Chapter 2 that the unaffected
price process follows a Bachelier model. A more general assumption, such as martingale or
even semi-martingale, is expected. Schied [2011] analyzes robust optimal strategies in the
Almgren–Chriss framework for a single trader. This work provides a basis to study Nash
equilibria for two or more traders when the unaffected price process is defined in a broader
class. Note that one difficulty may be the deviation of the optimal value function. In
Chapter 3 we analyze the effects of quadratic transaction costs. It is plausible to consider
transaction costs which are proportional to the size of trades. A technical problem is to
deal with absolute value, since transaction costs can be regarded as a nonnegative penalty.
This kind of problem is related to the optimization with l1-regularization of the following
form
inf
X∈X
f(X) = C(X) + θ‖X‖1.
Such optimization problem is usually solved by numerical methods. Another open ques-
tion is the optimal closed-loop strategies in continuous-time models. As we state in
Chapter 3, the explicit formula of optimal strategies obtained by dynamic programming
is very complex. It is difficult to analyze its high-frequency limit directly. Moreover, in
Section 3.3 we show that optimal open-loop strategies exist only for θ = θ∗. Whether this
result still holds for closed-loop strategies is an interesting question.
On the other hand, there are also much possible further work with respect to Nash
equilibria. A main open question in this thesis is the uniqueness of Nash equilibria in the
class of adapted strategies under the model setting of Chapter 2. Moreover, as it is men-
tioned at the beginning of this thesis, Nash equilibrium is a concept for non-cooperative
game. In some cases, Nash equilibrium is not the “best” solution if cooperation is allowed.
A classical example is prisoner’s dilemma. Therefore, to consider an alternative optimality
for a cooperative game is desirable. We suggest Pareto optimality as one candidate.
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